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ABSTRACT 
Many people share the belief that the state can lend support to the arts and the natural 
environment for their cultural and aesthetic qualities. However, the question remains 
open as to what justifies this support. This question hinges on whether the state must be 
neutral in reference to judgment of values. The political anti-perfectionist positions of 
Rawls and Dworkin are inadequate to justify this kind of state support because the 
funding of art necessarily involves a judgment of value in two ways. First, the fact that 
the state funds any art requires that, in general, art is valuable. Second, determining 
which art to fund, since presumably the state cannot fund all art, requires making a value 
judgment about which art is worth funding. Thus, in order to justify art’s funding, a 
theory of the state must allow judgments of value. Even if we have a theory of the state 
that allows the state to act on judgments of value, this alone does not prove that art is the 
kind of thing that the state should support.  
 Why should the state care specifically about art? I argue that aesthetic experience 
is the most fundamental purpose of art and that aesthetic experience is a basic human 
good. The state exists for the common good of its citizens. Thus it has a vested interest in 
things that lead to the citizens’ well-being, like aesthetic experience. And this is what 
justifies the state in supporting the arts. To illustrate how this works on a practical level, I 
show how art is funded in the United States, while also pointing out ways that it could be 
funded differently depending on circumstances. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Aesthetic experience—the enjoyment of beauty and sublimity in art and nature—is 
valuable for people’s lives. From the simplest aspects of order in our homes to the more 
lofty experiences of fine art and natural beauty, the possibility of aesthetic experience 
serves in our lives as a reason for action. And its achievement ultimately contributes to 
our well-being. A recent example of the effects of aesthetic experience is seen in Rio de 
Janeiro slums (called favelas). Two artists who call themselves Haas&Hahn—their 
names are Jeroen Koolhaas and Dre Urhahn—painted, with help from the community 
(especially the youth), two large murals in Vila Cruzeiro, Brazil’s ‘most notorious slum’ 
between 2006 and 2008.1 Though there are other problems in the Brazilian slums besides 
the way they look, the impact of the paintings has changed the morale of the community. 
One reason is surely that the community takes pride in the fact that they have these 
murals in their community. But another reason seems to be that the painting radiates the 
community through its aesthetic qualities. This example illustrates that concern with the 
aesthetic can have practical importance for the well-being of a community. The above 
example might also illustrate a moral obligation. For example, if adding some color (not 
necessarily murals) increases a person’s or community’s well-being, then, all things 
considered, it ought to be done. Though I am not necessarily committed to the moral 
claim as it pertains to this example, I do think that the aesthetic aspect of our environment
                                                            
1 “Favela Painting,” accessed August 5, 2013, www.favelapainting.com. 
2  John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, ed. Erin Kelly (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2003), 
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 has an effect on our well-being, which does imply some kind of moral importance. But 
for this project, I am concerned primarily with the political importance of the aesthetic. 
 Even though aesthetic experience—which I define as the enjoyment of, for its 
own sake, aesthetic objects, which involve by definition the presence of the beautiful or 
sublime—is valuable for our lives, it is not always clear what role, if any, the state should 
play in promoting, protecting, advising, discouraging, or coercing things that could cause 
or hinder us from having valuable aesthetic experiences. It is not, after all, necessarily the 
state’s role to declare exactly which things should be appreciated. But should the state 
help to create an environment that encourages the creation and appreciation of art? Those 
in the liberal anti-perfectionist tradition have trouble with this question. For example, 
they have difficulties justifying state funding for the arts because they believe the state 
must refrain from making value judgments, which are necessary when selecting which art 
should be funded. 
 From the natural law tradition, I argue for a political perfectionist view that 
provides justification for the state to support persons, institutions, and organizations that 
create, exhibit, and educate about works of art. The reason is that aesthetic experience is a 
basic human good and the most fundamental purpose of art. The state exists to help its 
citizens move toward the common good, which includes creating the conditions for the 
citizenry to pursue the basic goods. Thus, the state is justified in supporting those goods 
that lead to human flourishing. 
 What follows is an explanation of how I will make my case that aesthetic 
experience is a basic human good that warrants protection and promotion by the state. I 
first present, in Chapter One, the views of John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin, who both 
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argue for a position known as political anti-perfectionism. This position claims that, 
though some ways of life might be better than others, the state cannot favor any way (or 
ways) of life when making policy. I have selected Rawls and Dworkin because they 
represent two distinct ways of framing a political anti-perfectionism. Rawls claims his 
view is not derived from any comprehensive doctrine (e.g. moral, or religious), while 
Dworkin says that his view is a continuation of liberal ethics. According to Rawls, if the 
state did favor a particular way of life or comprehensive doctrine of the good, then it 
would necessarily be treating some of its citizens unfairly. Dworkin tends to focus on the 
idea that the state would be acting disrespectfully toward some citizens (those not 
subscribing to the favored way of life), if it were not neutral among competing ways of 
life.  
 Rawls’ main concern is that the state would have to adopt a comprehensive 
conception of the good, either religious, philosophical, or moral, if political perfectionism 
is the guiding theory of the state. Rawls endorses a view of the state that is concerned 
primarily with the basic structure of society. The state cannot endorse any substantive 
conception of the good, but it can create the situation for its citizens to pursue whatever 
conception of the good they happen to desire, even ones that are known to be degrading. 
Rawls thinks that the state should only support people’s primary goods, including:2 (1) 
basic rights and liberties, like freedom of thought and liberty of conscience; (2) freedom 
of movement and free choice of occupation; (3) power and prerogatives of offices and 
positions; (4) income and wealth; and (5) the social bases of self-respect. These are the 
instrumental conditions necessary for people to pursue their own rational plan of life, 
                                                            
2  John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, ed. Erin Kelly (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2003), 
58-59. 
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and, according to Rawls, they do not require the state to adhere to any comprehensive 
doctrine of the good. 
 Dworkin’s main contention with perfectionism is that he believes it is not possible 
for someone’s life to be better unless that person makes his own choices about what he 
wants to do. Obviously, one way the state could hinder people’s choices is by coercion; 
in that they could try to force the citizens to behave a certain way. But even if we ignore 
this possibility, a weaker version still has similar problems, according to Dworkin. If a 
state simply limits the options of its citizens—allowing them to freely choose among 
these limited options—this is still problematic for Dworkin because it is not truly free 
choice. The state is not required to make every option available to their citizens, but they 
cannot forbid some options, while allowing others. If the state encourages or discourages 
certain ways of life, then it is being disrespectful, according to Dworkin, to those people 
who adhere to different ways of life. Dworkin allows that some ways of life are actually 
better than others, but it is not part of the state’s duties to favor those better ways of life.  
 Can an anti-perfectionist state support the arts? A common belief is that art is 
beneficial to society and human well-being. Because of this, many people believe that the 
state can and should support the arts and arts education, albeit to varying degrees. 
However, the political anti-perfectionist position has difficulties in theoretically justifying 
the funding of art, art education, or art museums. For example, the strongest argument for 
supporting the arts would seem to depend on the value of art; yet this goes against the 
anti-perfectionist prohibition of the state making value judgments. Still, rejecting anti-
perfectionism on the grounds that it does not allow the state to support the arts would be 
too hasty. I therefore will present other reasons for thinking that anti-perfectionism is 
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inadequate as an account of the state at the end of Chapter Two, after discussion the 
perfectionist views of Raz and Finnis. 
 Contrary to the anti-perfectionist position, political perfectionists argue that it is 
not possible for the state to be neutral among all competing ways of life and that trying to 
be neutral still ends up favoring some ways of life. Thus, we should try to find out what 
things the state should value, and allow the state to promote these things, albeit in a 
general fashion that allows for pluralism. I have chosen Raz and Finnis as my 
representative political perfectionists because Raz’s view is like a bridge from the liberal 
anti-perfectionists to my own view, which is closer to Finnis’ view. 
 Raz aligns himself, in some ways, with liberal philosophers like Rawls and 
Dworkin in his defense of the importance of autonomy and freedom, but he differs from 
them by taking a perfectionist stance. Raz believes that it is not always possible to be 
neutral. Sometimes the attempt to be neutral ends up favoring one group over another, 
perhaps indirectly. For instance, when the state acts neutrally, it can sometimes end up 
hurting those holding the minority position. Additionally, Raz claims that all attempts to 
endorse state neutrality end up failing by allowing some dominant conception of the 
good. For instance, he claims that Rawls endorses a liberal, individualistic conception of 
the good, which would mean it is not really neutral.3 
 Like Rawls and Dworkin, Raz believes that autonomy is intrinsically valuable. 
Unlike Rawls and Dworkin, Raz believes that the intrinsic value of autonomy is exercised 
only in the pursuit of the good. Trying to protect autonomy, anti-perfectionists oppose 
                                                            
3 This criticism was asserted originally by Thomas Nagel, “Rawls on Justice,” Philosophical Review 82, 
No. 2 (April, 1973): 228. And it is thought to be an implication of Rawls’ original position disallowing 
comprehensive doctrines that apply to all people. Rather, the each individual’s doctrine of the good is 
supreme, even though they do not know what it is under the veil of ignorance (which will be explained 
in the section on Rawls). 
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perfectionism because they fear that it leads to coercing citizens to follow the ‘good’ life 
endorsed by the state. However, Raz explains that not all versions of perfectionism 
require coercive action by the state. For instance, the state could merely encourage or 
discourage certain ways of life; they do not have to enforce them. Raz shows that 
perfectionism allows for a plurality of views. Part of Rawls’ motivation for endorsing 
anti-perfectionism is because he believes that a free society will inevitably lead to a 
reasonable pluralism, but Raz claims that even a perfectionist state can allow pluralism. 
So, the state has a responsibility to promote valuable ways of life but it does not force its 
citizens to pursue any particular one of these. 
 Finnis also finds the anti-perfectionist position to be incorrect. In fact, he claims 
that this position is self-stultifying. By claiming that each person is entitled to equality, 
fairness, and respect, the anti-perfectionists are advocating a particular conception of the 
good. Representing the natural law position, Finnis provides a different version of 
political perfectionism than Raz; Finnis endorses a natural law position with which I will 
align my own view. Even though Rawls maintains that a pluralistic state cannot subscribe 
to a comprehensive doctrine, Finnis’ theory is both comprehensive and pluralistic. Finnis 
does not think these notions are incompatible in a theory of the state. He claims there are 
seven basic human goods: life, knowledge, play, sociability (friendship), aesthetic 
experience, practical reasonableness, and ‘religion’. The basic goods are the first 
principles of practical reason and the fundamental reasons for which people act. They 
provide the foundations for a theory of morality, though the goods themselves are pre-
moral. But they also provide the foundations for political and legal philosophy, as they 
are the ultimate foundation for the notion of the common good. If the goods are common 
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to all people, then the goods provide the foundation for the possibility of a common 
pursuit of goods. The state exists for the political common good of its citizens, an 
ensemble of conditions that enables them to pursue the basic goods. Though I think Raz’s 
critique of anti-perfectionism is brilliant, I present reasons for preferring a natural law 
theory (closely linked with Finnis’ view) to Raz’s liberal perfectionist position. 
 I claim that aesthetic experience is a basic human good—a basic reason for 
action—as some in the natural law tradition have asserted. I describe the contributions of 
three philosophers—Kant, Dewey, and Beardsley—to theories of aesthetic experience. 
These three philosophers (along with Aquinas and some recent Thomists) are the most 
important for my theory of aesthetic experience. I take something from each of them for 
my view of aesthetic experience and its status as a basic good: disinterestedness (Kant), 
everydayness (Dewey), and functionalism (Beardsley). So, in Chapter Three, rather than 
presenting a history of aesthetic experience I show how these philosophers have 
contributed to the discussion in ways that get to the truth about the nature of aesthetic 
experience. 
 I begin with Kant because he sets up many of the terms of the debates in recent 
discussions of aesthetics. Kant, for example, presents his notion of disinterested 
pleasure—that judgments of taste are purely contemplative—which is still used by many 
philosophers when describing their approach to beauty. I prefer the term contemplation to 
disinterestedness, but I think Kant rightly claims that an aesthetic experience as such is 
purely contemplative. I also employ other concepts from Kant's aesthetics for my notion 
of aesthetic experience, such as the sublime, which seems to be an important yet often 
neglected aspect of aesthetic experience. 
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 I believe that aesthetic experience is important to some extent in people’s 
everyday lives. For this reason, I discuss Dewey's notion of aesthetic experience, which 
he explicitly tries to connect with everydayness. In fact, for Dewey, every experience 
contains an aesthetic quality to some degree. Though I do not fully endorse Dewey’s 
view, I maintain that aesthetic experience is important, to some degree, in our daily lives. 
Dewey’s contribution to my thinking is concerned with aesthetic experience’s status as a 
basic good more than with a theory of aesthetic experience in itself. 
 I then explain pertinent parts of the theory of Monroe Beardsley, who revived and 
defended the aesthetic functionalist tradition in the mid-1900s. Though Beardsley is 
lesser known in broader philosophical circles, his impact in the field of aesthetics is 
tremendous. Beardsley represents what is known as an aesthetic theory of art or aesthetic 
functionalism. These theories claim that the fundamental purpose of art is to provide the 
capacity for an aesthetic experience. Beardsley posits that there is one necessary 
condition for an aesthetic experience: object directedness. And he claims that three of the 
following four criteria must also be present: felt freedom, detached affect, active 
discovery, and wholeness. I endorse his idea that an aesthetic experience must have an 
object, but I also try to avoid being too fixated on the object by expounding on the 
activity of the beholder, which he seems to neglect. 
 Despite its importance to many philosophers, the concept of aesthetic experience, 
particularly as it relates to art, has been replaced more recently by the concept of 
interpretation by many in both the analytic and Continental traditions of philosophy. 
Following Richard Shusterman, I argue that since aesthetic experience is clearly 
important for our lives, the concept must also be important in aesthetics, even if we 
 9 
cannot achieve the level of precision that we would like. So, I develop the foundation for 
a theory of aesthetic experience. 
 In Chapter Four, I propose that an aesthetic experience is the enjoyment of, for its 
own sake, aesthetic objects, objects involving the presence of the beautiful or sublime. In 
developing my own view of aesthetic experience, I argue that ideas from Thomist 
philosophy (notably Jacques Maritain) can be used to enhance some of the claims 
developed by the previous philosophers—Kant, Dewey, and Beardsley. Aesthetic 
experience by definition—‘aesthetic’ implies the use of the senses—requires the presence 
of an object. In the previous chapter, object-directedness was listed as the only necessary 
condition in Beardsley’s notion of aesthetic experience. In order to have an aesthetic 
experience, an appropriate object must be present to one’s senses. What makes an object 
an appropriate object is its internal properties; it must possess the proper aesthetic 
properties, of which the two most important are beauty and the sublime. With this in 
mind, I adopt Beardsley’s term ‘aesthetic object’ because I think it is important for a 
theory of aesthetic experience to envelop both natural and artifactual objects.  
 An often overlooked aspect of aesthetic experience is the role of the beholder. An 
aesthetic experience does not just occur on unsuspecting passersby. The beholder must be 
actively engaged with the object. Jacques Maritain, a Thomist philosopher, applies the 
concept of knowledge by connaturality, which Aquinas applied to morality, to aesthetics, 
particularly the creative activity of the artist. I will extend Maritain’s use of connaturality 
to the beholder of works of art. Knowledge by connaturality—knowledge which is gained 
by habituation rather than speculation—provides a way of explaining the beholder’s role 
in the aesthetic experience and why some people will have lesser and greater experiences. 
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After explaining my account of aesthetic experience, I present reasons for thinking that 
aesthetic experience is the most fundamental purpose of art, as opposed to interpretation 
or knowledge. Now I return to the question of whether the state can and should support 
the arts. 
 I articulated a disagreement between the political anti-perfectionists (Rawls and 
Dworkin) and the political perfectionists (Raz and Finnis), concerning the possibility of 
state neutrality about different ways of life. I also raised a concern for the anti-
perfectionists that they cannot justify state support for the arts. Additionally, I have 
presented reasons for thinking that aesthetic experience is the most fundamental purpose 
of art. In Chapter Five, I will argue that aesthetic experience is a basic human good or 
reason for action. For example, people enjoy reading a book, decorating their homes, and 
traveling to other places to experience natural and artifactual objects. Even people living 
in undesirable circumstances turn to aesthetic experience for their well-being. Aesthetic 
experience is thus part of the common good in multiple ways: (a) it is good for everyone; 
and (b) it can be pursued together.  
 Still, aesthetic experience might not thereby be part of the political common good. 
So, in Chapter Five, I argue that aesthetic experience contributes to peace, one of two 
main aspects of the political common good (the other being justice). For Finnis, peace is 
not limited to the absence of discord, but it also includes the development of culture, 
including libraries, art museums, education, and so on. By protecting the common good, 
the state makes it possible for the citizens to pursue the basic goods, according to their 
rational plan of life. But the state also helps by encouraging some ways of life (or things 
of value) and discouraging other ways of life (or things that harm or degrade an 
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individual). The artifacts and natural objects that contribute to the citizens’ experience of 
the aesthetic make their lives better. And therefore, these aesthetic objects are justifiably 
promoted and protected by the state. Additionally, the community, as a unit, has more 
resources making it possible to pursue aesthetic experience individually or together in 
ways that would not be realizable as individuals. Thus, the state and its citizens have 
reason to encourage and help each other in the creation and appreciation of art and the 
preservation of natural beauty. 
 Those who argue against the funding of art (including art projects, museums, and 
education) usually claim that the state has more important things to worry about than art 
or that the state cannot make the necessary value judgment to support the arts.  However, 
if art provides the capacity for aesthetic experience, a basic good, then this objection does 
not seem to be strong enough to wholly reject the possibility of arts funding. The state 
has limitations and must make decisions about how to prioritize its spending. Sometimes 
(perhaps during a crisis), it might be necessary to spend less money on the arts, but this 
should not be confused with a rejection of arts funding altogether. 
 Generally, people seem to share the intuition that supporting art to some extent is 
an acceptable action of the state. Though I have claimed that anti-perfectionists cannot 
justify the state’s funding of art, Dworkin attempts to argue that the state, in fact, can 
fund art. Dworkin, however, is careful to avoid justifying state funding on the basis that 
beauty and aesthetic experience are intrinsically valuable for people because this would 
be a clear violation of his anti-perfectionist position. We often think of  ‘high art’ as the 
only thing that counts as art, but Dworkin thinks that there is a gradation of culture from 
high art to low art. These are not two different cultures. They comprise one culture with 
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two aspects that influence each other.  However, Dworkin fails to explain why a cultural 
structure is something valuable to maintain under the anti-perfectionist scheme.  
 Even if we think that the state is allowed to fund art, some might think there are 
aesthetic reasons for the state not to do so. Noël Carroll argues against the funding of art 
partly on aesthetic grounds. Carroll worries that allowing the government to fund art will 
give the government too much control over what art gets made. Though his point might 
be valid if the state only funds new art, it should be noted that funding new artistic 
experiments might not always be the best use of the state’s money. Though if the state 
can fund any art, then it should be allowed to fund at least some new art. To avoid 
Carroll’s concerns, one might claim that the state could encourage the production and 
appreciation of all art, but that the state should only fund art indirectly by funding 
museums. In other words, it might be better for the state to fund works that have already 
been declared great by the community. However, I will explain how with certain 
prerequisites the state can fund new artistic endeavors along with the funding of 
museums and arts education. 
 Though I have used the practical idea of arts funding to motivate this dissertation 
project, it is not the most fundamental aspect. My goal is to show that aesthetic 
experience is indeed valuable for our lives, and the state should consider this fact, among 
others, when making policy. Though I am arguing that the state should protect and 
promote those things that have the capacity for aesthetic experience, I do not believe my 
ideas only impact the state. So, I am interested in the intellectual foundations of an issue 
that is of practical significance to legislators, artists, and the community.
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CHAPTER 1 
THE POLITICAL ANTI-PERFECTIONISMS OF RAWLS AND DWORKIN 
 
Introduction 
People have a right to liberty, to freely choose their plan of life. This means that the state 
ought not to coerce people to believe, think, or act in a particular way, even when it is 
thought to be good for the citizens. If the state is allowed to endorse certain ways of life 
or values, then the fear is that the state would eventually harm those who practice other 
ways of life not encouraged by the state. Or at the very least, the state would be 
disrespecting or treating unfairly those citizens that adhere to the ways of life that are not 
endorsed by the state. For example, if the state fully advocates a Christian way of life, 
then all non-Christians, it is thought, will be treated unfairly in some sense. So, political 
anti-perfectionists claim that the state must be neutral in reference to competing ways of 
life in order to respect their citizens and maintain fairness. But if one accepts this view of 
the state, then a problem seems to arise for the arts. Many people seem to think that the 
state, to differing degrees, should be able to support the arts through funding and 
education. However, if the state must remain neutral to (or not act on) judgments of 
value, then it seems that the state cannot support art because such support requires 
making a value judgment about the goodness of some works of art. 
 John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin are two prominent anti-perfectionists, and I will 
present their views in this chapter, explaining the core elements of their political theories.
14 
 More specifically, I will explain their objections to perfectionism, and then I will present 
their theories of the role of the state—that it must be neutral toward differing substantive 
conceptions of the good—to  show how they avoid the pitfalls that they find in 
perfectionism. They advocate anti-perfectionism because they believe that a lack of state 
neutrality among differing ways of life will lead to the unfair or disrespectful treatment of 
some of the citizens of the state. 
 
John Rawls 
John Rawls derives his political anti-perfectionist position from his belief that his two 
principles of justice would be chosen in what he calls the original position—Rawls’ 
hypothetical situation where parties select principles of justice without knowing their 
own conception of the good—because they are chosen through public reason. The 
fundamental organizing idea of Rawls’ political theory (justice as fairness) is that of 
“society as a fair system of cooperation over time, from one generation to the next.”4 
Rawls wants to preserve stability in society, and he thinks that the basic structure of that 
society must be free from any particular comprehensive doctrine. Steve Sheppard 
describes Rawls’ anti-perfectionism in the following manner, “the state should not 
enshrine a single comprehensive view of the person and require individual conformity to 
it.”5 And this is one reason why Rawls uses the original position; it models a fair social 
choice. The parties make a decision without the intrusion of their own bias. Even though 
people making real political decisions cannot forget their own view of the good, they 
should decide, in a sense, as if they were covered with a veil of ignorance. Since the 
                                                            
4 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, expanded ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 15. 
5Steve Sheppard, “The Perfectionisms of John Rawls,” Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 11, 
No. 2 (July 1998): 415. 
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parties in the original position are prevented from knowing their own values, Rawls 
concludes that the two principles of justice are fair—the two principles do not support 
any comprehensive doctrine of the good. Rawls not only supports anti-perfectionism in 
the realm of government, but he also endorses an anti-perfectionist stance in the realm of 
public discourse among citizens, which he calls public reason and is integral to his anti-
perfectionism. When deliberating about a given topic or certain matters, Rawls maintains 
that people should rely only on reasons that everyone could reasonably accept. The 
notion of public reason will guide my explanation of Rawls’ political philosophy. Even 
though the term ‘public reason’ does not appear until his later work, I maintain that the 
basic idea was present in A Theory of Justice as a motivation for the original position.6 In 
this first section, I will present Rawls’ account and critique of perfectionism. Then, I will 
explain his approach to anti-perfectionism in A Theory of Justice, followed by his more 
developed account of public reason from Political Liberalism.  
 
Explanation of Perfectionism 
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls presents two variants of perfectionism: strict and moderate 
(intuitionist). He then argues that both fail. Overall, his main contention with 
perfectionism is that the state should not adhere to a comprehensive doctrine of the good, 
whether religious, philosophical, or moral. As Arneson writes, “Rawls sees perfectionism 
as the enemy of the liberty and autonomy that are the birthright of all individuals in a just 
and liberal society.”7 Thus, Rawls contends that the state must remain neutral toward 
                                                            
6 In A Theory of Justice, Rawls uses the term ‘publicity’, which provides the foundations for his notion of 
public reason. See also, Charles Larmore, “Public Reason,” in The Cambridge Companion to Rawls, ed. 
Samuel Freeman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 368-393. 
7 Richard Arneson, “Perfectionism and Politics,” Ethics 111, No. 1 (Oct 2000): 38. 
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various comprehensive doctrines; otherwise, the state will necessarily end up treating 
some people unfairly. 
 Strict perfectionism claims that there is only one principle by which society 
should be directed: “to arrange institutions and to define the duties and obligations of 
individuals so as to maximize the achievement of human excellence in art, science, and 
culture.”8 Only a minority of individuals—geniuses—makes significant contributions to 
the betterment of society; it is for these individuals that the rest of society exists to 
promote. As Rawls succinctly describes, “We give value to our lives by working for the 
good of the highest specimens.”9 Nietzsche is credited with advocating this strict variant 
of perfectionism, giving “unusual” weight to men like Goethe and Socrates. To sum up 
this variant, the whole of society exists to enable these geniuses to flourish in their 
endeavors; by doing so, all members of the society achieve value. 
 A more moderate version of perfectionism claims that the principle of perfection 
is balanced against other principles by intuition; thus, it is called intuitionist 
perfectionism. This version is more flexible than the previous. As Rawls explains, “The 
extent to which such a view is perfectionist depends, then, upon the weight given to the 
claims of excellence and culture.”10 To illustrate this comment Rawls provides two 
examples. First, it could be maintained that in ancient Greek society the achievements in 
art, science, and philosophy justified (or even required) the practice of slavery. This 
society maintains a higher level of perfectionism. The principle of perfection, therefore, 
overrides other intuitions, such as liberty or equality. Second, the principle of perfection 
in another society might simply limit the “redistribution of wealth and income under a 
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constitutional regime.”11 This society allows only that the principle of perfection be used 
to secure balance, not as a force to demand cultural progress. But the principle allows that 
the greater good of the less fortunate may be helped if the only ones hurt are the more 
fortunate; ceteris paribus, helping the less fortunate does not warrant reducing the 
resources necessary for maintaining cultural values, whatever those values happen to be 
in a given society. The state should always have a certain amount of resources set aside 
for the preservation of these values, except when they conflict with the basic needs of 
citizens. Due to its more moderate approach and its wider range of interpretation, 
intuitionist perfectionism is far more reasonable, according to Rawls, than strict 
perfectionism.  
 Prior to critiquing the principle of perfection, Rawls comments on the relation 
between the principles of justice, which will be discussed below, and the two teleological 
theories (utilitarianism and perfectionism). Normally, Rawls categorizes utilitarianism 
and perfectionism together because they are teleological theories; however, here he notes 
one similarity between perfectionism and the principles of justice that utilitarianism does 
not share. Both perfectionism and the principles of justice are ideal-regarding principles, 
while utilitarianism consists of want-regarding principles. Rawls defines ideal-regarding 
principles only as contrary to want-regarding principles. He writes, “they do not take as 
the only relevant features the overall amount of want-satisfaction and the way it is 
distributed among persons.”12 Moreover, he notes, “[Ideal-regarding principles] do not 
abstract from the aims of desires and hold that satisfactions are of equal value when they 
are equally intense and pleasurable (the meaning of Bentham’s remark that, other things 
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equal, pushpin is as good as poetry).”13 The principles of justice require more than simply 
multiplying the satisfaction of desires; the principles encourage the citizens to gain 
character, especially a sense of justice.”14 The main difference, in this context, between 
perfectionism and the principles of justice is that the principles do not adhere to a prior 
notion of human excellence, which usually relies on some metaphysical account of 
human personhood. Thus, Rawls claims that the ideal of the person is purely political. 
 
Critique of Perfectionism 
Perfectionism, according to Rawls, must subscribe to a comprehensive doctrine of the 
good, and he seems to think that this comprehensive doctrine cannot allow for pluralism. 
The state, in his opinion, should not favor any one comprehensive doctrine to ensure that 
each person is treated equally. Peter De Marneffe describes Rawls’ position as follows, 
“According to the principle of justificatory neutrality [which is Rawls’ position], in 
contrast [to the legislative neutrality of Dworkin], the government ought to act in 
accordance with a system of principles that can be justified without reference to any 
particular conception of how it is best for people to live.”15 Moreover, for any action or 
policy, the state must be able to provide reasons that any person could accept. Rawls 
believes that reasonable pluralism is a natural outcome of a democratic society, and any 
theory of the state needs to account for this pluralism. For example, Rawls refers to the 
Reformation as making the way for people to choose other religions beside Catholicism 
and even other forms of Christianity; thus, now a political theory must consider religious 
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pluralism in a way that was unnecessary prior to the Reformation.16 So, we can now turn 
to Rawls’ criticisms of the two variants of perfectionism. 
 Turning to strict perfectionism, it is clear that if the principle of perfection is the 
only principle by which a society should be governed, then a standard by which to 
measure (and rank) various activities must exist. In other words, society ought to exist to 
promote the achievements of the highest specimens, but a standard is required to 
demarcate the highest specimens (and their achievements) from everyone else. It might 
seem possible to differentiate the highest and lowest specimens, but it seems implausible 
that we could differentiate the highest from the second highest and third highest without a 
fine-tuned standard of measurement. Even more problematic, Rawls thinks that persons 
in the original position will not have access to their conception of the good, though they 
are aware that they will have certain commitments. It is possible that one person’s notion 
of the highest specimen is another person’s notion of the lowest. The parties in the 
original position (behind the veil of ignorance) cannot subscribe to any particular 
standard of the good without potentially injuring themselves. In other words, prudence 
seems to be the reason for rejecting perfectionism. Rawls describes, “They cannot risk 
their freedom by authorizing a standard of value to define what is to be maximized by a 
teleological principle of justice.”17 Rejecting the standard, Rawls thinks, is rejecting the 
strict perfectionist position, especially when one accepts the principle of equal liberty 
(which will be explained below). 
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 Rawls is careful to note that he has not “contended that the criteria of excellence 
lack a rational basis from the standpoint of everyday life.”18 It is quite obvious, believes 
Rawls, that some people possess superior skill over others in terms of their work in art or 
science. That there are standards of excellence, at least in cultural contexts, is not a 
problem for Rawls. But people must not have access to them in the original position to 
prevent the principles of justice from favoring some ways of life over others. People have 
different aims in life. If people wanted to adopt the principle of perfection, then they 
would have to subscribe to a notion of natural (and, therefore, universal) duty prior to 
their own (individual) notion of the good. Since people have different aims, there cannot 
be one standard to which all people will agree.  
 Turning toward intuitionist perfectionism, Rawls notes that this form of 
perfectionism is more plausible and “not easy to argue against.”19 Even though the 
principle of perfection in this view is balanced by other principles, all of these principles 
still need to be chosen. And Rawls claims that “there is as before no basis for 
acknowledging a principle of perfection as a standard of social justice.”20 Principles of 
perfection might be acceptable within certain communities, but they are not broad enough 
to be political principles. Rawls writes, “Justice as fairness requires us to show that 
modes of conduct interfere with the basic liberties of others or else violate some 
obligation or natural duty before they can be restricted.”21 Hence, Rawls claims that 
appeal to perfectionist principles often sounds ad hoc. For example, when a reasonable 
case against certain kinds of sexual behavior cannot be made in terms of the principles of 
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justice, then people will appeal to ideas that these behaviors are degrading to the 
individual and should be restricted on this basis alone. Rawls fears that this kind of 
reasoning results from personal preference and the sort of differences that are banned in 
the original position. To put it differently, Rawls thinks that in these cases people will 
rely on reasons coming from their own comprehensive doctrine, rather than public 
reason. So, even the more plausible intuitionist perfectionism is still not a feasible 
foundation for social justice.  
 
Original Position and the Veil of Ignorance 
Rawls does not accept teleological principles of justice, so it needs to be shown how 
Rawls thinks he avoids the dilemmas posed by these kinds of principles. We cannot 
assume that persons all share common aims, since experience shows that people act from 
very different comprehensive doctrines of the good. So, Rawls believes that principles of 
justice must not favor any of these comprehensive doctrines of the good over others. The 
original position represents a pure procedure that yields a procedural justice, as opposed 
to a “substantive justice governed by shared presuppositions concerning the common 
good.”22 The principles of justice, according to Rawls, must be such that people from any 
comprehensive doctrine could accept them. Rawls writes, “This explains the propriety of 
the name ‘justice as fairness’: it conveys the idea that the principles of justice are agreed 
to in an initial situation that is fair.”23 So, Rawls, as a contract theorist, claims that in the 
original position (a fair situation) the parties would choose his two principles of justice. 
Unlike others in the contract tradition, Rawls makes explicit that the contract in his 
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original position is merely hypothetical. In fact, some, like Dworkin, have criticized his 
use of the contract metaphor as an irrelevant notion adding nothing of substance to his 
argument. In other words, if there is reason to think people would choose the two 
principles in the original position, then there is some other reason to choose them besides 
just being in the original position.24 Admitting some skepticism about the contract 
metaphor, Larmore writes, “The contractarian metaphor, however dispensable, has then 
the merit of combining in a single image two essential conditions that the principles of 
justice should satisfy—their justifiability to reason and their publicity.”25 In Theory, the 
notion of publicity provides the starting point for Rawls’ later idea of public reason. 
Rawls constructs his hypothetical situation, famously called the original position, that 
encourages people to form a fair contract. Borrowing concepts from game theory, Rawls’ 
original position does not allow the parties to know their own conception of the good, so 
that the ‘contract’ cannot be designed to give anyone an advantage. Suppose that Walter 
wants to sell his car to Maude. In this situation, they each have something to gain due to 
their respective positions in the sale contract. Walter will try to get more money, and 
Maude will try to pay less. What if these two do not know who is buying and who is 
selling the car? If neither Walter nor Maude know which position they hold in the 
contract, then they will construct, assuming they are rational, a fair contract. In other 
words, once they find out who is the buyer and seller, neither one will be disadvantaged. 
This is the basic idea behind the veil of ignorance in the original position. The parties in 
Rawls’ hypothetical situation do not know what sex, religion, or ethnicity they will be 
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once the veil is removed, so it would be irrational to favor one religion (or sex or 
ethnicity) in the contract because it might injure you once the veil is removed.  
 The original position is carefully constructed to avoid favoring one 
comprehensive doctrine of the good over another. If the parties do not know what 
doctrine of the good they will hold, then, claims Rawls, they (since they are rational) will 
create a contract that is neutral among the various doctrines of the good.26 The parties in 
the original position are forced to practice the cooperative virtues of public reason and 
reciprocity.27 They cannot try to manipulate the situation to their own end, if they do not 
know what their end is. Rawls believes that the original position is the fairest starting 
point to construct a theory of justice because it relies on public reason. For example, if 
most people in a society are atheists, then the statutes of that society might tend to favor 
atheism and discourage (or even hinder) all forms of religion. From the starting point of 
fairness in the original position, Rawls claims that his two principles of justice are the 
most reasonable view of justice for people to accept. 
 
The Two Principles of Justice 
Rawls places his two principles of justice alongside some traditional theories, including 
utilitarianism (which is his main target), perfectionism, intuitionism, and egoism. In the 
original position, Rawls firmly believes that the two principles of justice are the most 
reasonable position to select because they rely on public reason. It should be noted that 
Rawls does not use the term public reason in his explanation of the original position in A 
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Theory of Justice; however, he discusses public reason in the context of the original 
position in Justice as Fairness: A Restatement.28 Because people in the original position 
have no choice but to use public reason—it is rational for them to use reasons that anyone 
could accept because they do not know what their idea of the good will be—Rawls 
believes that the two principles will be chosen. The original position is a selection device 
for the parties to choose their principles of justice; they do this by comparing all of the 
various options two by two. And Rawls thinks that his two principles will emerge as the 
best option for the parties to select. For present purposes, I am not going to discuss 
Rawls’ rejection of any of the positions (aside from the previous discussion of 
perfectionism). I will focus on explaining why Rawls thinks the two principles would be 
chosen and what results from this choice. 
 Here is a statement of the two principles of justice from A Theory of Justice:29 
First: each person is to have an equal right to the most 
extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a 
similar scheme of liberties for others. 
Second: social and economic inequalities are to be 
arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be 
to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to positions and 
offices open to all. 
 
These principles, claims Rawls, would be chosen in the original position, which provides 
grounds for believing them to be the most reasonable. The two principles do not apply to 
everything in a society. For example, they do not apply to the inner workings of a 
religious organization. “These principles primarily apply, as I have said, to the basic 
structure of society and govern the assignment of rights and duties and regulate the 
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distribution of social and economic advantages.”30 The reason they apply to the basic 
structure is to help ensure stability and cooperation in a society over time. Just like a 
strong foundation is necessary for the stability of a building, Rawls thinks that a society’s 
basic structure must also be strong to ensure a well-ordered society. More specifically, 
the first principle applies to the basic liberties: political liberty (right to vote and hold 
office), freedom of speech and assembly, liberty of conscience and freedom of thought, 
freedom of the person (freedom from oppression), and the right to hold property. And the 
second principle applies “to the distribution of income and wealth and to the design of 
organizations that make use of differences in authority and responsibility.”31 It is not 
necessary that the distribution of wealth is equal, but the unequal distribution must 
benefit everyone. A last general remark must be made about the principles; the order 
matters. The first principle must be prior to the second principle. The basic liberties 
protect citizens from being exploited, say, for economic gain. The first principle, in other 
words, is necessary to justify the second principle. 
 Why does Rawls believe that these principles of justice as fairness are superior to 
all other principles or theories? Part of why he calls these principles justice as fairness is 
because he believes they are the most fair principles that one can choose when ignorant 
about one’s conception of the good. If one is hindered, by the veil of ignorance, from 
knowing one’s conception of the good, then it would be foolish for someone to accept a 
principle of justice that advocated a particular way of life. Once the veil is lifted, one 
might discover that he shot himself in the foot because he endorses a different way of 
life. The presence of the veil forces these rational members of the original position to rely 
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on public reason when picking their principles of justice. In other words, the two 
principles of justice are purely instrumental, meaning the primary goods protected by the 
principles are beneficial to anyone, regardless of what that person wants to do or what 
conception of the good he holds. Because the people in the original position have to rely 
on public reason, their choice will be fair.  
 
Political Liberalism 
Pluralism is a natural condition of people living in a free society together. The only way 
for pluralism to be defeated is through an oppressive use of power. This abuse of power, 
however, leads to an unstable society because, eventually, the oppressed people will try 
to overcome their oppressors. Rawls believes that his notion of stability must be revised, 
which is what he set out to do in Political Liberalism. The notion of stability as presented 
in A Theory of Justice is considered by Rawls to be unrealistic.  Toward this end, Rawls 
introduces two main concepts: reasonable pluralism and overlapping consensus.  
 In a non-oppressive society, reasonable pluralism will develop naturally because 
the citizens will possess (or develop) differing conceptions of the good or different aims. 
Rawls stresses that democratic societies will have reasonable pluralism and not just 
pluralism. Rawls explains, “It is the fact that free institutions tend to generate not simply 
a variety of doctrines and views, as one might expect from peoples’ various interests and 
their tendency to focus on narrow points of view. Rather, it is the fact that among the 
views that develop are a diversity of reasonable comprehensive doctrines.”32 If it were the 
case that only one reasonable doctrine existed, then Rawls might claim that this one 
doctrine should be the guiding force of justice. However, multiple reasonable doctrines 
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exist, and the state must not favor any one of them. It is possible that some unreasonable 
doctrines will exist, but this is not Rawls’ concern. The main focus is that there are a 
plurality of reasonable doctrines. It might even be true that one of these doctrines is, in 
fact, the truth. But since humans do not possess perfect knowledge, we are only able to 
subscribe to what is reasonable. Many diverse viewpoints can certainly fit under the 
category of reasonable, and the state must be neutral toward these doctrines. 
 How can people holding to such different yet reasonable doctrines maintain a 
stable existence in the same society? Rawls’ answer to this problem is known as 
overlapping consensus. The main idea behind an overlapping consensus is that the 
citizens support the same policies (or laws) for different reasons. For example, an atheist, 
a Muslim, and a Christian might support the same law for entirely different reasons, 
internal to their respective systems of belief. The goal of an overlapping consensus is to 
find a political conception of justice that can be supported by all people from within their 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines, like the overlapping areas of a Venn diagram. Two 
things make an overlapping consensus possible. First, the existence of reasonable 
pluralism, as discussed above, requires some kind of agreement that allows all these 
doctrines to live together peacefully. Second, the political conception of justice as 
fairness does not rely on any one comprehensive doctrine for its foundation.  
 An important objection that Rawls answers is why an overlapping consensus is 
not a mere modus vivendi. Rawls writes, “A typical use of the phrase ‘modus vivendi’ is 
to characterize a treaty between two states whose national aims and interests put them at 
odds.”33 When negotiating a treaty, these two states should try to find a balance (or 
equilibrium) between their respective aims. Rawls explains, “That is, that the terms and 
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conditions of the treaty are drawn up in such a way that it is public knowledge that it is 
not advantageous for either state to violate it.”34 As long as conditions do not change, this 
arrangement should work. But as soon as one of the states becomes more powerful, that 
state will push their aims to the forefront to the detriment of the other, now weaker, state. 
So, a modus vivendi is essentially a temporary agreement. 
 So, why isn’t an overlapping consensus simply another form of modus vivendi? 
Rawls presents a ‘model case’, which he uses to illustrate that an overlapping consensus 
is something different from a modus vivendi. The model case consists of three views:35 
(1) the first view affirms a political principle of toleration and liberty due to its religious 
doctrine; (2) the second adheres to a comprehensive moral doctrine in the spirit of Kant 
and Mill; (3) the third is not ‘systematically unified’; it contains both the political 
conception of justice and many nonpolitical values. The first and second views are both 
comprehensive and general. The third one is partially comprehensive but maintains that 
political values surpass nonpolitical values. So, all three views overlap in reference to the 
political conception, and, Rawls believes, that they will all lead to approximately the 
same fundamental political judgments. The important difference between the overlapping 
consensus model and a true modus vivendi is that each of the three views (in the model 
case) are based on moral conceptions. They do not arrive at their consensus simply 
because all of them accept the same authority or institutional arrangements. Thus, 
advocates of each view reach consensus from within their own comprehensive doctrine.36 
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Public Reason 
A potential problem for Rawls is why we should think that the overlapping consensus of 
reasonable doctrines will yield similar political judgments. Rawls develops his notion of 
public reason around two virtues: respect and reciprocity. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls 
focused his anti-perfectionism on the basic institutions of society. In Political Liberalism, 
he claims that when presenting reasons in a public forum citizens should justify their 
positions only using reasons that anyone could accept. Rawls writes, “Public justification 
is not simply valid reasoning, but argument addressed to others: it proceeds correctly 
from premises we accept to conclusions we think they could also reasonably accept.”37 
This is the duty of civility, according to Rawls. Everyone should be allowed to argue for 
their opinion on a given topic, but they must argue from reasonable premises that others 
could accept. Rawls believes that a criterion of reciprocity is at play here; by arguing 
from one’s comprehensive doctrine, one is violating that reciprocity.38  
 What exactly is public reason, according to Rawls? I will begin by mentioning the 
five aspects of public reason as listed by Rawls:39 
(1) the fundamental political questions to which it applies; 
(2) the persons to whom it applies (government officials 
and candidates for public office); (3) its content as given by 
a family of reasonable political conceptions of justice; (4) 
the application of these conceptions in discussions of 
coercive norms to be enacted in the form of legitimate law 
for a democratic people; and (5) citizens’ checking that the 
principles derived from their conceptions of justice satisfy 
the criterion of reciprocity. 
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Rawls discusses these aspects in two groups: the first two aspects and the last three. 
Public reason does not apply to every discussion of fundamental political question; it 
applies only to the “discussions of those questions in what I refer to as the public political 
forum.” 40 Rawls claims that there is no “settled meaning” of the term forum in this 
context. But to set up some parameters, he divides this forum into three parts: discourse 
of judges, discourse of government officials, and discourse of candidates for public 
office.41 Public reason applies differently to each of these parts. For example, public 
reason applies more strictly to judges than to others. Rawls distinguishes the above three-
fold division from what he calls the background culture, which is another context for 
applying public reason. 
 The belief that public reason should be employed in the public political forum, as 
Rawls defines it, might seem reasonable. But Rawls pushes the notion of public reason 
further by applying it to the culture of civil society. Toward making his case, Rawls 
describes what he calls the ideal of public reason, which is distinct from the idea of 
public reason. Rawls writes,  
This ideal is realized, or satisfied, whenever judges, 
legislators, chief executives, and other government 
officials, as well as candidates for public office, act from 
and follow the idea of public reason and explain their 
reasons for supporting fundamental political positions in 
terms of the political conception of justice they regard as 
the most reasonable. Hence, whether judges, legislators, 
and chief executives act from and follow public reason is 
continually shown in their speech and conduct on a daily 
basis.42 
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But, Rawls asks, how is this ideal realized by normal citizens? Even though government 
officials receive votes from people who typically agree with them on many things, the 
elected officials are supposed to represent everyone (in their district or state). This fact is 
why they need to exercise public reason; they need to be able to justify their positions on 
reasons that others should be able to accept. However, citizens are not elected officials; it 
might appear that they do not have the same responsibility to employ public reason. This 
belief about citizens seems reasonable at first glance, but Rawls claims that citizens do 
have the same responsibility, in certain contexts. He writes, “We say that ideally citizens 
are to think of themselves as if they were legislators and ask themselves what statutes, 
supported by what reasons satisfying the criterion of reciprocity, they would think it most 
reasonable to enact.”43 It is a moral duty for citizens to hold their elected officials to the 
duty of civility and the idea of public reason. They do this, in part, by exemplifying the 
idea of public reason (and the duty of civility) in their public deliberations, acting in the 
ideal of public reason. The citizens should encourage their leaders to use civility and 
public reason, but they should also employ these moral virtues in their own public 
political forums. 
 We can now turn to the last three aspects of public reason. Two features of 
democratic citizenship play an important role in this discussion: it is a relationship of 
citizens in the basic structure, which we enter by birth and exit by death; and it is a 
relation of free and equal citizens “who exercise ultimate political power as a collective 
body.”44 Citizens, as stated above, should employ the idea of public reason and the duty 
of civility. But, here, Rawls presents another notion called the criterion of reciprocity. 
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“[This] requires that when those terms are proposed as the most reasonable terms of fair 
cooperation, those proposing them must also think it at least reasonable for others to 
accept them, as free and equal citizens, and not as dominated or manipulated, or under the 
pressure of an inferior political or social position.”45 The criterion of reciprocity grounds 
the idea of political legitimacy, for Rawls. Citizens should propose reasons for their 
views of political justice that anyone could reasonably accept from within their own 
comprehensive doctrines. In other words, political actions are legitimate when the 
citizens can accept the reasons behind the action, even if they still have disagreements 
with the act itself; employing public reason is a necessary requirement for political 
legitimacy. So, in these three aspects of public reason, we have citizens sharing in a 
family of reasonable political conceptions of justice. The reasonable pluralism of this 
collective body means that they will not all share the exact same view of basic justice, but 
there will be some overlap. Also, they will apply these conceptions (public reason and the 
duty of civility) in their deliberations and decisions to create legitimate law. Lastly, 
citizens will ensure that principles that are derived from their respective conceptions 
adhere to the criterion of reciprocity. If not, they should be adjusted (or discarded) so that 
they satisfy the criterion of reciprocity. So, public reason is present in the original 
position when the parties select the principles of justice, in the workings or deliberations 
of the state, and in political discussions among citizens. 
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Ronald Dworkin 
Dworkin’s Critique of Perfectionism 
Dworkin, like Rawls, believes that some ways of life are truly better than others, but that 
it is not the state’s place to promote any way(s) of life over others. Dworkin maintains 
this position for at least two main reasons: (1) by favoring some way(s) of life, the state 
would necessarily be treating some people unequally, hence disrespectfully, namely those 
who hold a contrary way of life; (2) furthermore, Dworkin believes that it is not possible 
for someone’s life to be better if that person is forced to conform to the way(s) of life 
advocated by the state. In what follows, I will explain Dworkin’s arguments for these two 
positions. 
 The general belief that the state should treat every citizen equally is probably not 
very contentious. However, it is when we begin to parse out what ‘treating citizens 
equally’ includes and excludes that it can become contentious. It should be noted that 
there is a difference between treating people as equals and treating them equally. 
Dworkin endorses treating people as equals, which follows from the Kantian admonition 
to treat people as ends and not only means.46 And this begins by treating citizens with 
respect. This is not necessarily a respect for someone’s belief, but it is a respect for 
persons.47 However, this respect for persons translates into a kind of respect for belief. 
Dworkin writes, “political decisions must be, as far as possible, independent of any 
particular conception of the good life or of what gives value to life.”48 Dworkin’s position 
could be put in the form of a conditional: if the state favors (or promotes) some ways of 
life over others, then the state will necessarily treat unequally those citizens who adhere 
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to the contrary ways of life. Someone might object to the idea that the state will 
necessarily treat its citizens unequally in this situation. For example, if we liken the state 
to a family, we can see this very clearly. Parents will clearly favor some ways of life over 
others; for example, they might favor a strict notion of healthiness over non-healthiness. 
So, these parents might not allow their children to eat much (if any) fast food and ‘junk’ 
food, even though their children might really want to eat all manner of unhealthy food. 
Moreover, these parents might even encourage their kids to exercise, rather than watching 
TV all day long. But we would not automatically think that parents who encourage health 
in their children are treating their children unequally just because some of their children 
want to eat ‘junk’ food and watch TV all day. In other words, the parents are not favoring 
those children that actually want to eat healthy food and exercise. So, the objection might 
go, it does not seem necessary that the state would treat its citizens unequally just by 
encouraging some ways of life over others. 
 Dworkin might initially respond by saying that he never said that the state would 
necessarily treat its citizens unequally. But the objector could then respond by claiming 
that the problem is not very daunting. If there is a way for the state to encourage some 
ways of life and not treat its citizens unequally, then it seems on the surface that this 
would be the best state of affairs in light of the fact that Dworkin has already admitted 
that some ways of life are truly better than others. But Dworkin seems to deny any 
possibility that the state could treat its citizens equally, if it favors some ways of life. And 
this lack of possibility is the core motivation of his anti-perfectionism. The state must 
treat its citizens as equals. Steven Wall writes, “Even if a government has good reason to 
impose a sacrifice or constraint on its citizens, if they could not accept this action without 
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losing their sense of equal worth, then the government should not undertake the action.”49 
If it cannot both treat them equally and favor ways of life, then it cannot favor ways of 
life because the state must treat citizens equally. More importantly, Dworkin believes that 
it is disrespectful to treat some citizens as if their favored conception of the good is false.  
 In a seminal article called “Liberalism,” Dworkin spells out his position more 
carefully. He begins with two views of what it means to treat citizens equally.50 The first, 
and liberal response, claims that the state must be neutral concerning what might count as 
the good life. The second, like the example of the parents above, claims that a state 
cannot treat its citizens equally without having a conception about what people should do 
and avoid doing. In showing Dworkin’s account of the first option, it will become 
apparent why he rejects the second option. Dworkin begins by supposing a liberal is 
asked to found a new state; this liberal needs to write a constitution and establish the 
major institutions of this new state.51 “He will arrive initially at something like this 
principle of rough equality: resources and opportunities should be distributed, so far as 
possible, equally, so that roughly the same share of whatever is available is devoted to 
satisfying the ambitions of each.”52 What about the disparity of people’s tastes? For 
example, some people prefer cheap beer, while others prefer expensive champagne. So, if 
everyone is given the same share of resources, then those who have more expensive 
tastes will be at a disadvantage in satisfying their desires and making their lives good. 
Dworkin responds to this anticipated objection by writing, “But the liberal may reply that 
tastes as to which people differ are, by and large, not afflictions, like diseases, but are 
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rather cultivated, in accordance with each person’s theory of what his life should be 
like.”53 So, the state must remain neutral, despite people’s differing interests, because 
citizens must come to these differing tastes on their own without the state encouraging 
the expensive champagne, or using the surplus resources from those who prefer cheap 
beer to subsidize those who prefer expensive champagne. If one’s surplus resources was 
taken away to subsidize someone’s desire for a higher standard of living, then the state 
would be treating that person unequally. Thus, the state must remain neutral concerning 
which ways of life have value in order to treat its citizens as equals. 
 Dworkin’s second main reason for rejecting perfectionism concerns a core 
motivation people have for advocating perfectionism—to make people’s lives better. 
Political perfectionism claims that the state can promote certain ways of life (and 
discourage other ways of life) in hopes of enabling the citizens to flourish. Dworkin 
denies that ‘preventing’ people from doing something they desire could really make their 
lives better, even if the action is arguably degrading. A person must come to the 
conclusion by oneself that a given action is degrading before its avoidance has any value 
for that person. As Dworkin writes, “My life cannot be better for me in virtue of some 
feature or component I think has no value.”54 Suppose some religion R is the true 
religion, or, at the very least, practicing this religion would make one’s life better for 
various reasons. Regardless of whether R is true (or valuable) or not, Dworkin claims that 
it cannot benefit someone unless that person thinks it is true or valuable. 
 A possible objection might be that the person would eventually find that religion 
(or other action) valuable; therefore, the state should promote R because, in the long run, 
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the person’s life will be better. There are two problems here. First, what if the person 
never comes to accept the value of a given action?  Dworkin seems to suggest that in so 
far as a person needs to accept an action as valuable for it to benefit her, an action 
lacking this acceptance, in a sense, harms her. Hence, in order for this to be a possibility, 
there would have to be a guarantee (or an extremely high probability) that a person would 
eventually find this way of life valuable. This is a guarantee few would be willing to 
make. Second, suppose that most people would eventually ‘come around’ to accept the 
action as valuable, it would still need to be shown by some utilitarian calculus that the 
immediate harm from not valuing the action is worth enduring to eventually come to 
accept the action as valuable. It is not clear how this could be accomplished. For 
example, if it took person A one week to find an action valuable, then it might be worth it 
(in this case) to force A to perform that action, especially if A has 50 more years of life 
with which to enjoy the benefits of the action. But if it took 50 years to get person B to 
begin to value some action (and B only had a week to live), it is not as clear that forcing 
the action is beneficial. 
 We can also look at this idea from a reverse perspective: Causing someone to 
cease performing an action that he or she finds valuable cannot be better for that person, 
even if the action is arguably not valuable. Many people might believe that the 
consumption of pornography is degrading to the individual who consumes it. However, if 
a person believes (even falsely) that pornography is somehow good for him (or at least 
not harmful), then Dworkin seems to think that it could not be better for that person to be 
forced not to consume pornography. For Dworkin, the liberty to choose actions comprises 
(at least) part of what makes actions valuable for humans. Richard Arneson has referred 
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to this principle—that one’s life is not better if one does not think a forced act (or forced 
cessation of an act) has value—as the ‘endorsement constraint’.55 In putting this principle 
in his own words, Arneson writes, “Nothing is noninstrumentally good for a person 
unless that very person endorses it.”56 So, Dworkin claims that an arguably good act has 
no value to the person who does not endorse it, even if it would lead to a consequence 
that the person would otherwise endorse. Under Dworkin’s liberal view, higher education 
would not have value to someone who did not endorse it, even though it would likely 
lead to a better job (I am assuming that the person would endorse more money). 
Endorsing an action is necessary for someone to have ‘ethical integrity’.57 As Dworkin 
describes, “If we give priority to ethical integrity, we make the merger of life and 
conviction a parameter of ethical success, and we stipulate that a life that never achieves 
that kind of integrity cannot be critically better for someone to lead than a life that 
does.”58 Thus, Dworkin is an anti-perfectionist because he believes that if the state 
promoted particular ways of life, then (1) those who live their lives differently would be 
worse off because their ways of life are not endorsed by the state; and (2) because of this 
unequal treatment, the state would be treating them disrespectfully. 
 
Dworkin’s Political Anti-perfectionism 
Dworkin, like Rawls, promotes a version of liberalism. However, Dworkin deviates from 
Rawls in several ways, one of which is quite important. It is clear that ethics and politics 
(and the philosophy thereof) overlap in some ways. Dworkin divides the field into those 
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ways that have discontinuity and those ways that have continuity between these two 
perspectives of the personal (or ethical) and the political. Discontinuity refers to a belief 
that the political perspective is in a sense artificial. It is “a social construction whose 
purpose is exactly to provide a perspective that no one need regard as the application of 
his full ethical convictions to political decisions, so that people of diverse and conflicting 
personal perspectives can occupy it together.”59 The discontinuity strategy gets its formal 
structure from the idea of a commercial contract. Each partner in a business transaction 
has a perspective with competing desires, but the contract is constructed in a way that 
makes the transaction fair to both parties. Dworkin cites Rawls as claiming that justice as 
fairness is specifically a ‘political conception’ of justice.60 For it to count as a ‘political 
conception’, Rawls’ theory had to meet three tests:61 (1) it must be designed for politics; 
(2) it cannot be derived from any comprehensive doctrine, e.g. religious, ethical, or 
philosophical; (3) it must reflect the intuitive principles of justice that are latent within 
the society for which they are posited. So, the citizens could have a wide range of 
personal perspectives and the political principles which govern them will not interfere 
with their comprehensive doctrines of the good. Though the strategy of discontinuity has 
several virtues, Dworkin wants to try to construct a more integrated approach to the 
relationship between the two perspectives of personal and political. Thus, Dworkin offers 
the strategy of continuity. 
 Dworkin admits right away that there are a couple of problems that this strategy of 
continuity must alleviate if it is to succeed. The first problem is that a core tenet of 
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liberalism is that it is tolerant, so “a liberal ethics must be abstract.”62 In other words, a 
liberal ethics must not advocate any specified interpretation of the good life, especially 
not one that is controversial within the community. Dworkin writes, “A liberal ethics 
must have a structural and philosophical rather than substantive character.”63 The 
performance of individuals, not the product (or end result), is the goal of liberal ethics, 
according to Dworkin. In other words, Dworkin thinks liberalism should be concerned 
with the actions of individuals in themselves, not as means to achieve some goal like the 
good life. Liberal ethics should not only focus on this negative virtue of trying to be 
sufficiently abstract, it should also try to achieve the positive virtue of ‘discriminatory 
power’. By this expression, Dworkin means that “it must be sufficiently muscular to form 
a distinctive liberal ethics, so that anyone embracing the views it deploys would be more 
likely also to embrace liberal politics.”64 These are the problems that Dworkin 
acknowledges he must overcome in order for his strategy of continuity to be acceptable 
for explaining the relationship between the personal and political perspectives. 
 Dworkin begins his account with equality of resources. He says, “The most 
efficient exposition, I believe, begins in the account that conception of liberalism [liberal 
equality] gives of the just distribution of property, that is, control over resources.”65 He is 
very clear to emphasize that liberal equality is only about resources, not welfare (or well-
being). Resources for people come in two kinds: personal and impersonal.66 Personal 
resources are qualities of a person’s mind and body, what we might think as given by 
nature. These include a person’s intellectual abilities, physical capacities, and various 
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talents. These are not the resources that are (or even can be) distributed under the system 
of liberal equality. Impersonal resources consist of whatever parts of the environment, 
natural and artifactual, that can be bought, transferred, or sold. These are things like land, 
automobiles, and so on. Since personal resources cannot be sold or transferred, welfare or 
well-being cannot be distributed equally. To illustrate, suppose people are given the exact 
same set of resources (whatever this might contain) from which to begin their lives. 
Through the course of time, people will have used their set of resources differently. Some 
will have taken risks, from which we can further subdivide into those who have gained 
and those who have lost resources. Some will have simply tried to maintain the original 
level of resources by saving and not taking risks. And still others will have squandered 
their resources recklessly. Though this picture is a bit simple, it illustrates that since it is 
not possible to distribute personal resources, let alone equally distribute them, through the 
course of time people’s level of impersonal resources will become unequal as a result of 
their diverse personal resources and decisions. Thus, liberal equality claims that equality 
must concern impersonal resources, not welfare. 
 Dworkin, using the strategy of continuity, wants to show that his political 
philosophy is a continuation of his ethics, so now we must examine how he attempts to 
accomplish this goal. Ethics begins with some notion of the good life. Dworkin asks, 
“What kind of goodness does a good life have?”67 He avoids any reductionist theory, 
such as utilitarianism, in favor of a more complex and structured account. First, he 
clarifies that there are two types of well-being that can potentially be improved: volitional 
and critical. Volitional well-being is improved when someone “has or achieves what in 
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fact he wants.”68 For example, Dworkin claims that avoiding dental work and going 
sailing are aspects of his volitional well-being. Critical well-being is improved when 
someone has or achieves “what he should want, that is, the achievements or experiences 
that it would make his life a worse one not to want.”69 To illustrate, Dworkin claims that 
having a close relationship with his kids and having some success in his work are aspects 
of his critical interests. However, these interests or types of well-being are 
interconnected; they are not isolated from each other. “Critical interest normally tracks 
volitional interest.”70 Once I have decided to take up whitewater kayaking, it is in my 
critical interest to have some measure of success, not because kayaking is essential but 
because some measure of success in things I like to do is important. “And volitional 
interest normally tracks critical interest: people generally want what they think it is in 
their critical interests to have.”71 If I think it is in my critical interest to have a certain 
degree of success in my work, then I will want to make every effort necessary to achieve 
at least this degree of success. These interests sometimes conflict when someone desires 
to do something that is clearly against her critical interests. But Dworkin claims there is 
no higher interest to which we can appeal. In such a situation, we must follow our critical 
interests. This reflects Dworkin’s view, mentioned earlier, that endorsement is a 
necessary condition of something having value for the individual.72 What we understand 
or believe to be our critical interests is the final thing to which we can appeal; there is 
nothing beyond us. Dworkin concludes by noting that the “project of finding a liberal 
ethics as a foundation for liberal politics must concentrate on critical as distinct from 
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volitional well-being.”73 His goal is to provide an account of what people’s critical 
interests are in order to then show that people who accept this understanding of critical 
interests will also opt for some version of liberal politics.  
 “Most people believe they have critical interests.” writes Dworkin, “They think it 
important to make something of their lives, whether or not that conviction much affects 
how they actually live.”74 But there is a problem: the critical interests are also enigmatic, 
and many people “fear that it is a cosmic illusion.”75 So, Dworkin has isolated five 
puzzles (or anxieties) about critical interests. First, significance. What if life is 
completely meaningless? Thinking about whether or not one’s life is good is usually 
connected with a notion of whether it is also meaningful. Second, transcendent or 
indexed? There is concern in ethics about whether the good life is transcendent or 
indexed to a particular time, place, ability, or resource. Are one’s critical interests the 
same as other people’s throughout history and the world or are they limited to where a 
person happens to find herself? Third, ethics and morality. Dworkin writes, “Now 
consider Plato’s question. What is the connection between self-interest [in the critical 
sense] and morality?”76 Dworkin believes there are three possible views. First, we might 
believe that living well and living justly are wholly independent of each other. Second, 
we might maintain that morality is an aspect of well-being, but only part of it. Third, we 
might take Plato’s view that justice and self-interest are never in conflict because to live 
unjustly is not to live well. Most people’s intuitions, according to Dworkin, tend to lean 
toward one of the first two options. Fourth, additive or constitutive? If we were to reflect 
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on someone’s life, we could ask two basic questions: (1) how many components of the 
good life did his life possess? (2) how far did he recognize the valuable elements of the 
good life in his own life? There are two possible ways of combining these questions. 
First, the additive view claims that we can judge a person’s life good or bad solely on 
how much of his critical interests are met, regardless of whether or not he believed these 
things to have any value. Second, the constitutive view claims that if a person does not 
think a given action is valuable, then it cannot make his life more valuable by doing it. 
So, this second view relies on which things a given person found valuable to determine 
whether or not he led a good life. Fifth, ethics and community. Which entity is the object 
of the good life: the individual or the community? There is certainly a sense in which it is 
my life that is affected by decisions about what to do. But, in another sense, a flourishing 
life of the community can impact the goodness of each individual’s life. So, these puzzles 
are raised to illustrate the diverse (and even antagonistic) ways we tend to think about 
ethical value. 
 Dworkin presents two philosophical models of value that play a role in forming 
our ethical convictions. Basically, both models have some appeal for us, but Dworkin 
claims that our intuitions about ethics will remain inconclusive until we decide upon one 
of these models. First, the model of impact asserts that the value of the good life rests in 
its final product. To put it more precisely, a life is good when it impacts the rest of the 
world in a positive way. It seems clear that this model plays a role in our judgments about 
other people’s lives. For example, we value the lives of Mother Theresa, Martin Luther 
King, Jr., Leonardo da Vinci, and Albert Einstein because of the impact their lives had on 
the rest of the world. Though Dworkin does not refer to Nietzsche, it seems that the 
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model of impact could easily fit well with Nietzsche’s idea that society has value insofar 
as it enables the geniuses to flourish. Thus, according to this model of impact, a life is 
more or less valuable (or good) based on the degree to which that life benefited the rest of 
the world (or at least the particular society). Second, the model of challenge “argues that 
the goodness of a good life lies in its inherent value as a performance.”77 The impact 
model has a major limitation—“that lives go better only in virtue of their impact on the 
objective value of states of affairs”78—that Dworkin wants to avoid by advocating the 
challenge model. Dworkin aligns himself with Aristotle’s view that the good life 
possesses value as a skillful performance, providing two examples that he thinks 
illustrates this model. We think the execution of a dive has value from beginning to end, 
even after the last ripple has subsided. Also, we think that someone’s climbing Mount 
Everest has value, even though he might have climbed it simply because it was there. But 
it is because we think these particular performances are good; not all performances are 
good, e.g. murder. On the one hand, these examples work since Dworkin is considering 
the whole process (and beyond) as having value. On the other hand, I think someone 
could argue that these examples still represent finished products, in a sense, because the 
dive was perfect and the climber made it to the top. However, I think even if the dive was 
not quite perfect and the climber turned back before reaching the top, these actions could 
still have value as performances. I think the point is that the performance is valuable, 
regardless of whether or not it is completed perfectly.  
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 If one accepts the model of challenge, as Dworkin does, then he further thinks he 
or she will accept the liberal politics (what he calls liberal equality) as an outgrowth of 
the ethics. It should be noted that, contrary to Rawls and other social contract theorists, 
Dworkin begins with a normative ethical position, which is the challenge model of ethics. 
And he maintains that this model of challenge merges into the liberal political position of 
liberal equality. The ethical liberals, in Dworkin’s sense, are not prevented from knowing 
anything, as in Rawls’ original position. They have access to whatever knowledge any 
normal or real person would be able to access. So, if the challenge model of ethics is 
concerned with the performance, rather than the product or end result, then we need to 
know what allows for the possibility of a good performance. Moreover, if, as previously 
stated, it is not possible to equally distribute welfare (well-being) among people, then we 
must rely on the distribution of external or impersonal resources. Thus, liberal equality is 
a resource-based version of justice. As Dworkin writes, “It holds that justice is measured 
in the resources people have, not the welfare or well-being they achieve with those 
resources.”79 So, one role of the state is to ensure that the impersonal resources are (or 
have been) distributed equally. Dworkin explains, “If living well means responding well 
to circumstances as these ought to be, then it must be one function of government to try 
to bring it about that circumstances are as they should be.”80 This equal distribution 
makes it possible for people to develop their lives into what they deem to be good lives. 
So, one person might waste his impersonal resources and not have a very pleasant life; 
another might use her resources wisely and have an excellent life. The point is that their 
lives would have had less value if they had been coerced into actions that they did not 
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value. Presumably, this idea is true for Dworkin even if someone eventually comes to 
regret past decisions that led to bad current circumstances; that is, a person’s life still 
holds more value since the bad decisions were his decisions.  
 Opposing perfectionism, Dworkin believes that the political community should be 
neutral between differing ways of life or views of the good. Now, it is time to develop 
that point more fully. There are two ways that a political community could be neutral 
about different ethical convictions: neutrality of appeal and neutrality of operation. First, 
the state could be neutral in its appeal; it is ecumenical. Dworkin writes, “It might set out 
principles of political morality that can be accepted by people from a very great variety of 
ethical traditions.”81 Second, it could be neutral in its operation; it could be tolerant. 
About this way of neutrality, Dworkin writes, “It might specify, as one of its principles of 
political morality, that government must in no way punish or discriminate against people 
of any particular ethical party or conviction.”82 The strategy of continuity that Dworkin 
has adopted, contrary to Rawls and other contractarians, attempts to arrive at both of 
these ways of neutrality like theorems.83  
 First, the challenge model of ethics is ecumenical or neutral in appeal. It allows 
for some people to think the religious life is a requirement for the good life, while others 
maintain that practicing bizarre sexual activities is the best way to achieve the good life.84 
He thinks that because the challenge model of ethics could be acceptable to most people 
and their intuitions about the good life, it has neutrality of appeal. Thus, it is ecumenical 
among people of very different viewpoints of the good life.  
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 Second, the challenge model of ethics has neutrality in operation. This point is 
illustrated by what a community outlaws. A community might outlaw certain activities 
for two main reasons. The first is a reason of justice. Certain actions, like theft and 
murder, are outlawed because they violate all of the best theories of justice. This first 
reason, Dworkin seems to think, is not very contentious. The second reason is ethical. A 
community might outlaw certain conduct that they believe is degrading to the individual, 
like pornography and homosexuality, even though these actions do not violate any 
principle of justice. Liberal equality, as Dworkin claims, adheres to the first reason for 
denying liberty because it violates a version of the harm principle, but they should not 
adhere to the second reason for denying liberty. 
 Are people, under this notion of tolerance, allowed to promote the versions of the 
good life that they think is best? Yes, they can. But they cannot use the law to do it, even 
when they are in the majority.85 To use Dworkin’s terminology, that is the one weapon—
the law—that they are not allowed to employ in their attempt to convince other people of 
their view of the good life. The reason is that ethical liberals know that they cannot make 
anyone’s life better through coercive means.86  
 
Anti-Perfectionism and the Arts 
Both Rawls and Dworkin maintain that, in a sense, the state must remain neutral between 
competing ways of life; accordingly, the state cannot advocate particular judgments of 
value. If the state promoted, whether strongly or weakly, a particular value judgment, 
then, according to Dworkin, those who do not agree with that judgment would 
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necessarily be treated unequally and disrespectfully. If the state promoted a given value 
judgment, then, according to Rawls, the state would also have to adhere to a 
comprehensive doctrine of the good by which to make that judgment. In light of these 
anti-perfectionist positions, an issue arises concerning the relationship (if any) between 
the state and the arts. Can the state support the arts through funding, education, and other 
kinds of encouragement? 
 Consider a model problem:87 should the state fund (or support in other ways) the 
arts to some degree? Here, the worry is that if the state were to fund a particular artist or a 
particular type of art, then the state would necessarily be making a value-judgment about 
art and aesthetic experience (or at least the funded art). Thus, the state would necessarily 
be treating those who disagree about the value of the funded work unequally compared to 
those who agree with that work’s value. And it seems that the state would have to 
endorse a comprehensive doctrine of the good that either advocates the funding of art or 
the funding of certain kinds of art to which this art belongs. In either case, funding art 
seems to violate the claims of political anti-perfectionism.88 The problem arises because 
many people seem to believe that it is reasonable for the state to fund art in some sense, 
and many countries currently do fund the arts to some degree. The state could fund 
individual artists or a collective of artists; the state could fund the artists directly or fund 
art indirectly by giving to museums; past art that has been declared great could be funded 
by preserving it or future art projects could be funded. Yet it seems that the anti-
perfectionists cannot theoretically justify any arts funding. 
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 A second related issue that sometimes comes up in these discussions is, due to 
finite resources, whether funding art is the best way to spend money anyway. There are 
other more essential instrumentalities that should be given priority over arts funding, e.g. 
employment and welfare. These other instrumentalities provide primary goods—goods 
that everyone needs regardless of their rational plan of life—to a higher degree, which 
renders them more important. The basic idea here is that the arts and aesthetic experience 
are mere luxuries. They might be valuable and beneficial, but the benefit is only 
something added to someone’s life when it has reached a sufficient level of welfare. It is 
not essential for one’s well-being at its most basic level. Thus, contrary to some common 
intuitions, it appears that the state should not fund the arts, according to anti-
perfectionism. 
 There are other kinds of problems (of which I mention two here) that can be 
raised, which will not be given full treatment here, but it is important to see that the issue 
is not solely concerned with the direct funding of art. First, is the state justified in 
supporting and encouraging educational programs in public schools and elsewhere that 
center on the arts? It seems that the anti-perfectionist could not support art programs on 
the grounds art has some inherent value, though they may claim that art has instrumental 
value that is worth the funding. Second, to give a negative example, is the state justified 
in being intolerant of obscenity? It seems the answer must be no. Both Rawls and 
Dworkin maintain that there are some ways of life (and actions) that just are degrading to 
the individual. Dworkin implies that pornography is, in fact, degrading to the individual 
and the community, but liberty is more important and is worth the consequences of 
allowing pornography. On the one hand, a man’s life might be better if he did not 
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consume large doses of pornography, even though he does not believe that, since he 
chooses to view pornography. On the other hand, if the state forces that man to stop 
viewing pornography (“for his own good”), then his life will still not be better, so it 
seems Dworkin believes, because he does not endorse that cessation. So, the state, in this 
situation, would be treating him (because of his lifestyle) unequally and disrespectfully 
when compared with those who already have no desire to view pornography. 
Furthermore, according to Rawls, the state would have to embrace a kind of 
comprehensive value that precludes the viewing of pornography. Because people in the 
same state will have incompatible conceptions of value, that state cannot pick any one of 
these comprehensive doctrines as the basis of its decisions; the state must be neutral to 
ensure equal freedom for all citizens. Moreover, some might think it is questionable 
whether or not the state can adequately judge between what counts as obscenity and what 
counts as art. And, if true, this inability to judge causes obvious problems if the state is 
supposed to decide to protect art and suppress obscenity. Despite some common beliefs 
that pornography is degrading and harmful to the individual who consumes it; and despite 
evidence89 that shows how pornography is problematic; the anti-perfectionist has no 
theoretical basis on which to restrict (or even discourage) the consumption of 
pornography.  
 Just because advocates of political anti-perfectionism have difficulty justifying 
state support for the arts, this is not sufficient for rejecting the position. It might be an 
unfortunate consequence of the best theory of the state. However, after discussing the 
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perfectionist position in the next chapter, I will offer a critique of the anti-perfectionist 
position in favor of political perfectionism.
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CHAPTER 2 
THE POLITICAL PERFECTIONISMS OF RAZ AND FINNIS 
 
Introduction 
Contrary to the anti-perfectionist positions discussed in the previous chapter, this chapter 
will explain the political perfectionist theories of both Joseph Raz and John Finnis. As a 
preliminary statement, political perfectionist theories maintain that the state cannot be 
neutral to differing ways of life; the state should promote good ways and discourage bad 
ways. Political perfectionism can range from simply discouraging bad practices and 
encouraging good practices, or the state could be more paternalistic, using law to coerce 
some practices and forbid others. Thus, the specifics of a theory of perfectionism are not 
spelled out in advance; hence, a rejection of perfectionism must account for the entire 
scope of perfectionist theories to be successful. Both Raz and Finnis offer theories that 
avoid or reject some of the criticisms that Rawls and Dworkin have put forth. As in the 
previous chapter, what is presented here are sketches of the theories of Raz and Finnis, in 
which I show their reasons for rejecting anti-perfectionism and simplified versions of 
their perfectionist theories to provide a context for my own view in the following 
chapters. 
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Joseph Raz 
Raz’s Argument against Anti-Perfectionism 
Though agreeing with Rawls and Dworkin on some tenets of liberalism, Joseph Raz parts 
company with them as he supports political perfectionism. In The Morality of Freedom, 
Raz offers a thorough critique of anti-perfectionism, specifically the views presented by 
Rawls and Nozick. Prior to his critique, he clarifies two forms of restriction that can be 
classified as anti-perfectionist.90 The first form claims that the state must be blind to the 
various conceptions of the good; in other words, the state must not consider the truth or 
falsity, the validity or invalidity, or the wisdom or stupidity of different conceptions of 
the good when making policies. Raz refers to this first one as neutral political concern. 
The second (and related) view claims that the state must be neutral concerning different 
conceptions of the good; that is, the actions of the state must not hinder or help any 
particular group of individuals achieve a higher potential for living according to their 
conception of the good. Raz refers to this second one as the exclusion of ideals. Even 
though these two doctrines can be distinguished, most of the anti-perfectionist writers do 
not explicitly make this distinction. Raz admits that much of the reasoning against one 
will also apply to the other, but he still targets them individually in The Morality of 
Freedom. 
 Anti-perfectionism, Raz acknowledges, has prima facie appeal; it seems normal to 
not want the state’s power to be used to help only some group(s) of citizens. As Raz 
writes, “At the intuitive level anti-perfectionism responds to a widespread distrust of 
concentrated power and of bureaucracies. Any political pursuit of ideals of the good is 
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likely to be botched and distorted.”91 Thus, it seems reasonable to believe that the 
government should not advocate any one conception of the good. In other words, political 
neutrality seems to enable fairness; but, Raz claims, it is a “confused notion that to act 
neutrally is to act fairly.”92 To illustrate the problem with this ‘confused notion’, Raz 
draws on an example provided by Montefiore. Suppose there is a father who has two 
sons, and he observes his sons disputing with each other. The father knows that, if left 
alone (if he remains neutral), the older and stronger son will inevitably triumph. So, the 
decision to remain neutral is, in a sense, the decision to allow the older son to prevail. 
Would this not seem like an odd concept of fairness to the younger son? Raz uses this 
example to illustrate an important point: “there are circumstances in which it is unfair to 
act neutrally, where there are not even prima facie reasons to be neutral.”93 Consequently, 
in this example, the father ought not to remain neutral. So, the issue of political fairness 
cannot be settled simply by the initial appeal that neutrality offers. And it is these kinds 
of arguments, specifically found in Rawls and Nozick, to which Raz will offer further 
disputations. 
 One other important preliminary idea concerns whether one’s life is really more 
valuable just because one is doing what one believes to be good. This idea is important to 
Dworkin’s rejection of perfectionism. Recall that he claimed one’s life has value only as 
one believes in the goodness (even falsely) of his actions and that objective badness did 
not guarantee a bad life. Raz, however, does not think belief is enough to ground the 
moral status of an action; he believes there are actions that are objectively good and bad. 
Mulhall and Swift explain, “For Raz, a person’s well-being does not depend upon her 
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living the life that she believes to be of value, it depends upon her living a life that is 
valuable for reasons independent of her belief in its value.”94 In fact, Raz suggests that it 
is disrespectful to ignore moral considerations when dealing with other people. Thus, 
things of value may enter the political realm, not because people believe they are 
valuable, but because they are actually valuable.95 
 Raz begins by presenting three interpretations of the principle of restraint; 
according to Raz, all advocates of political neutrality accept one of these 
interpretations:96 
1. No political action may be undertaken or justified on 
the ground that it promotes an ideal of the good nor on 
the ground that it enables individuals to pursue an ideal 
of the good. 
2. No political action may be undertaken if it makes a 
difference to the likelihood that a person will endorse 
one conception of the good or another, or to his chances 
of realizing his conception of the good, unless other 
actions are undertaken which cancel out such effects. 
3. One of the main goals of government authority, 
which is lexically prior to any other, is to ensure for all 
persons an equal ability to pursue in their lives and 
promote in their societies any ideal of the good of their 
choosing. 
 
Using these variants of the concept of neutrality, primarily from Nozick and Rawls, Raz 
argues that all versions of state neutrality ultimately fail. The first interpretation of 
neutrality is attributed to Nozick. For now we will concentrate on the last two 
interpretations: the second one is the narrow conception and the third one is the 
comprehensive conception, according to Raz’s categorization.97 
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 Rawls presents the ‘most serious’ defense of the comprehensive conception of 
political neutrality.98 Under the conditions of the original position with the veil of 
ignorance, Rawls maintains that the parties would choose the two principles of justice: 
the principle of equal liberty and the difference principle. Moreover, the parties in the 
original position will necessarily opt for political neutrality because they are unaware of 
what conceptions of the good they will hold once the veil is removed. As a component of 
his arguments against Rawls, Raz employs the criticism developed by Thomas Nagel. 
The basic idea of the criticism is that Rawls’ theory claims to be neutral between 
conceptions of the good but it is not. Nagel writes, “It is a fundamental feature of Rawls’s 
conception of the fairness of the original position that it should not permit the choice of 
principles of justice to depend on a particular conception of the good over which the 
parties may differ.”99 Nagel does not think that the original position accomplishes this 
goal; indeed, it endorses a conception of the good. Raz describes this, “The specific point 
that Nagel is making is that there is no way of justifying the conditions of choice in the 
original position except from the point of view of a certain conception of the good.”100 
Nagel asserts that the original position does not presuppose neutrality between competing 
conceptions of the good, rather it assumes “a liberal, individualistic conception according 
to which the best that can be wished for someone is the unimpeded pursuit of his own 
path, provided it does not interfere with the rights of others.”101 In terms of individualistic 
plans of life, this view might be considered neutral. But it is not neutral in reference to all 
non-individual conceptions of the good. Rawls’ theory does not prevent people from 
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pursuing non-individualistic conceptions of the good, but his theory makes it more 
difficult for people who hold to these other conceptions, by allowing that the state not 
advocate these non-individualistic conceptions. And Rawls claims that justice as fairness 
is neutral (and therefore fair) between all conceptions of the good. Thus, the primary 
goods, as presented by Rawls, are not “equally valuable in pursuit of all conceptions of 
the good.”102 Non-individualistic conceptions of the good will have to be grouped with 
the more expensive tastes, since they will require more effort and the cooperation of 
others. Thus, Raz, and Nagel, conclude that Rawls’ theory does not equally help all 
conceptions of the good; therefore, it is not neutral. 
 Raz thinks that the criticism of Nagel—the original position is not actually 
neutral—works for neutrality as such. But is it possible that neutrality could be a matter 
of degree? So, for instance, neutrality that respects individualistic goods might be held to 
a higher level than non-individualistic conceptions of the good. Raz offers two arguments 
that he thinks show that any approximation to complete neutrality is a chimerical notion. 
First, neutrality concerns only how much help or hindrance people receive and the degree 
to which they receive it. But “it is silent concerning acts which neither help nor 
hinder.”103 This view leads to the conclusion that one is not responsible for what one does 
not do. In other words, if the state does nothing, then it is automatically being neutral in a 
given situation. So, we need to formulate a distinction between not helping and hindering. 
As an example, Raz cites that Uruguay had no relation of any kind with either Somalia or 
Ethiopia when they were warring. And he asks this question, “Would we say that 
Uruguay was not neutral unless the help that it could have but did not give Ethiopia was 
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equal to the help that it could have but did not give Somalia?”104 If both Ethiopia and 
Somalia needed some commodity to an equal degree—if their circumstances were 
exactly the same—then we might think that not giving that commodity to either country 
is what neutrality requires. Both would be equally not helped. Would it be the same 
situation if one of those countries had an excess of that commodity (say, Somalia), but 
the other country (say, Ethiopia) was quite deficient in that same commodity? In this 
case, one country would simply be not helped but the other country would be hindered, if 
Uruguay decided not to provide any aid. Raz’s point is that if not helping and hindering 
are the same, then we must claim that Uruguay is not being neutral. However, the 
common understanding of neutrality is that by giving any aid to only one country, 
Uruguay would not be neutral. This shows that the distinction between hindering and not 
helping is crucial to a doctrine of neutrality. Yet this example does not show that this 
distinction always carries moral significance; moreover, the distinction might not always 
be easy to make. Raz concludes, “Neutrality is possible in some cases, but it may be 
impossible in others.”105  
 Raz states the second argument as follows, “whether or not a person acts neutrally 
depends on the base line relative to which his behavior is judged, and that there are 
always different base lines leading to conflicting judgments and no rational grounds to 
prefer one to the others.”106 Once again, Raz employs an example of helping and 
hindering to illustrate the problem. Suppose there are two groups in a conflict; the Reds 
and the Blues are fighting each other. Suppose further that we have no relations of any 
kind with the Blues, but we have been regularly trading with the Reds (we give them 
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food, which could aid the war effort). Raz asks, “If we want to be neutral, should we 
continue normal supplies to the Reds or should they be discontinued?”107 If we continue 
giving normal supplies to the Reds, then we will be helping them more than we are 
helping the Blues. But if we discontinue supplying the Reds, then we will be hindering 
them more than we are hindering the Blues. This example might be a case where 
neutrality is impossible. Raz thinks that the main problem with this case is that it 
confuses two standards of neutrality. 
 Neutrality consists of being neutral “between parties in relation to some issue 
regarding which the success of one sets the other back.”108 Some issues (or commodities) 
are only of interest due to the current conflict; so, in the case of war, military equipment 
certainly becomes more important to each participant. Other issues (or commodities) are 
important regardless of any conflict, though these would certainly also be helpful in a 
conflict; for example, food is important even at times when there is no conflict. So, Raz 
explains two kinds of neutrality that bring out this distinction. First, comprehensive 
neutrality “consists in helping or hindering the parties in equal degree in all matters 
relevant to the conflict between them.”109 On the other hand, narrow neutrality “consists 
in helping or hindering them to an equal degree in those activities and regarding those 
resources that they would wish neither to engage in nor to acquire but for the conflict.”110 
To illustrate these kinds of neutrality in our previous example, if we give the Reds food, 
then we are still being narrowly neutral but not comprehensively neutral. These two kinds 
of neutrality (and degrees of variance in between) are often used simply under the 
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common title of ‘neutrality’, which makes the issue more complicated and, in Raz’s 
opinion, impossible to enact. Depending on what perspective one takes on a given 
situation, there could be multiple and incongruous acts done under the general name of 
neutrality. This is an undesirable result. 
 The examples given above refer to neutrality in relation to separate countries; as 
such, they are simply meant to illustrate the general idea that sometimes neutrality is not 
desirable or possible. But what about the responsibilities of a state to its citizens? Should 
the state adopt the narrow or comprehensive view of neutrality? The conflict here is not 
between two different nations, but it concerns the “ability of people [citizens] to choose 
and successfully pursue conceptions of the good (and these include ideals of the good 
society or world).”111 Raz claims that the neutrality here is necessarily comprehensive, 
even if some want to attempt to claim it is narrow. It takes the whole of life for one to 
pursue his or her conception of the good life. It does not seem possible to be narrowly 
neutral for things that are comprehensive. Whatever duties a state should have toward its 
citizens, failure to perform those duties is a hindrance. So, the state must arrange society 
in such a way that all citizens have an equal opportunity to pursue whatever conception 
of the good they desire and have an equal chance of attaining it. Rawls endorses the 
comprehensive notion of neutrality, about which Raz raises some concerns. 
 Rawls maintains that parties in the original position will select the principles of 
justice, as well as adopting political neutrality. The main reason for adopting political 
neutrality in the original position is that the parties are not aware of what their 
conceptions of the good will be once the veil of ignorance is removed. Therefore, 
according to Rawls, they will either be politically neutral or they will risk their freedom. 
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Since the parties do not want to risk their freedom, then they will certainly choose 
political neutrality. Raz thinks this is a hasty conclusion; he believes there is a third 
possibility. Even if we accept Rawls’ veil and original position, Raz claims that it is still 
possible to advocate a type of perfectionism.112 His reasoning rests partially on the 
following idea: “there is no reason to think that people who know they differ in their 
conceptions of the good but do not know how will reach a compromise, whereas those 
who also know how will not.”113 It seems reasonable that the parties could decide to 
develop a procedure for encouraging some ways of life over others, once these arise in 
their given society.114 So, Raz thinks that Rawls’ argument proves only that a state need 
to allow for moral pluralism, which does not necessarily require political neutrality 
(which he already argued was impossible). Raz defends a view of moral pluralism that is 
also politically perfectionist, contrary to Rawls and Dworkin. 
 Though I have not presented Robert Nozick’s version of anti-perfectionism, it still 
seems important to present Raz’s critique of it as it extends his overall critique of anti-
perfectionism. Raz explains that there is a difference between two forms of anti-
perfectionism: one is a neutrality among ideals and the other is the exclusion of ideals. 
Raz believes that Rawls (and presumably Dworkin) are committed to the neutrality 
among ideals version, and to provide arguments against only that version does not 
prevent this other version of anti-perfectionism. In fact, Raz seems surprised that 
advocates of anti-perfectionism have not noted this distinction; according to Raz, they 
seem not to even be aware of it most of the time. It is not enough to have presented 
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arguments against the neutrality of ideals version, Raz thinks that one would still need to 
argue against the version he calls the exclusion of ideals, which he attributes to Nozick. 
 Raz summarizes the exclusion of ideals position, by writing, “Excluding 
conceptions of the good from politics means, at its simplest and most comprehensive, that 
the fact that some conception of the good is true or valid or sound or reasonable, etc., 
should never serve as a reason for any political action.”115 In contrast, the neutrality 
version could in principle appeal to some conception that everyone accepts, but this 
would be disallowed under the exclusion rubric. Nozick seems to think that his anti-
perfectionism is warranted by his appeal to a version of Kant’s belief that people should 
not be treated as means only, but as ends. In other words, an appeal to a conception of the 
good will inevitably treat some people (those not adhering to that conception) as means. 
And more specifically, the method for advocating a particular conception of the good is 
thought to be coercion. Thus, Raz claims that the main problem for this version of anti-
perfectionism is the act of coercion, which is thought to always violate people’s rights 
except when they are a threat to others.  
 Though, according to Raz, all coercive acts invade someone’s autonomy, the 
‘evils’ are too easily exaggerated.116 It is assumed by the anti-perfectionists, according to 
Raz, that under a perfectionist regime the state will impose coercively one favored way of 
life onto everyone, even those who disagree with it. Raz does not so much argue against 
this belief; rather he shows that it is not a correct understanding of perfectionism.117 First, 
perfectionism does not have to be coercive when advocating a particular way of life or 
conception of the good. It might only encourage (e.g. through tax breaks or such) certain 
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good things and discourage others. Second, perfectionism does not have to endorse very 
specific actions or instantiations of the favored conception of the good. For example, it is 
often claimed that art, to some extent, is valuable for citizens, but the state does not have 
to support any particular kind of art. The state could simply encourage people to create 
(by grants) and appreciate (by tax breaks) the arts. Third, Raz thinks it is a mistake not to 
recognize that “supporting valuable forms of life is a social rather than individual 
matter.”118 Many goods require common action because individuals are too limited to 
provide every good for themselves. The state should be allowed to encourage and support 
these goods, and sometimes the state might even have to direct some of them. Raz uses 
the example of marriage. If it is good for society, marriage by definition cannot be 
accomplished an individual. So, Raz claims that anti-perfectionism would actually 
undermine some valuable conceptions of the good by neglecting them. Though the 
sources of anti-perfectionism are legitimate, says Raz, they are not enough to justify 
subscribing to a theory of political anti-perfectionism. 
 
Raz’s view of Autonomy, Moral Pluralism, and Political Perfectionism 
“[I]t is the goal of all political action to enable individuals to pursue valid conceptions of 
the good and to discourage evil or empty ones.”119 Raz writes this statement as he 
concludes his rejection of anti-perfectionism, specifically Rawls’ version. The anti-
perfectionist fears that if the state encourages people to pursue certain conceptions of the 
good and discourages them from pursuing certain conceptions of the bad, then that state 
will have infringed on the personal autonomy of its citizens. However, Raz adopts a 
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different notion of autonomy that not only allows for, but actually requires, 
perfectionism, albeit with limitations. Moreover, he reasons that his view of autonomy 
also requires moral pluralism, which will be explained below. So, contrary to other liberal 
political philosophers (e.g. Rawls and Dworkin), Raz defends political perfectionism, 
while maintaining that the liberal ideal of autonomy and pluralism remain intact. 
 Autonomy, as a liberal ideal, is frequently used to allow any free choice as long as 
it does not harm another or another’s liberty. So, this version of personal autonomy 
allows people to choose any terribly, unworthy, or degrading actions they will, provided 
that other individuals are not harmed by the choice. Raz agrees with this perspective 
insofar as both assert that coerced choices violate personal autonomy. But contrary to this 
somewhat crude picture, Raz claims that “autonomy requires a choice of goods. A choice 
between good and evil is not enough.”120 For example, suppose a woman has 100 
different options. On the surface, this fact seems to suggest that she has an adequate 
number of options from which to choose. However, upon closer inspection, she realizes 
that 99 of those options are unworthy of her. By choosing the 1 good option, is she really 
exercising her personal autonomy? Many might be inclined to think yes because the ‘bad’ 
options could still be chosen freely; in other words, those options are really options. 
However, Raz would think otherwise. Because, in this example, she did not have a 
sufficiently wide range of options; she was not truly able to exercise her autonomy.  
 An obvious question: what counts as a sufficiently wide enough range of options? 
Raz does not provide a clear answer to this question, nor does he think any exact answer 
is forthcoming. But Raz provides some considerations that must be met for a range of 
options to count as adequate. First, the range must include options that lead to both long 
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term consequences and short term consequences with a gradation of options in between 
these extremes.121 If our options only had short term consequences, then we could not 
really decide about some of the bigger issues in life, like careers and families. But if we 
only had long term options, then we would have trouble choosing simple daily things, 
like going to the movies or a soccer game. Second, we not only need a large enough 
number of options, but we also need a variety of kinds of options. Raz gives this 
example, “A choice between hundreds of identical and identically situated houses is no 
choice, compared with a choice between a town flat and a suburban house.”122 It could be 
argued that these two factors are still not enough to determine how many options are 
adequate. But Raz views this situation as a virtue, rather than a vice. Depending on the 
cultural context (or structure of the society), it might be better to have more or less 
options. Or it just might not be possible for one society to have as many options as 
another. Raz admits that these two factors are not enough to provide hard rules for 
governing a particular society. They are meant to be looser guidelines for making sure 
any society has enough options available for its citizens. This fact, that the two factors are 
not culture-bound, is part of its virtue. 
 From the above, Raz concludes that, in order to be autonomous, people must have 
a sufficient number and variety of valuable options from which to choose. Unlike other 
liberal philosophers, however, Raz does not think unworthy or degrading options fit into 
the variety or number of options that should be available. David McCabe shows that it is 
not always clear whether Raz regards autonomy “as a transcendent value (such that no 
one can lead a fully good life without it)  or instead merely as a contextual value (such 
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that it is central to leading a fully good life in some contexts but not all).”123 Specifically, 
Raz claims that “autonomy is not valuable per se, but only in so far as it is used in the 
pursuit of the moral good.”124 In fact, Raz puts this point quite boldly, “No one would 
deny that autonomy should be used for the good.”125 He then asks whether or not 
autonomy has any value as autonomy when it is used for evil? Is the autonomous evil-
doer in a better position than the non-autonomous evil-doer? It seems quite clear, 
according to Raz, that someone who willingly commits evil is not in a better moral 
position than someone who is coerced into committing the same evil. Thus, we do not 
think that autonomy as such has higher value in terms of evil actions. And it seems 
almost platitudinous to claim that autonomous good actions have a higher moral value 
than non-autonomous good actions. So, of these four kinds of actions, the only ones that 
seem to have any significant moral position are those that are autonomous good actions. 
Raz asks a second question about this view: should the state allow bad options to be 
present in order for people to avoid them? Or is there any value in choosing good options 
when there are only good options? Unfortunately, people do not need special bad options 
in order to commit base or evil acts; hence, the government does not have to provide 
specialized opportunities for people to commit degrading or evil acts. 
 Part of Raz’s view is a particular version of the harm principle, which even he 
acknowledges is rather unorthodox. His view of the harm principle is derived from his 
view of personal autonomy; therefore, it is no surprise that his version allows 
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perfectionist principles. The harm principle was made famous by Mill,126 who claimed 
that “the only justification for coercively interfering with a person is to prevent him from 
harming others.”127 Like the traditional advocates of the harm principle, Raz agrees that 
the state cannot use coercive means to prevent (or discourage) people from engaging in 
victimless, immoral behavior. Where Raz deviates from the traditional advocates is when 
he allows the state to use non-coercive means to discourage people from engaging in 
victimless, immoral behavior. Robert George offers this explanation, “While [Raz’s] 
perfectionism authorizes the government to use noncoercive methods of combatting 
immoralities of this sort [i.e., victimless], he argues that a due regard for the value of 
autonomy forbids the government as a matter of principle from criminalizing immoral 
acts unless those acts are harmful, or at least potentially harmful, to others.”128 It is 
important to see that he differs with the anti-perfectionists here. The anti-perfectionists 
maintain that the state cannot endorse any way(s) of life over any other ways, coercively 
or noncoercively. But Raz insists that the state, since it cannot be neutral as his previous 
arguments show, must encourage some adequate number of morally acceptable ways of 
life. And this leads to an explanation of Raz’s notion of moral pluralism. 
 One of the main contentions with perfectionism, particularly for Rawls, is the 
concern that one comprehensive doctrine of the good would come to dominate all others. 
Raz shares this concern to an extent; Raz does not think one comprehensive doctrine 
should rule over others; hence, Raz maintains that the state should encourage moral 
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pluralism. He explains what he means by ‘moral pluralism’ in the following 
description:129 
Moral pluralism is the view that there are various forms and 
styles of life which exemplify different virtues and which 
are incompatible. Forms or styles of life are incompatible 
if, given reasonable assumptions about human nature, they 
cannot normally be exemplified in the same life. There is 
nothing to stop a person from being both an ideal teacher 
and an ideal family person. But a person cannot normally 
lead the life both of action and of contemplation, to use one 
of the traditionally recognized contrasts, nor can one person 
possess all the virtues of a nun and of a mother. 
 
Ways of life that contain different and incompatible virtues illustrate the fact that no one 
can fulfill all the virtues. But each way of life is morally acceptable; and different ways 
of life may certainly have overlapping virtues. The important point is that when pursuing 
one way of life some virtues will not be possible to achieve because they are unique to 
another, incompatible way of life that is also morally acceptable. If we accept this 
description of moral pluralism and the need for it, what is the role of the state in 
relationship to moral pluralism? 
 The state cannot coerce someone to adhere to one way of life over any other way; 
probably, the state should not even encourage someone to choose one morally acceptable 
way over another morally acceptable way of life. But the state can encourage a plurality 
of morally acceptable ways of life and discourage morally unacceptable ways of life. The 
morally acceptable or unacceptable will depend on the society in which one lives. This 
has been called the social forms thesis. McCabe explains, “social forms structure the 
possibilities for many of our most important pursuits (for example, personal relationships, 
careers, leisure activities, personal projects, and aesthetic experience) and are embodied 
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both in social practices and in such things as common beliefs, myths, folklore, and 
images drawn from the public culture.”130 For example, in a society that values 
monogamous marriages, the state should encourage this way of life and try to hinder 
sudden changes in this way of life. Raz seems to think that sudden changes would cause 
too many problems. But if the society gradually changes its practice of marriage, then 
Raz thinks the state should become more tolerant of the newer practice, unless it is 
morally repugnant. But toleration does not include morally unacceptable options, which 
is highlighted in Raz’s perfectionist autonomy principle. As Raz writes, “The autonomy 
principle permits and even requires governments to create morally valuable opportunities, 
and to eliminate repugnant ones.”131 Again, it should be stressed that this promotion and 
elimination does not necessarily require coercion, which Raz is against except in the case 
of harm to others. As Raz explains, “A government which subsidizes certain activities, 
rewards their pursuit, and advertises their availability encourages those activities without 
coercion.”132 Thus, the government should create a plurality of morally acceptable 
options, encourage its citizens to choose among these options, encourage tolerance 
among the morally acceptable options, and discourage any options that are morally 
repugnant. 
 
John Finnis 
Representing the natural law theory, John Finnis presents a different version of political 
perfectionism from that of Raz. Finnis’ theory is pluralistic in that there are many ways of 
life that are morally acceptable. On this point, Rawls, Dworkin, and Raz would converge 
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to some degree with him. But Finnis’ theory is also comprehensive, which separates his 
view from both Rawls and Dworkin. And Finnis’ view is ultimately distinct from Raz’s 
where Raz tries to hold onto his liberal origins. Raz maintains, with other ‘liberal’ 
philosophers, that liberty is intrinsically valuable (but only as one’s liberty is used to 
pursue good things133), i.e. a basic reason for action, while Finnis claims that liberty (or 
autonomy) is very important but only instrumentally valuable. I will first present Finnis’ 
critique of political anti-perfectionism. Then, I will present the basic structure of his 
natural law theory. 
 
Finnis’ Critique of Anti-perfectionism 
Political anti-perfectionism claims that the state cannot advocate any particular 
conception of the good; otherwise, lack of neutrality would lead to the unequal or 
disrespectful treatment of citizens. However, Finnis claims that this position is “self-
stultifying.”134 Finnis’ line of reasoning can be summarized in his own words, “Those 
who put forward the argument [for anti-perfectionism] prefer a conception of human 
good, according to which a person is entitled to equal concern and respect and a 
community is in bad shape if that entitlement is denied; moreover, they act on this 
preference by seeking to repeal the restrictive legislation which those against whom they 
are arguing may have enacted.”135 By enforcing their views of equality, anti-
perfectionists already betray their belief that the state must be neutral toward conceptions 
of the human good. If they believe that their conception of the human good allows for the 
                                                            
133 Raz, Morality of Freedom, 378ff. Admittedly, this is an odd view to hold. Raz thinks that the state 
needs to help make available a plurality of good options for its citizens, but it is the citizens that must 
exercise their autonomy and choose among the various options. 
134 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights [NLNR, hereafter] (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 221.  
135 Ibid., 221-222. 
72 
equal treatment of people, then certainly it is possible that other conceptions of the 
human good could allow for the equal treatment of people as well. If Finnis is correct in 
claiming that it is not possible to avoid all conceptions of the human good, then, it would 
be better to argue about which conception(s) of the human good are true. 
 Another issue Finnis has with the anti-perfectionists is that they frequently 
assume, at least implicitly, that all forms of perfectionism (or paternalism) are essentially 
the same. Finnis’ version of perfectionism is comprehensive, but it is also pluralistic. Yet 
Rawls seems to assume that to be pluralistic, a view of the state must not be 
comprehensive. The main point here is that Finnis would agree that some versions of 
perfectionism or paternalism are indeed unacceptable, but this fact does not mean that 
there are no good theories of perfectionism or paternalism. Unlike the anti-perfectionists, 
Finnis does not believe that a paternalist state necessarily shows a lack of respect to some 
citizens.136 However, Finnis prefers a more limited government (which will be explained 
more fully below), which is why he does not advocate a pure form of paternalism. So, as 
will be explained below, Finnis thinks his theory is a good candidate to overcome some 
of the pitfalls and concerns of perfectionist theories.  
 Unlike Raz, Finnis does not present an elaborate set of arguments and 
counterexamples to disprove the anti-perfectionist position. It is largely through the 
development of his own position that the reasons he opposes anti-perfectionism become 
clear. Prior to explaining Finnis’ natural law position, an important distinction between 
him and Raz needs to be mentioned. Raz, as discussed above, believes that the state can 
promote morally acceptable ways of life and discourage morally unacceptable ones. On 
this point, Finnis and Raz agree. But Raz still wants to adhere to one of the main liberal 
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tenets: the intrinsic value of liberty (or autonomy). Raz claims that autonomy is 
intrinsically good; thus, it is a basic reason for action. At first glance, this idea might 
appear to be plausible; a good action seems to be better when it is done through a process 
of the individual’s reason and will. However, Finnis would relegate liberty (or autonomy) 
to the category of instrumental goods. Liberty is important for one to follow his rational 
plan of life, but it is not a basic reason for action. To put it differently, liberty is a 
necessary condition for the possibility of pursuing the good life but it is not basic (or 
intrinsically valuable). Liberty is never the intelligible benefit of an action; a rational 
person never does something simply because one can do it. For example, it would seem 
strange for someone to join a monastery only because one was free to do it, or to get an 
advanced degree simply because one had the liberty to do it. One joins a monastery 
because one thinks it fulfills some sort of religious commitment; and one gets an 
advanced degree because one values knowledge and, sometimes, the instrumental value it 
might have for getting a job and making money. However, some choices are rationally 
under-determined and might seem to be counterexamples. If I had a choice between blue 
slacks or brown, I might decide to wear the blue slacks just because I can. But this is not 
actually a counterexample. When the choice to do something (or not) is rationally under-
determined, then one is not deciding to do it (or not) on the basis of reasons for action. 
One might be deciding on what feels better. And this is completely consistent with 
Finnis’ position. The important point is that liberty or autonomy cannot be a reason for 
action. 
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Finnis’ Natural Law Position 
Aquinas writes, “good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided.”137 The word 
‘good’ in this statement does not refer to moral good; the statement is used simply as the 
first principle of practical reason. The good is the end to which one’s actions are directed. 
Finnis explains that we should not think of this as something is good because I desire it; 
but rather that I desire it (whatever it is) because it is good.138 In Natural Law and 
Natural Rights, Finnis lists seven basic human goods, which are the basic reasons for 
action. They are basic because they are intelligibly pursued for their own sake. The list of 
basic goods consists of the following: life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, 
sociability (friendship), practical reasonableness, and ‘religion’.139 Again, it needs to be 
stressed that these goods are premoral. To illustrate this point, an example, using the 
good of friendship, given by Robert George will suffice.140 Scenario 1: I have a friend in 
the hospital who is quite sick; in fact, he is barely conscious and aware of his 
surroundings. I go to visit him. He does not even know that I am there, so I cannot be 
visiting him for his own sake or for some ulterior motive (e.g. to get in good with him 
before he dies). I am visiting him solely because the friendship is good and important. 
Scenario 2: I find out that my friend and colleague in the university has taken money for 
personal use that was supposed to pay for his travel to a professional conference. Some 
officials come to me, knowing that I am his friend, and ask me if I know anything about 
this situation. Knowing that my friend did take this money, I lie to protect him because I 
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value his friendship and do not want his career to end for something like this. When we 
reflect on either of these scenarios, we see an intelligible reason for action at work: 
friendship. Even if we are wholly against lying (believing that lying is always immoral), 
we can understand why someone would lie in scenario 2; it is intelligible action. Finnis 
argues that all intelligible actions are ultimately based on these basic goods.  
 Before proceeding, I should explain what Finnis means by these basic goods, what 
is included under each. The good has the nature of an end, Aquinas claims, and our 
natural inclinations, guided by reason, direct us toward these ends, even though we 
sometimes make mistakes in our judgment.141 And these goods lead to what Aristotle 
calls eudaimonia (happiness or well-being).142 For example, we might believe that a 
given pill will help us overcome our sickness, and that pill might actually not be the right 
pill. Yet we take it because we understand health as being good. So, practical reason is 
directed toward good ends, aspects of our human fulfillment.143 This direction is initially 
not a moral category; it first is understood as intelligible action as explained above. And 
now I will explain briefly Finnis’ initial list of the basic goods. 
 First, life is the first good on Finnis’ list. This good includes things like health 
(including mental health) and “freedom from the pain that betokens organic 
malfunctioning or injury.”144 Second, knowledge is considered a basic good in so far as it 
is pursued for its own sake and not instrumentally. All knowledge falls under this 
category, not only some kinds (or fields) of knowledge. Third, some activities have no 
other point than the performance of the activity, which is called play. For example, chess 
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played just for the fun of it (as opposed to playing for money at a tournament) can serve 
no other purpose than the enjoyment of the game itself, including the competition. Plus, 
chess is complex enough to allow for a lifetime of performance. Fourth, aesthetic 
experience is the next good that contributes to human flourishing. By this good, Finnis 
thinks that beautiful form can be found in artifacts and nature that are appreciated for 
their own sakes. Fifth, people desire to be at peace with other people, especially people 
near them like family and neighbors. But people also desire to have a certain amount of 
friends. There are certainly some kinds of ‘friendship’ that serve only instrumental 
purposes, as Aristotle points out; but a certain kind of friendship exists where each friend 
acts for the sake of the other. And this good also highlights the general attitude that 
people typically prefer to be in some state of harmony with others. Sixth, practical 
reasonableness is the ability to make good decisions in shaping one’s life. Finnis writes, 
“it involves that one seeks to bring an intelligent and reasonable order into one’s own 
actions and habits and practical attitudes.”145 Lastly, the seventh basic good is ‘religion’. 
Finnis specifically puts this word in scare quotes because he does not want it limited to 
organized religion. Finnis certainly uses the word to refer to the typical religions, but he 
also wants it to include those who do not hold any religious beliefs. For those who do not 
hold to any religious belief, Finnis uses the word ‘religion’ as a placeholder to represent 
whatever one takes to be the ultimate reality or ultimate principle of reality.  
 The idea of self-evidence needs some explanation because a common objection 
against the basic goods is that not everyone agrees that these are all goods or that not 
everyone recognizes that these are valuable. Finnis illustrates the self-evidence of the 
basic goods using the good of knowledge. He writes, “This is not to say that everyone 
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actually does recognize the value of knowledge [or any other good], or that there are no 
preconditions for recognizing that value.”146 To explain these preconditions, we should 
cite a larger statement made by Finnis, 
The value of truth becomes obvious only to one who has 
experienced the urge to question, who has grasped the 
connection between question and answer, who understands 
that knowledge is constituted by correct answers to 
particular questions, and who is aware of the possibility of 
further questions and of other questioners who likewise 
could enjoy the advantage of attaining correct answers. A 
new-born child, for example, has presumably not had any 
such set of felt inclinations, memories, understandings, and 
(in short) experiences.147 
 
For clarification, Finnis states what is not meant by self-evidence because this term is 
frequently misunderstood in contemporary philosophy. Once again, he illustrates his 
points using the good of knowledge. The first thing is that these self-evident values are 
not derived from facts. “No such inference is possible.”148 So, even if it could be proven 
as a fact that “all humans desire to know”, we could not conclude that knowledge is 
thereby a value. Moreover, if it could be shown that all humans value knowledge, that too 
would not be enough to conclude that knowledge is a value. Finnis is quick to point out 
that the converse is also not true—just because some people do not value or pursue 
knowledge does not prove that knowledge is not a value. Granted, the fact (if it was 
proven to be so) that all humans desire to know and value knowledge would be relevant 
as a reminder, but it is not enough to justify the conclusion that knowledge is a human 
good. Persons of great knowledge and wisdom (e.g. Plato or Galileo) reveal the 
possibilities open to individuals who might not otherwise get to that level without their 
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inspiration. To explain this subtle point well, I will again cite a longer portion of Finnis’ 
text: 
But to say that knowledge must be a real value, because 
intelligent people, or great or mature persons have regarded 
it as a value and as an aspect of their own flourishing, is not 
to make what could be called an inference. For one’s 
assessment of a person as flourishing, mature, great, or, in 
the relevant respect, intelligent is made possible only by 
one’s own underived understanding that what that person is 
and does is really good (in the relevant respects). The 
‘premiss’ of the apparent inference thus rests on its 
‘conclusion’.149 
 
Without reflection, however, one may not consciously realize (or acknowledge) that she 
is pursuing knowledge (or the other goods) for its own sake. Likewise, one may not 
comprehend that he is using the law of noncontradiction when noticing a contradiction in 
someone’s argument. Not consciously acknowledging the law of noncontradiction does 
not prove that it is not true (i.e. a valid rule of rational thought). Moreover, it does not 
prove that it is not self-evident. In the way that there are self-evident principles in 
theoretical reasoning, so there are self-evident principles in the realm of practical 
rationality.150 
 How does acknowledging the basic goods, for Finnis, influence anything in the 
political realm? To answer this question, we will have to explore the foundations for his 
natural law theory. First, it will be assumed that human beings have free choice. Finnis 
explains his use of ‘free choice’, “For the moment let it suffice that one makes a free 
choice when, judging that one has reason(s) or other motives to adopt one possible course 
of action (‘option’), and reason(s) to adopt some incompatible alternative, one adopts one 
option (if only to ‘do nothing’) in preference to the other and so settles what (unless one 
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changes one’s mind) one will do.”151 It is this notion of free will that will be assumed 
throughout this section concerning Finnis’ view. 
 An important foundation for Finnis’ natural law comes from Aquinas’ distinction 
of the four orders of reason.152 Failure to distinguish these four orders, Finnis believes, 
has led to many problems in current theories of morality, politics, and law. The first 
order is the one that we do not establish, but merely behold. It is the order of the natural 
sciences. We could call this the scientific order. The second order is concerned with the 
nature of reason itself. We call this the logical order. The third order relates to our 
deliberating about our own actions. We could call this the moral (or ethical) order. The 
fourth order involves making new things out of natural things. So, we could call it the 
technological order. Finnis claims that these orders cannot be reduced to one another. 
Hence, the order of morality cannot be reduced to (or derived from) science (or 
metaphysics), logic, or technology (or any other craft).153 To show the connection 
between the basic human goods and the four orders, we could say that the basic goods are 
the first principles of action for the third order. Just like logic has its first principles (e.g. 
the law of noncontradiction), so does morality.  
 The basic human goods are the principles of practical rationality that give 
substance to the first practical principle—the good is to be done and pursued and evil 
avoided. But this was all premoral. Next, Finnis moves into the moral, which will then 
lead to the political and legal realms. Finnis, along with Grisez and Boyle, have 
formulated what they call the master principle of morality (or the first principle of 
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morality). They have stated it as follows, “In voluntarily acting for human goods and 
avoiding what is opposed to them, one ought to choose and otherwise will those and only 
those possibilities whose willing is compatible with a will toward integral human 
fulfillment.”154 From this principle, Finnis et al derive specifications, such as “do not do 
evil that good may come,” but, for present purposes, I will focus on explaining the 
meaning of this principle. First, it is important to notice that the actions are voluntary, 
which I already mentioned above with Finnis’ notion of free will. So, this master 
principle applies to free actions. Second, the clause—“acting for human goods and 
avoiding what is opposed to them”--means that all actions should be directed toward the 
fulfillment, even in a broad sense, of the basic human goods. On the negative side, that 
clause means that one cannot intentionally do damage to any of the basic goods for 
oneself or others. So, for example, I cannot intentionally harm another person (or myself) 
because that would do damage to the basic good of life. However, the doctrine of double 
effect allows for unintended harm to the basic goods. For example, if I pursue the good of 
knowledge to such a great extent, then I might not have as much time for friends or play, 
thereby doing damage to those goods. This leads to the third main component of the 
master principle—the notion of integral human fulfillment. For Finnis et al, integral 
human fulfillment is an ideal toward which we strive on the earth but can never achieve; 
theologically speaking, it might be achievable in the kingdom of heaven, which is 
suggested by some Catholic philosophers. But since we are finite, we cannot possibly 
pursue all of the basic goods equally and fully; this is impossible. Explaining this 
concept, Finnis writes, “Integral human fulfillment is the fulfillment of all human persons 
and their communities, precisely because each of the first practical principles picks out 
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and directs one towards a basic human good which is as good in the lives of others as in 
one’s own.”155 
 The notion of integral human fulfillment highlights the fact that human beings are 
connected to each other; in the most general sense, there are goods that will fulfill all 
human beings when pursued. But this connection is far too general to be practically 
meaningful, if we consider every human being in the world. What does it mean to say 
that a particular group of human beings are connected politically? The answer lies in an 
understanding of community, but even this term has a variety of senses. First, there are 
‘business’ and ‘play’ communities. Business communities are comprised of people 
coordinating their efforts for some common goal or because they need each other in order 
to pursue individual goals. Finnis gives an example of two people (he calls them A and 
B) who want to get tutored by X.156 Both A and B need to coordinate their efforts to learn 
from X because X will only tutor two people at a time. A and B may not care at all for 
each other’s goals (they might even be competing with each other), but they have to 
collaborate in so far as they both want to be tutored by X. ‘Play’ communities are those 
that contain individuals who are interested in the good of the game. Each game has 
certain rules, for instance, that must be followed by all parties involved in order for the 
game to be played. Finnis writes, “Beyond that [playing for the the good play of the 
game], neither [or none] of the participants need have any interest in the other 
participant[s], even when, as in some games or play relationships (e.g. swopping jokes), 
one party’s evincing pleasure or satisfaction is a necessary condition of the other party’s 
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finding the game satisfying.”157 These communities are similar because you do not have 
to be concerned with the parties involved, except as it will effect your own goals for 
which you joined the community. 
 Contrary to the above, which Aristotle might call relationships of utility or 
pleasure, another type of community is friendship, in which the parties are concerned for 
the good of the other. Finnis writes, “the good that is common between friends is not 
simply the good of successful collaboration or co-ordination, nor is it simply the good of 
two successfully achieved coinciding projects or objectives; it is the common good of 
mutual self-constitution, self-fulfillment, self-realization.”158 The play and business (i.e. 
contractual) communities mentioned above co-ordinate their efforts for the end goal, and 
the individuals involved do not need to care for the other. But the ‘community’ of 
friendship requires that the friends are concerned for the good of each other; this is what 
we might call true friendship. However good this true friendship might be, it cannot 
supply all of the needs and goods for the individual. After all, one person cannot sustain 
this higher level of friendship with too many people.  
 Family is another form of community, which influences (and even controls) many 
facets of people’s lives. In family life, people begin to understand some of the reflexive 
basic goods, such as friendship and ‘religion’.159 However, Finnis writes, “[family as a 
community] is incomplete and inadequate.”160 For example, a family cannot breed within 
itself; it will ultimately destroy itself. So, the presence of other families is necessary in 
order for marriage and procreation to occur in a healthy manner. Additionally, regardless 
                                                            
157 Ibid., 140. 
158 Ibid., 141. 
159 Finnis, Grisez, and Boyle, 108. 
160 Ibid., 147. 
83 
of the size of one’s family, no family can supply all of the various needs and goods for 
each person. Finnis concludes that this leads to a desire for a larger community of people, 
which Aquinas calls the ‘complete community’.  
 Finnis, borrowing this concept from Aquinas, defines complete community in the 
following way: “a community so organized that its government and law give all the 
direction that properly can be given by human government and coercive law to promote 
and protect the common good, that is, the good of the community and thus of all its 
members and other proper elements.”161 Individuals, and even individual families or 
groups of friends, cannot secure all of the material conditions necessary for pursuing the 
basic goods and following their rational plan of life. Necessarily, a complete community 
would require a certain degree of coordinated action among its members (or citizens). For 
Finnis, the concepts of politics and law both concern the complete community and its 
flourishing. Finnis’ view advocates a comprehensive conception of the good, contrary to 
Rawls’ position, but it is also pluralistic. The state cannot arbitrarily support one way of 
life over another. The state, however, should encourage its citizens to pursue the basic 
goods and discourage people from doing damage to instances of the basic goods (toward 
themselves and others). But the state cannot tell its citizens to pursue the goods in any 
particular way. For example, some will pursue knowledge more than aesthetic 
experience, while others will pursue friendship more than ‘religion’. Finnis is a political 
perfectionist, yet he maintains the government is limited. The government exists for the 
common good of its citizens. 
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 Finnis lists three senses of the expression ‘common good’:162 (1) there is a 
common good among humans in the sense that the basic goods (life, knowledge, 
friendship, aesthetic experience, play, practical reasonableness, and ‘religion’) are good 
for all human beings; (2) each of the basic goods are also a “‘common good’ inasmuch as 
it can be participated in by an inexhaustible number of persons in an inexhaustible 
number of ways or on an inexhaustible variety of occasions.”; (3) the third sense is the 
main one used to describe the political community, Finnis defines it as such, “a set of 
conditions which enables the members of a community to attain for themselves 
reasonable objectives, or to realize reasonably for themselves the value(s), for the sake of 
which they have reason to collaborate with each other (positively and/or negatively) in a 
community.”163 The citizens of a state do not have the same goals and objectives, so the 
state exists to enable people to pursue their individual plans of life. In other words, many 
plans of life can be reasonable, so the state should not exclusively promote any one of the 
many reasonable life plans. The state, however, should discourage unreasonable life 
plans—plans that violate the basic goods. Since the state cannot directly promote each 
instantiation of a basic good, Finnis appeals to the notion of the political common good, 
which is more limited in its scope. 
 Since the individuals (and groups) in a political community have diverse goals, 
there is a more limited common good in a political community, which is called the 
political common good or public good. The political common good consists of two 
elements: peace and justice. According to Michael Pakaluk, Finnis’ account of peace 
consists of at least three facets: (1) protection from aggressors, both internal and external; 
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(2) things that enable trade and commerce, like roads and regulations; (3) ways to 
advance culture, like schools, museums, and libraries.164 It is clear from this explanation 
that peace, for Finnis, is not simply a lack of conflict; it also involves the advancement of 
culture as a necessary part of a more general concord of good will. In terms of the 
common good, Finnis refers to a specific kind of justice called general justice. As he 
explains, “Justice, as a quality of character, is in its general sense always a practical 
willingness to favour and foster the common good of one’s communities, and the theory 
of justice is, in all its parts, the theory of what in outline is required for that common 
good.”165 By having these two aspects of the common good, the state provides the 
necessary conditions (including things like liberty) for its citizens to pursue the basic 
human goods. In other words, the common good is instrumental in allowing people to 
pursue the goods. 
 More should be said about the limited nature of the political common good in 
Finnis’ view, which demonstrates why he does not advocate a strict paternalism. Mark 
Murphy claims that Finnis has two main reasons for subscribing to the instrumental view 
of the common good, “first, that the common good aggregatively conceived is not a 
realizable end; second, that the common good instrumentally conceived is able to provide 
an account of limited government.”166 I will address these ideas more fully in Chapter 
Five when I discuss the relationship of the political common good to aesthetic 
experience. But, for now, I will focus on the second reason: limited government. It would 
be overstepping the state’s authority to coerce people into liking a particular basic good 
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more than others or to pursue a particular good in a particular way. As previously stated, 
people will develop their own rational plans of life. In other words, Finnis might agree 
with Rawls that a free society will develop into a reasonable pluralism, but this fact does 
not preclude the appeal to a comprehensive doctrine, as Rawls supposes. This is why, for 
Finnis, the political common good consists mostly of justice and peace—the conditions 
that make it possible for people to pursue the goods they want and in the way that they 
want. 
 If the power of the state is limited, as Finnis supposes, then we need to gain a 
clearer notion about the authority of law within a state. Why have authority in the first 
place? Multiple ways of achieving the common good are available in any given society. 
Either the society must possess unanimity or there must be an authority.167 In order for 
society’s actions to be coordinated, an authority must make a decision about which 
possible course of action will be done. The primary method comes in the form of law. 
Part of the idea here is to respond to those that think that law (and authority) are only 
needed when there is deficiency. For example, children do not have fully developed 
mental capacities, which is why they need the authority of their parents. But Finnis and 
others (especially Yves Simon) argue that even if we ignore deficiencies, we can still see 
that law and authority are needed to bring about the common good. Finnis writes, “the 
greater the intelligence and skill of a group’s members, and the greater their commitment 
and dedication to common purposes and common good, the more authority and 
regulation may be required, to enable that group to achieve its common purpose, common 
good.”168 Thus, we have authority, according to Finnis, because we need someone (or 
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some group) to make decisions about achieving the common good. And the law is the 
primary means by which the authority directs the community to the common good. In 
other words, the law, backed by the state’s authority, is supposed to create an 
environment that allows for its citizens to pursue the basic goods and constitute 
themselves (or help) in community.169 
 
Some Criticisms of Anti-Perfectionism 
As mentioned at the end of the previous chapter, the fact that political anti-perfectionism 
has trouble justifying state support for the arts is not a reason for the complete rejection 
of this position. If anti-perfectionism is the best option as a theory for government action, 
then the inability of the state to support the arts might just be a bullet one must bite. 
However, I maintain that there are other more serious problems for the anti-perfectionist 
position, in addition to the ones that Raz and Finnis have offered. 
 I provide three reasons for rejecting the anti-perfectionist position. First, it is not 
actually neutral among differing ways of life, which, if so, suggests we need to argue for 
endorsing a particular conception of the good. Liberal anti-perfectionism endorses an 
individualistic conception of the good—the individual’s rights or liberties are the most 
primary of the goods—which is why the individual is what matters to those parties in the 
original position, according to Rawls’ view. On this idea, Robert George claims it is 
critical to note that the parties in the original position do not reject perfectionism because 
it is unjust. “Perfectionist principles are unjust, Rawls supposes, because the parties in the 
original position would reject them. Their rejection of perfectionism is motivated, not by 
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moral considerations (e.g. considerations of justice), but by cautious self-interest.”170 This 
is precisely the problem—that the individual’s interest is supreme—that communitarians 
have with the liberal anti-perfectionist position. “According to this criticism, liberals base 
their theories on notions of individual rights and personal freedom, but neglect the extent 
to which individual freedom and well-being are only possible within community.”171 The 
concept of rights, for instance, depends on the existence of a community to bestow (and 
enforce) those rights; an individual living alone on an island does not have rights, except 
maybe in relation to his country of origin. We might believe that people ought to have 
certain basic rights, even in a state of nature, but rights in a strict sense only exist in a 
political community. Furthermore, in a state of nature, if someone believes his rights have 
been violated, there is no recourse that he can take to have this violation corrected, which 
is like Hobbes’ view. Contra Hobbes, I believe, with Locke, that there would be an idea 
of morality in a state of nature because people would still understand certain things to be 
for their good and other people’s good, but rights seem to require the existence of an 
official community. Obviously, in the state of nature, the man could try to overpower his 
aggressor as some kind of vindication, but there is no higher communal authority to 
which he can appeal to protect his ‘rights’. And the political anti-perfectionists seem to 
sidestep this idea in their emphasis on the individual, as if an individual’s rights were 
innate and appeal to them were not a comprehensive doctrine. 
 To explain this point further, it will be shown that just because the state does not 
support certain obvious doctrines of the good does not mean that it does not support any 
doctrine of the good. By not supporting some option A, the state is not acting in a neutral 
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manner. The state will be supporting a different option B. Though it might appear that 
option B is neutral, choosing B is still the conclusion of a judgment made by the state. 
Thus, it is not neutral. Using arts funding as an example of this lack of neutrality, 
Lambert Zuidervaart claims that a state that does not support and fund the arts is 
privileging “market-based conceptions of the good, which are not neutral with respect to 
nonmarket goods, practices, and institutions.”172 One might think that not funding the arts 
is the neutral position, which even Dworkin rejects by insisting that not funding the arts 
cannot be viewed as the default position. But Zuidervaart claims that the state would still 
support a conception of the good, a conception that maintains art (and other such 
products) should exist only as the market allows. So, if people could no longer produce 
(and appreciate) art because no one had any money for it, then this would be an 
acceptable, though unfortunate, consequence of this market-based conception of the 
good. The state always supports something that it deems valuable for it citizens, so the 
question is what qualifies as valuable and worthy of state support. Believing, correctly I 
think, that neutrality is not possible, political perfectionists try to uncover which kinds of 
value the state should be allowed to support and why. 
 Second, an alleged virtue of the anti-perfectionist position is that it does not favor 
any ways of life or conceptions of the good. I have already shown how it favors an 
individualistic conception of the good, but it also, particularly for Dworkin, favors a 
liberal ethics as well. It assumes to treat people adhering to all manner of reasonable 
doctrines equally, including religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines. But Dworkin 
openly allows his political view to be a continuation of his ethical view, which not 
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everyone will endorse. So, he very clearly favors a comprehensive moral doctrine in his 
theory of the state. This is where Rawls at least tries to be more consistent (not to say 
Rawls is correct), though Rawls seems to sneak an individualistic conception into his 
theory as mentioned above. Showing that Rawls tries to avoid this issue, Larmore writes 
that Rawls “declares that a political conception is freestanding, if it looks only to the 
principles that should govern the political life of society.”173 Favoring a moral doctrine is 
not neutral nor consistent with Rawls’ anti-perfectionism, yet it is allowed in Dworkin’s 
view, albeit only the liberal view of ethics. Perhaps, Dworkin (or a follower of his) would 
claim that his moral and political doctrines are not strictly connected, like two lines 
running parallel with each other; so, his political view is not derived from nor dependent 
on his moral view. Yet Dworkin claims that his political theory is a continuation of his 
liberal moral theory. So, they must be intimately connected. It is inconsistent for him to 
be able to connect his political and moral philosophy in a way that he does not allow 
others (namely perfectionists) to do. 
 Dworkin points out, correctly I think, that if the two principles of justice in Rawls’ 
theory are accepted, they are accepted because they are good in some sense. We should 
not need a hypothetical situation with a hypothetical contract to determine that we should 
accept them. After all, Dworkin writes, “a hypothetical contract is not simply a pale form 
of an actual contract; it is no contract at all.”174 If the parties in the original position 
would pick the two principles in the hypothetical situation, they should also want to pick 
them in normal circumstances as well because they are good principles. The ‘fact’ that 
the parties (or any one of us) would have selected them adds nothing substantial to the 
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argument. If the principles are good, then it is because they are “fair and sensible” in 
themselves.175 And this is why he believes in the continuity between his ethical and 
political theory. But this seems to create a kind of paradox: Dworkin wants his liberal 
theory to treat people equally and respectfully by not favoring conceptions of the good, 
yet his political view favors the liberal ethical position. However, Dworkin claims that 
his liberal ethical position is sufficiently abstract to allow people of diverse ethical 
positions to accept it. While I think he gets some things correct in his challenge model of 
ethics, I think he lacks a third alternative. 
 Dworkin claims that there are two models of ethics: the model of impact which 
has the good life resting in a final product and the model of challenge which has the good 
life resting in the performance. It seems to me that these are not necessarily exclusive; in 
other words, it could be one or the other or both. Dworkin seems to imply that the 
performance is the only thing that really matters, but surely he does not think all 
performances are equally good, especially ones that lead a person to a disastrous end. For 
example, does Dworkin really think that the process (or performance) of becoming 
addicted to drugs or obese are good because the performance was good? This is where 
the ideas of ends (or worthy goals) becomes important. The performance and the end 
seem to need each other. Even a stringent believer in teleology usually will not think all 
processes are good to arrive at the desired end (though there might be a few exceptions 
here). And Dworkin seems to believe that some ways of life are truly better than others, 
which cannot be endorsed by his theory of the state, but it is not clear why his theory of 
morality, which is at an individual level, cannot endorse certain ways of life. Or, at the 
very least, it seems that his theory of morality should be able to discourage some ways of 
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life that are harmful to the individual. Otherwise, on what basis can Dworkin claim that 
certain things, like the consumption of pornography, is degrading to the individual? He 
asserts this as a fact not just his own opinion. Though I think Dworkin is correct to desire 
a continuity, to some extent, between ethical and political theory, I think he makes his 
account too thin and too abstract in order to hold onto his liberal ideal of not favoring 
ways of life and conceptions of the good.  
 Dworkin’s notion of continuity—that political theory is a continuation of ethical 
theory—is something that a natural law theorist would also embrace, but there is a 
difference. Dworkin claimed that if the state favors a way of life (or conception of the 
good), then the state is treating disrespectfully those who do not hold that way. Is 
Dworkin claiming that his continuation of liberal ethics into liberal politics treats 
disrespectfully those people who do not adhere to liberal ethics? It seems that this would 
be a logical conclusion. Dworkin seems to think that he avoids this dilemma because the 
core of the liberal ethics that he presents is abstract. In other words, anyone should be 
able to accept it from their own perspective. Recall that Dworkin adheres to the model of 
challenge—that the good life has value as a skillful performance. By adopting this model, 
Dworkin thinks he has achieved a “structural and philosophical rather than substantive 
character” to his position of liberal ethics and politics.176 He cites Aristotle as an adherent 
of this view, which seems basically unproblematic. But Aristotle says quite specifically 
that there are some performances for which there is no mean; they are just wrong, 
including adultery, theft, and murder. The reply might be that these would also be wrong 
under liberal ethics as these actions do harm to another person. However, Aristotle also 
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lists certain feelings, like spite, shamelessness, and envy.177 Aristotle does not allow that 
all performances are good as a performance. Does Dworkin think that all performances 
make a life good? People may disagree with the specific things that Aristotle lists as not 
having a mean because they are not good. But the point remains that performances and 
ends are more integrated than Dworkin allows. A performance that fails to achieve a 
desired end might still be good as a performance, but a performance without any end is 
unintelligible. 
 Third, I believe that Rawls and Dworkin probably want people to flourish. 
However, the state, in their views, cannot really help citizens (or even encourage them) to 
achieve this goal. The state can only set up conditions for the survival of its citizens, but 
the citizens should not be coerced by the state to pursue worthy goals. This does not 
mean that people will not pursue worthy goals, but just that the state should not coerce 
them to pursue worthy goals or to avoid non-worthy goals. Otherwise, the state will be be 
violating the liberal view of treating citizens equally. For the most part, I agree that to 
force a conception of the good onto someone is not acceptable for the state. But the state 
does not have to force a conception of the good, as Raz pointed out, it might simply 
encourage certain ways of life and warn of the dangers of other ways of life. In fact, 
many governments already do this and they even go a bit further. For example, in the 
United States, the government has not outlawed smoking, but it restricts the 
advertisements for cigarettes and taxes cigarettes at a higher level. Presumably, liberal 
philosophers should oppose these restrictions, and even perfectionists do not have to 
agree with these particular restrictions. But it seems odd that the state, with the 
information that cigarettes harm people, would not, at the very least, encourage its 
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citizens to avoid them. So, I think the state, in a sense, has a duty to encourage things that 
lead to flourishing and discourage things that hinder human flourishing. I should add that 
perfectionism does not preclude pluralism as was made clear by both Raz and Finnis, 
which seems to be one of Rawls’ main worries.  
 
The Superiority of Finnis’ View over Raz’s View 
Due to the criticisms I have presented above, I believe that it makes sense to abandon the 
liberal anti-perfectionist positions of Rawls and Dworkin. For someone still committed to 
the liberal ideals, the obvious move to make next would be to accept a liberal 
perfectionist position, like that of Raz. The state cannot avoid supporting certain ways of 
life and conceptions of the good because the state should want more for its citizens than 
mere survival; they should want their citizens’ lives to be full and enriched. Thus, the 
question is which valuable things should the state support and how, while still being just. 
Though I think Raz’s critique of anti-perfectionism is very strong, I ultimately align my 
view closer to that of Finnis’ position. In fact, I think if one comes to accept Raz’s liberal 
perfectionism, I think the next logical step is to accept a position like Finnis’ that has a 
more robust account of the good. In Chapter Five, I will present my account of political 
perfectionism and its relationship to aesthetic experience. Here, I will briefly present a 
couple of reasons for favoring Finnis’ position over Raz’s view. 
 First, Raz’s view does not go far enough in explaining why certain things are 
valuable. A main tenet of perfectionism is that it gives priority of the good over the right, 
but Raz does not seem to provide an account of the good. He says throughout his main 
book, The Morality of Freedom, that certain things are good, but he does not really 
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explain why those things are good. What grounds their goodness? For example, Raz 
thinks that destroying a painting that I own by Van Gogh is my right to do so, but I 
should not exercise that right because art is “one of the values which give life 
meaning.”178 Why is art valuable and gives life meaning? It certainly seems that not 
everyone would agree about all art being valuable, which seems to be problematic for a 
liberal view. Which art is valuable? Raz does not offer any substantial reason as to why 
art is valuable or how it gives meaning to people’s lives. I will argue that aesthetic 
experience is a basic human good and the most fundamental purpose of all art; therefore, 
art is valuable for our lives and deserves the state’s protection and promotion. 
 Second, and related, Raz maintains that autonomy is intrinsically good, but only 
when it is used for good. This is a problem because of his lack of an account of the good 
as mentioned above, but also because autonomy is not basic but instrumental. If 
autonomy is truly an intrinsic good, “are not all choices valuable just to the extent that 
they are autonomous?”179 Raz does not want to say that all choices are equally valuable, 
if they are chosen autonomously, and yet he does not explain why autonomous choices of 
the good are the only ones that matter. Why not just provide an account of the good (or 
goods)? Though he does not endorse relativism, Raz does not explain how it is to be 
avoided in his system because he does not provide an account of the good. Someone 
might say that autonomy is used for good whenever the person makes an informed (and 
free) decision, which corresponds with Dworkin’s view. This is consistent with Raz’s 
belief about autonomy being used for the good, but it slides into a relativistic position 
about the good because any informed choice would become good. Even if Raz is correct 
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that autonomy is only valuable when used for the good, then he still needs an account of 
the good, which I think is better supplied by the natural law position. 
 Autonomy should not be considered intrinsically good because it is not a reason 
for which people act; it is instrumental. People do not generally do things only because 
they can. But having the autonomy to do things is a necessary condition for acting in 
ways that are good. For example, one will not play soccer for the reason that one has the 
autonomy to do so. One will play soccer (or other games and sports) because they 
instantiate the good of play. But in order to be able to play a game, one must, as a 
necessary condition, have the freedom to do so. And the idea of using one’s autonomy for 
good is what motivates Raz to claim that autonomy has value only as one uses it to 
pursue the good. But he does not offer a theory about what counts as good. This lack is a 
serious problem for his theory which is why I think after someone comes to accept his 
perfectionist theory, he or she will eventually move to something more like the natural 
law position that presents an account of the good.  
 
Conclusion 
As explained above, Raz and Finnis proffer theories of political perfectionism, in contrast 
with the anti-perfectionist theories of Rawls and Dworkin. Raz, though, still claims to fall 
under the main tenets of liberalism, that autonomy is a basic or primary good 
(intrinsically valuable), which is part of the reason I favor Finnis’ position. Finnis breaks 
away from the liberal ideals and suggests different goods as basic, from which he derives 
his natural law theory. The problem for the political anti-perfectionist positions 
concerning state support for the arts that was presented at the end of chapter one is not a 
problem for the political perfectionist, or so I shall be arguing. I will argue for a version 
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of political perfectionism that claims aesthetic experience is a distinct basic human good, 
and this position allows the state to encourage and fund the arts. But, prior to making that 
argument, I will present in the next two chapters the main constituents for a theory of 
aesthetic experience, beginning with some historical figures and ideas (Chapter 3) and 
then, drawing from the resources provided by those sources, my own view (Chapter 4).
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CHAPTER 3 
SOME IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTIONS AND  
THE CONTEMPORARY DECLINE OF AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapters, I have shown the tension between political anti-perfectionism 
and political perfectionism in reference to state neutrality. A problem, as I mentioned, 
with the anti-perfectionists is that they cannot theoretically justify state support for the 
arts, such as the funding of art. The state, for them, must be neutral toward values and 
goods, like aesthetic experience. But if something like aesthetic experience leads to 
people's well-being, as I will argue, then it seems that the state should not be neutral 
toward it. Or so the political perfectionists contend. I present my perfectionist position in 
Chapter Five. Prior to that, I need to give an account of the nature of aesthetic experience 
in Chapter Four, in order to clarify how I am using this term. Since the concept of 
aesthetic experience is important to many philosophers of aesthetics and aesthetic 
experience is important in people’s lives, then we should consider whether we can 
develop a theory of aesthetic experience that overcomes the problems of previous 
accounts, which is my motivation for this chapter. 
 Aesthetic experience is a concept with a rich history, having its origin in the 
writings of Plato and Aristotle, though I will not be recounting its history here. Yet
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 recently, many contemporary philosophers and theorists have deemed it a useless 
concept. This verdict has arisen because the term ‘aesthetic experience’ cannot be 
precisely defined; there seems to always be present a certain amount of ambiguity. The 
two components, aesthetic and experience, have each been considered ambiguous. It is 
claimed that putting them together to form one concept ‘aesthetic experience’ seems to 
multiply the problem. So, as I will show below, interpretation has replaced aesthetic 
experience as the fundamental concept and purpose of art in much of the current 
literature. However, many philosophers, most notably Richard Shusterman, are not 
satisfied with diminishing the concept of aesthetic experience; they claim this concept 
might be vague, but it is clearly important in the lives of human beings around the world. 
Prior to cataloging the decline of the concept of aesthetic experience, I will first discuss 
three philosophers—Kant, Dewey, and Beardsley—who influence, in different ways and 
degrees, my own view of aesthetic experience.   
 I begin with Kant180 as one of the most important modern philosophers in 
aesthetics, since he presents the first systematic treatment of aesthetics in the modern era 
and sets the stage for the future discussion of many of the key topics. Kant, for example, 
presents his highly influential concept of disinterested pleasure, which means that the 
experience of beauty is a purely contemplative action. I adopt a version of this idea in my 
own theory, though I tend more towards a Thomistic understanding of contemplation. 
Additionally, I use some other concepts from Kant's aesthetic theory for my notion of 
aesthetic experience, such as the sublime and taste. Though others have used these terms 
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(the sublime dates back to Longinus and taste can be traced back to Plato and Aristotle), 
it is Kant who offered the first thorough discussion of these concepts. Though I do not 
agree with several of his conclusions, I am influenced by the distinctions he makes and 
his overall system. 
 It is important to the ultimate thesis of this project to connect aesthetic experience, 
in some sense, with everyday life. For this reason, it is relevant to discuss Dewey's notion 
of aesthetic experience, which he explicitly tries to connect with everydayness. In fact, 
for Dewey, every experience has a degree of the aesthetic present. It was around the same 
time frame (albeit a little earlier) as Dewey’s lectures at Harvard (1932), which are now 
published as his book Art as Experience, that the shift began to move away from aesthetic 
experience and the necessary connection between art and beauty. Though Dewey tried to 
hold onto the importance of aesthetic experience, many of the philosophers of the time 
were beginning to move away from the concept, deeming it useless. I rely on Dewey 
more in his connection of aesthetic experience with the everyday than his his aesthetic 
theory proper. 
 At this point in history, it seems impossible to develop a view of aesthetic 
experience that does not borrow some aspects from other theorists. I owe a lot to the 
writings of Monroe Beardsley, a preeminent aesthetician and literary critic in the 20th 
century. His magnum opus, Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism (1958), 
was the first systematic treatment of aesthetics by an analytic philosopher. One does not 
need to look far in recent writings on aesthetics before finding his name cited for both 
agreement and disagreement; his influence is tremendous in the philosophy of art. I 
explain pertinent parts of the theory of Beardsley, as I align myself with the tradition that 
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he revived and began defending in the early 1900s. Beardsley represents what is known 
as an aesthetic theory of art or aesthetic functionalism. These theories claim that the 
fundamental purpose of art is to provide the possibility (or capacity) for an aesthetic 
experience.  
 Aesthetic experience may seem to be a concept from common experience that 
anyone could readily accept as legitimate. However, many philosophers and theorists 
have now abandoned the concept, despite its importance in history, in favor of another 
one, interpretation. They claim that aesthetic experience, being highly ambiguous, is no 
longer useful for aesthetics. So, the goal of art is to provide an object for beholders to 
interpret, regardless of any experience they may or may not have in the process. 
Shusterman suggests that since aesthetic experience is clearly important for our lives, the 
concept must also be important, even if we cannot achieve the level of precision that we 
would like. But as Aristotle has written, “[T]he educated person seeks exactness in each 
area to the extent that the nature of the subject allows.”181 And it is taking this cue from 
Shusterman—that aesthetic experience is important—that motivates me to begin 
developing a theory of aesthetic experience, which I present in the next chapter.182 
 
Historical Development of the Notion of Aesthetic Experience 
Immanuel Kant 
Though the ideas of aesthetics have been discussed since ancient times, the term 
‘aesthetics’, as it is currently used, was coined by Alexander Baumgarten in his book, 
Reflections on Poetry (1735). He used ‘aesthetics’ to refer to the lower faculties of human 
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beings, the faculties that sense. But it is Kant who has become the most famous for 
writing the modern philosophical system of aesthetics, The Critique of the Power of 
Judgment (1790). The focus here will be on Kant’s contribution to theory about aesthetic 
experience. Kant, however, did not have a specific concept of aesthetic experience; he 
mostly spoke about aesthetic judgments (or judgments of taste). But the principles he 
presents for his judgments of taste have been used by later philosophers to ground their 
theories of aesthetic experience.  
 Judgments of taste, which are judgments of beauty, are explained by appealing to 
four moments. These moments distinguish aesthetic judgment from other kinds of 
judgment. The third Critique is seen “as a culmination and completion of critical 
philosophy.”183 The four moments correspond with the four judgments in the table of 
judgments in The Critique of Pure Reason (A70/B95): quantity, quality, relation, and 
modality. With judgments of taste, Kant begins with quality, not quantity, because “an 
aesthetic judgment about the beautiful is concerned with it first.”184 The first moment can 
be summarized by the word ‘disinterestedness’. To judge something beautiful, one must 
have a feeling of pleasure, but this kind of pleasure is different from other kinds. For 
example, consider the feeling of pleasure involved in getting a new car. A car enables one 
to get to work, take trips, do errands, and possibly impress others. In other words, the 
pleasure of the car is, at least in part, based on interests. For Kant, the pleasure of beauty 
is disinterested, and therefore, subjective, since it can be applied only to the individual’s 
mind. This means that the object deemed beautiful fulfills neither any practical purposes 
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nor any moral requirements185 for the individual. Furthermore, the beautiful object as 
beautiful does not satisfy any desires, as would for example, someone finding a piece of 
cake while desiring to eat something sweet. Kant explains, “A judgment of taste, on the 
other hand, is merely contemplative, i.e., it is a judgment that is indifferent to the 
existence of the object: it [considers] the character of the object only by holding it up to 
our feeling of pleasure and displeasure.”186 Kant continues by claiming that free 
contemplation is not a cognitive judgment, “Nor is this contemplation, as such, directed 
to concepts, for a judgment of taste is not a cognitive judgment (whether theoretical or 
practical) and hence is not based on concepts, nor directed to them as purposes.”187 From 
these statements, the distinction between judgments of taste and other judgments 
becomes more clear. As Crawford explains, “For contemplation and reflection are absent 
in the case of what pleases merely through sensation, and in judging what is useful or 
moral, the acts of reflection and contemplation are not free but constrained by definite 
concepts.”188  
 The second moment corresponds with quantity, and it highlights how aesthetic 
judgments are, in a sense, universal. Kant’s conclusion is that “Beautiful is what, without 
a concept, is liked universally.”189 To put the conclusion this way is somewhat 
misleading because a beautiful thing does not necessarily please everyone. But Kant is 
not claiming that everyone will agree that a given object is, in fact, beautiful, rather when 
one claims that something is beautiful, he thinks everyone should agree with him. 
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Because this kind of universality is not based on concepts, Kant refers to it as subjective 
universality. For Kant, judgments of beauty cannot be objective because there are no 
rules that necessitate (or demand) the conclusion, “This is beautiful.” He presents two 
lines of reasoning for subjective universality. First, there is an argument from 
disinterestedness. Kant writes, “For if someone likes something and is conscious that he 
himself does so without any interest, then he cannot help judging that it must contain a 
basis for being liked [that holds] for everyone.”190 The judgment of beauty, since it is not 
based on any interest of the beholder, must be based on something that is universal. 
Second, Kant offers more of a linguistic observation in Section 7, by comparing the 
agreeable with the beautiful. He thinks it makes perfect sense to claim that something is 
agreeable to me. For example, one person likes the taste of onions, while another does 
not. Contrary to this, Kant thinks it is ‘ridiculous’ to claim that something is beautiful to 
me. By calling something beautiful, Kant claims, the beholder is expecting everyone else 
to agree; in fact, the beholder demands agreement. Thus, Kant believes that judgments of 
taste are subjectively universal. 
 The third moment corresponds with the notion of relation. The relation that is 
relevant here is a relation of ends or purposes. Kant defines purpose as follows, “a 
purpose is the object of a concept insofar as we regard this concept as the object’s cause 
(the real basis of its possibility); and the causality that a concept has with regard to its 
object is purposiveness.”191 It should be noted that the kind of causality Kant has in mind 
is final causality, as opposed to efficient causality or formal causality. For my own view, 
following Aquinas and others, I emphasize formal causality as the beauty of an object 
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relates the form of the object. Even so, how is the concept the final cause of the object? 
The concept preexists the object; it is the goal for which the object was made. A hammer 
has a purpose because it was made to put nails into wood; so, the idea of its purpose 
existed before the actual hammer. However, judgments of taste (or beauty) do not depend 
on concepts, so it seems that they could not have purpose. At this point, Kant introduces 
the expression ‘purposiveness without a purpose’. He writes,  
Therefore the liking that, without a concept, we judge to be 
universally communicable and hence to be the basis that 
determines a judgment of taste, can be nothing but the 
subjective purposiveness in the presentation of an object, 
without any purpose (whether objective or subjective), and 
hence the mere form of purposiveness, insofar as we are 
conscious of it, in the presentation by which an object is 
given us.192 
 
A key term to notice is the word form (not in the Thomistic sense). Though the object 
does not have any actual purpose (otherwise we would have interested pleasure for it), 
Kant suggests that it has the form of purposiveness. It is this form of purposiveness that 
allows for the free play of the two cognitive faculties: imagination and understanding. 
Beardsley offers this explanation, “the imagination recognizes an expression of itself in 
the formally satisfying object—something it might itself have made, or would wish to 
have made, out of freedom, though in harmony with the lawfulness (but not any 
particular law) of understanding.”193 The feeling of harmony between these two faculties 
(imagination and understanding) is the disinterested pleasure. This is a point with which 
there might be some discord between Kant’s view and mine. Endorsing aesthetic 
functionalism, I believe that works of art do have a purpose (or function), which is to 
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provide the capacity for an aesthetic experience. Despite artists having purposes for their 
works, Kant claims that “the purposiveness of [the artwork’s] form must seem as free 
from all constraint of chosen rules as if it were a product of mere nature.”194 Thus, art 
might have a purpose, but it is not relevant, according to Kant, for the judgment of taste 
associated with the work. For me, a work of art is successful, all things considered, in so 
far as it lives up to its purpose of providing the possibility for an aesthetic experience. 
 The fourth moment corresponds with modality, which is summed up in Kant’s 
conclusion: “Beautiful is what without a concept is cognized as the object of a necessary 
liking.”195 The wording here is also somewhat misleading; Kant does not mean that 
everyone will necessarily find the same thing beautiful. This point is similar to the one 
made above concerning subjective universality. What does Kant mean here by using the 
term necessary? Beardsley says, “This necessity is not apodictic, for no one who makes a 
judgment of taste can guarantee that all others will agree.”196 Kant explains that this 
necessity implies that the beautiful object is exemplary. By using ‘exemplary’, Kant 
means, “a necessity of the assent of everyone to a judgment that is regarded as an 
example of a universal rule that we are unable to state.”197 An individual must make a 
judgment of taste for it to become exemplary because there is no rule to derive any 
particular judgment of taste. Christian Wenzel offers this explanation, “It looks like an 
example of a rule, as if a general rule preceded it. But in fact there is no rule to start with, 
and it is the judgment of taste that comes first [contrary to my view], that simply occurs, 
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that stands on its own feet, so to speak, and is exemplary for other humans to follow.”198 
When we see a beautiful work of art, we want to imitate it as if there were rules to follow 
to produce an equally beautiful object. Artists employ techniques that can be learned, but, 
Kant believes, it is not possible to teach someone how to make a beautiful work of art, 
even if that person masters all the techniques of a given art. Scruton offers a similar 
statement, “Those who seek a standard in the rules open themselves to refutation, when it 
is pointed out that obedience to the rules is neither necessary nor sufficient for beauty.”199 
An example of this can be given from music. There have been multiple performances of 
the great composers of classical music. However, it seems clear that some of the 
performances were not as beautiful as others, even though they may have played the 
exact same notes. Thus, the musical composition is necessary but not sufficient for a 
beautiful performance of, say, Brahms’ Hungarian Dance No. 5. There is something that 
cannot be explained or taught that makes one of these performances more beautiful than 
another. And this ‘something’ is what Kant claims cannot have any rules, but the 
judgment about it still remains exemplary. Someone might say this example is not quite 
right because it is about a performance, and Kant was talking about creating beauty. I 
think that his idea can still be applied to performances, but we can also see examples of 
this in another art form like painting. Someone might paint a beautiful painting, and ideas 
about composition or proportion could be taught by this artist. And someone, following 
these instructions, might still fail to make a beautiful painting. So, even though the basic 
constituents of beauty can be taught, according to Kant, there is still something else that 
cannot be taught. 
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 The four moments are the basis for judgments of taste or beauty. Another point 
needs to be made concerning Kant’s notion of beauty. He divides beauty into two 
categories: free and dependent (or accessory). Kant explains this distinction, “Free beauty 
does not presuppose a concept of what the object is [meant] to be. Accessory beauty does 
presuppose such a concept, as well as the object’s perfection in terms of that concept.”200 
Free beauty is usually ascribed to natural objects. Natural objects just exist. No one had 
the concept of a natural object (say, a flower) in his mind and then set out to make one. 
To put it differently, when we contemplate and judge a natural object to be beautiful, we 
are usually not thinking about the purpose or function the natural object possesses. On the 
other hand, dependent beauty (or, perhaps, conditioned beauty) is beauty that cannot be 
separated from a concept of the object. Wenzel offers this example, “The entrance of a 
gothic church, for example, its decorations and its shape, might be beautiful. But if it is 
essential that they belong to a church (or even more conceptually determined: a gothic 
church), their beauty is not free, that is, we are not free from conceptual considerations in 
our aesthetic contemplation of them.”201 It is not necessarily the case that free beauty 
applies to nature and dependent beauty applies to artifacts. It just usually happens that 
way. The crucial point is that the more disinterested someone is toward an object judged 
to be beautiful, the more free the beauty will be in the experience. 
 For Kant, the beautiful is only one kind of aesthetic judgment or experience; the 
other is the sublime. The beautiful and sublime are similar in certain ways. Kant writes, 
“We like both for their own sake, and both presuppose that we make a judgment of 
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reflection rather than either a judgment of sense or a logically determinative one.”202 
However, some significant differences separate the beautiful from the sublime. Beauty is 
found in the form of an object, while the sublime could exist in something that is 
formless, in the sense of ‘unboundedness’. Also, beauty is concerned with quality, while 
the sublime is concerned with quantity. Another difference is that beauty produces a 
certain kind of positive pleasure, even though it is disinterested. The sublime both attracts 
and repels the onlooker, in some sense, which produces a kind of negative pleasure. As 
Kant writes, “The sublime moves, the beautiful charms.”203 The sublime moves us 
because it involves things that are massive or incomprehensible to the senses.  
 Kant divides the sublime into two aspects: mathematical and dynamical. First, the 
mathematical aspect of the sublime occurs when one experiences parts of nature with 
great magnitude, e.g. the sky, the ocean, mountains, and canyons. These things are too 
great to perceive with the senses. For example, no one can stand on the edge of the Grand 
Canyon and take it all in at once. The mathematical sublime could also be applied to 
something too small to be perceived by the senses. The main idea behind the 
mathematical sublime is that the sublime object is too great for the imagination to 
estimate its vastness. However, pleasure arises from this frustration because the human 
perceiver gains respect for the natural object. Kant writes, “Hence the feeling of the 
sublime is a feeling of displeasure that arises from the imagination’s inadequacy, in an 
aesthetic estimation of magnitude, for an estimation by reason, but is at the same time 
also a pleasure, aroused by the fact that this very judgment, namely, that even the greatest 
power of sensibility is inadequate, is [itself] in harmony with rational ideas, insofar as 
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striving toward them is still a law for us.”204 Humans often have so much respect for their 
use of reason, but, in the experience of the sublime, reason fails them and they turn their 
respect toward the natural object.  
 Second, the dynamical sublime is the experience of a natural phenomena that 
evokes fear in the onlooker, e.g. threatening and overhanging rocks, hurricanes, large 
waterfalls, and standing on the edge of a deep gorge. Kant calls this aspect of sublime 
dynamic from the Greek word meaning power. The power and dominance of nature is 
revealed. This aspect of sublime causes fear in the beholder. Kant describes, “Yet the 
sight of them [dynamically sublime objects] becomes all the more attractive the more 
fearful it is, provided we are in a safe place.”205 We feel terrified at the dominance and 
power of nature, but we also feel that nature has no ultimate power over us. Obviously, 
we are no match for the power of the forces of nature, but we try to find a different kind 
of power in ourselves that is greater than nature. “This element,” writes Wenzel, “is the 
idea of humanity and morality, which we discover in ourselves as persons. In this respect, 
we are, so to speak, untouchable.”206 The sublime in both of its aspects yields a feeling of 
negative pleasure as the human observer overcomes his mental inadequacies and his 
fearful encounters with nature (and some man-made objects). 
 From these explanations of Kant’s aesthetic theory, we can extract some crucial 
concepts that have become part of the development of theories of aesthetic experience. 
First, the notion of disinterestedness has been highly influential in aesthetics since Kant. 
This concept has developed into a view that aesthetic experience is valued for its own 
sake. Aesthetic experience may not have any purpose beyond itself; it is solely about the 
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act of contemplating the beautiful object. Second, Kant’s view of subjective universality 
is also important. The aspect of experience in aesthetic experience is necessarily 
subjective because it takes place in a subject. However, something certainly seems to be 
universal about such experiences because many people claim to have them when viewing 
the same (or similar) objects (both natural and artifactual). And, as Kant notes, we expect 
(or even demand) that others share our judgments of taste. And yet, no exact rules seem 
to be forthcoming that will guarantee spectators have an aesthetic experience. Though I 
agree that there are no exact rules that guarantee that an object will be beautiful, I think 
there are some general constituents of beauty, such as proportion and radiance (these will 
be discussed in Chapter Four). Since these constituents are in the object, I maintain the 
objectivity of beauty, which is why we expect others to agree with our judgments. And 
through habituation, we can refine our taste. Third, Kant’s view of beauty as positive 
pleasure and sublime as negative pleasure, which are the primary aesthetic properties that 
cause aesthetic experiences, have been highly influential in later thinking about them. For 
my own view, they are the two most important aesthetic properties. 
 
John Dewey 
From Kant’s aesthetics, the concept of disinterestedness has come to play a significant 
role in aesthetics, especially the early analytic thinking on the subject by Moore and 
Strawson, who with other analytic philosophers were strongly opposed to “naturalizing 
art and its aesthetic value.”207 For instance, Moore applied his naturalistic fallacy to 
beauty as well as the good. “Aesthetic qualities must not be identified with natural ones, 
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and are not even reducible or logically entailed by them.”208 Further, many early analytic 
philosophers concluded that art is useless, since it has “no specific, identifiable function 
which it could perform better than anything else.”209 For them, art, having no purpose, is 
not something that can hold the interest of people because it has no instrumental value. 
Seeking a different approach, Dewey thought, however, that we cannot separate the 
aesthetic (including art) from the rest of our lives, and he embraced a version of 
naturalism that emphasized the whole creature (human) in the experience of art, not just 
the logical faculties. Just because art cannot be explained through reductive means does 
not prove it is not valuable, even instrumentally. Shusterman writes, “Dewey’s important 
corrective is to argue that art’s special function and value lies not in any specialized, 
particular end but in satisfying the live creature in a more global way, by serving a 
variety of ends, and most importantly by enhancing our immediate experience, which 
invigorates and vitalizes us, thus aiding our achievement of whatever further ends we 
pursue.”210 For example, work songs sung by railroad workers and field workers did not 
just create a kind of aesthetic experience, according to Dewey, they also enhanced the 
work to be done. “[Works of art] energize and inspire because aesthetic experience is 
always spilling over and getting integrated into our other activities, enhancing and 
deepening them.”211 Dewey’s aesthetics influenced Beardsley’s view, from whom I draw 
for parts of my own view. 
 By claiming aesthetic experience is a basic human good, I want to show how it 
fits in other aspects of a person’s everyday life, not just the most intense aesthetic 
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experiences. I should mention here that there are central (or paradigmatic) and peripheral 
cases of aesthetic experience, which I will discuss in the next chapter. For now, I will 
simply claim that the central cases are those that exhibit the characteristics of aesthetic 
experience to a very high degree. Dewey tried to reconnect what we formally call 
aesthetic experiences with the experiences of daily life. So, I turn to Dewey to explore the 
way he developed a view that has a similar motivation as my own, and his influence is 
seen in my reasons for thinking aesthetic experience is a basic good (Chapter Five) more 
than in my account of the constituents of aesthetic experience (Chapter Four). Aesthetic 
experiences come in varying degrees, not all of which are supremely intense and vivid. 
Some aesthetic experiences might be more subtle, like a given room having a pleasing 
demeanor. For Dewey, aesthetic experiences should not be sought only in places isolated 
from everyday life, like museums or mountaintops; we should recognize the aesthetic 
element in all of our experiences. Though I do not fully endorse Dewey’s view, I want to 
present the main points of his view to explain how it relates to my own. I do not maintain 
that every experience has an element of the aesthetic (in the salient sense) in it because 
this threatens triviality, but I do think the aesthetic could be in more experiences than 
some people might think. 
 In his book, Art as Experience, John Dewey attempts to reconnect aesthetic 
experience with the everyday, as opposed to the discontinuity that sees art only in 
museums and theaters. Originally, many of the ancient items that we feature in museums 
(not just art museums) were things that had a function in the everyday lives of those 
ancient people. For example, we often display plates, vases, spears, and religious 
artifacts, though more frequently in history museums. But we still often admire them for 
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their beauty. These things were originally meant to enhance the lives of those people, not 
to be isolated from their activities. Dewey writes, “When an art product once attains 
classic status, it somehow becomes isolated from the human conditions under which it 
was brought into being and from the human consequences it engenders in actual life-
experience.”212 By putting everyday things from ancient people into museums, we often 
overlook the aesthetic aspect of the lives of those people as well as our own lives. This 
idea is derived from Dewey’s belief that the aesthetic permeates the lives of all people. 
Dewey develops a theory of aesthetic experience that allows for an aesthetic quality to be 
present in everyday activities, e.g. cooking, mowing the lawn, and our jobs. Art has been 
compartmentalized into museums and theaters, but Dewey pushes for a more integral 
approach to art and aesthetic experience. However, he maintains that there is a higher 
species of experience that counts as what people would regularly call an ‘aesthetic’ 
experience. In other words, rather than separating aesthetic experiences from all other 
kinds of experience; it seems that Dewey wants to show that aesthetic experience is the 
pinnacle of human experiences. To develop his view of aesthetic experience, Dewey first 
presents a general view of experience that he calls ‘having an experience’. Then, he 
shows what makes an experience an aesthetic experience. 
 Experience is something, Dewey emphasizes, that is continuous from birth to 
death. As might become clear from his view of experience, Dewey considers his 
philosophy to be ‘empirical naturalism’. He writes, “Experience occurs continuously, 
because the interaction of live creature and environing conditions is involved in the very 
process of living.”213 Due to distractions and other hindrances, many experiences are 
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inchoate. They stop short of what they were supposed to be. “In contrast with such 
experience,” Dewey writes, “we have an experience when the material experienced runs 
its course to fulfillment.”214 When one has ‘an experience’, the thing experienced comes 
to a point of consummation, rather than a point of cessation. It can be bracketed off from 
the general realm of experience, and it can now be referred to as ‘an experience’. In order 
to better grasp Dewey’s notion of experience, certain terms need to be explained, as used 
by Dewey. The main terms are as follows: precarious, stable, quality, ends, and histories. 
These occur in contexts or situations. Dewey uses the word ‘situation’ to refer to the 
circumstances that occur in nature.215 As Zeltner describes, “The situation possesses a 
variety of different elements and presents a complex of interacting processes. There are 
indeterminate, moral, cognitive, aesthetic, as well as other kinds of situations. The 
differing modes of experience, cognitive, emotional, etc., occur or dominate within a 
specific context. These situations or contexts are indicated by the pervasive quality or 
qualities resident within the situation.”216  Zeltner has done an excellent job in isolating 
and explaining the key terms of Dewey’s concept of experience; so, much of the 
following explanation of these terms relies on his analysis. 
 Since the stable and precarious work together for Dewey, they will be discussed 
together. “The ‘stable’ designates whatever in the situation has a known structure 
(cognitive status) or uniformity.”217 For example, nature is thought to have a certain 
structure, without which Dewey believes life would be impossible. Some regularities 
need to be present. However, nature also possesses some irregularities, for which Dewey 
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employs the term ‘precarious’. This term might be misleading, according to Zeltner, 
“This word may seem unnecessarily doom laden to describe what Dewey has in mind, for 
not all precarious situations or elements within them need to be precarious [by which he 
means something negative].”218 In other words, the ‘precarious’ is, for Dewey, another 
word for change, which can be both good and bad. Something must stay the same 
throughout the process of change; otherwise, chaos would ensue. Dewey thinks that 
everyone’s life is, in a sense, a gamble. Things happen all the time that are beyond human 
control, and humans must react to these occurrences. Plus, if the world was a fully stable 
place, then the ideas of better and worse would not make sense. In order for the 
possibility of getting better, there must be the possibility of getting worse. Humans strive 
to find the balance. Dewey writes, “While the precarious nature of existence is indeed the 
source of all trouble, it is also an indispensable condition of ideality, becoming a 
sufficient condition when conjoined with the regular and assured.”219 Zeltner explains 
this notion in a slightly different way, “The ability to overcome resistance and challenge, 
and to incorporate the measure of challenge in the effort to overcome further resistances 
and obstacles, is growth; and thereby survival.”220 So, the stable and precarious work 
together to give human beings experience of nature. 
 Next, quality is another key term for Dewey’s philosophy of experience. Not just 
objects have qualities, situations also have them. By ‘quality’, Dewey does not mean to 
simply highlight things like colors, shapes, and other things perceived by the senses, 
though these are an aspect of quality. Zeltner explains that qualities are “felt, not by a 
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specific faculty or category of the mind, but rather by the organism as a whole.”221 So, 
experience offers a more complicated example of quality.  
 The concept of ends is also pertinent to Dewey’s overall theory of experience. In 
line with common sense, Dewey writes, “We constantly talk about things coming or 
drawing to a close; getting ended, finished, done with, over with.”222 Though some 
people are inclined to speak about ends in a theological, teleological, or metaphysical 
sense, Dewey confines his notions of ends to the empirical. The end of one situation is 
the result of a qualitative change. As a point of fact, all situations must have an end at 
some point because no situation (or state of affairs) can extend indefinitely into the 
future.223 Dewey further describes, “We may conceive the end, the close, as due to 
fulfillment, perfect attainment, to satiety, or to exhaustion, to dissolution, to something 
having run down or given out. Being an end may be indifferently an ecstatic culmination, 
matter-of-fact consummation, or a deplorable tragedy. Which of these things a closing or 
terminal object is, has nothing to do with the property of being an end.”224  
 The final term for the foundation of Dewey’s theory of experience is histories. 
Qualitative change accounts for the end of one situation and the beginning of the next. 
Histories track the continuous process of beginnings and ends. These connect the 
different situations, so that nature appears to be, overall, a continuity, rather than a 
disconnected series of situations. As Dewey elucidates, “It enables thought to apprehend 
causal mechanisms and temporal finalities as phases of the same natural processes, 
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instead of as competitors where the gain of one is the loss of the other.”225 Histories, in 
other words, allow nature to appear coherent. 
 Another concept that is important for Dewey’s philosophy is his notion of 
meaning, which provides a segue from his theory of experience into his theory of art and 
aesthetic experience. “Meanings are not separate psychic entities within the realm of a 
separate cognitive faculty, they characterize the actual objects and events of nature.”226 
Meanings just are the understanding of the ways things work in the world around us. 
Meanings, therefore, include the ways a thing functions and the relationships it has with 
other things. To illustrate this point, Dewey uses the existence of paper.227 The most 
common meaning of ‘paper’ is that which can be written upon. But this is not the sole 
meaning; it just happens to be the most common. The essential meanings of the word 
‘paper’, according to Dewey, are endless. Dewey writes, “[Paper] signifies something to 
start a fire with; something like snow; made of wood pulp; manufactured for profit; 
property in the legal sense; a definite combination illustrative of certain principles of 
chemical science; an article the invention of which has made a tremendous difference in 
human history, and so on indefinitely.”228 Meanings, as can be seen, are not solely 
cognitive matters. There are multiple modes of experience; and the cognitive is only one 
mode. Another mode, important for Dewey’s aesthetic theory, is the qualitative, in which 
the qualities of the object are the focus of the experience. Both cognitive and qualitative 
are aspects of meaning. Moreover, both are essential to Dewey’s aesthetic theory, as he 
tries to de-compartmentalize the aesthetic and ordinary experiences.  
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 Since the basic components of Dewey’s general notion of experience have been 
presented, we can now move on to explain his more specific account of aesthetic 
experience. Experience is the bridge by which humans interact with the surrounding 
world. Through experience, humans gain meanings of the different objects and events. 
But life is an ongoing process; it is not static. So, we cannot fully compartmentalize the 
aesthetic away from our ‘ordinary’ lives. Dewey tries to show that there is an aesthetic 
quality in all of our experiences. What we usually call an aesthetic experience is merely a 
heightened amount of the aesthetic quality. “‘Aesthetic experience’ means those 
experiences wherein the qualitative character of experience, when structured in a certain 
manner, is dominant and final and not a subordinate feature of the experience.”229 This 
dominantly aesthetic character of experience does not come about by accident; it needs to 
be intentionally cultivated. An experience might have an aesthetic character, yet the main 
purpose in engaging in that activity was more cognitive; for example, one’s car fails to 
start, so one figures out what is wrong and fixes it. The experience might have a 
qualitative character. However, since the cognitive character is dominant, this experience 
would fall into the primary phase of aesthetic experience. On the other hand, if 
someone’s experience of fixing a car had a dominant aesthetic quality, then this 
experience, for Dewey, is an aesthetic experience. Dewey makes an important distinction 
between what he calls the primary phase of aesthetic experience—which is synonymous 
with ‘an experience’ and ‘consummatory experience’—and and what we typically think 
of as an aesthetic experience. Zeltner explains this distinction as follows, “Primary phase 
of aesthetic experience indicates the ongoing activities of human beings which, apart 
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from the fine arts or similar deliberate cultivations, possesses aesthetic quality.”230 To put 
the point more precisely, an aesthetic experience is one that is intentionally cultivated, 
where the qualitative character of the experience is the dominant trait. In ordinary 
experience the aesthetic quality plays a more subordinate role. 
 To summarize some of the important points about Dewey’s contribution to a 
theory of aesthetic experience, it is important to see that he was trying to re-connect 
aesthetic experience with everyday life (and experiences). When the aesthetic quality of 
an experience is sought after (or experienced) for its own sake, then an aesthetic 
experience is attained. His notion of aesthetic quality seems to be a broad term under 
which we can place the narrower contemporary phrase ‘aesthetic property’, which 
includes things like beauty, sublime, delicate, and so on. But beauty, for Dewey, is not 
the main point of aesthetic experience; he focuses more on the sensory aspect, which 
does not require the presence of aesthetic properties as my view does. Aesthetic 
experience, therefore, is a pinnacle experience, where the aesthetic (or sensory) qualities 
are at the forefront. It is not something that is wholly disconnected from the rest of one’s 
life, since an aesthetic quality, to varying degrees, flows through all experiences. So, 
Dewey’s view overlaps with my view by showing that our lives are filled with aesthetic 
experiences, which are not limited to the museum or theater. But he does not consider 
aesthetic experience a basic good as I do. In fact, Dewey thinks the concept of aesthetic 
experience has problems, and he would prefer getting rid of the term altogether. Also, I 
am not as concerned with the lesser aesthetic experiences because I think they do not 
warrant state involvement. These ordinary aesthetic experiences are neither sufficiently 
public nor having a sufficient degree of quality to concern the state. Moreover, the state, 
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generally speaking, does not need to assist people in attaining what they can accomplish 
on their own. However, I think these everyday (or ordinary or low level) aesthetic 
experiences are important only to show how pervasive aesthetic experience is for people; 
it is important in many areas of our lives. I think this fact grounds the importance of the 
greater aesthetic experiences that people are able to have.   
 
Monroe Beardsley 
Unlike both Kant and Dewey, Beardsley developed his notion of aesthetic experience 
solely within the context of art. This fact does not prevent someone from applying his 
thoughts on aesthetic experience to the natural world, as I will do. But it is important to 
understand that evaluating works of art is his main interest in discussing aesthetic 
experience. Though Beardsley was influenced by Dewey, he made some significant 
changes. For instance, while Dewey believed that works of art have no specific purpose, 
Beardsley maintained that art does have a function, namely to provide the capacity for 
aesthetic experience. It is this capacity that makes art valuable for people because 
aesthetic experience makes their lives go better. Beardsley never really developed this 
idea in the political realm. Part of my contribution is to show how aesthetic functionalism 
as a theory of art makes a difference for the relationship between the state and the arts, 
which will be explained in the next two chapters. 
 Beardsley is the first analytic philosopher to develop a system of aesthetics, 
publishing his  Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism in 1958. He 
represents what are usually called aesthetic theories of art or aesthetic functionalism. His 
core belief is that works of art are always instrumental; art has a function. This belief 
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almost seems trivially true because it is difficult to imagine someone dedicating energy, 
money, and time to make things that have absolutely no reason for their existence. 
Additionally, the function of art must be intelligible; it cannot be a complete mystery, 
though individual works might have an element of mystery. If they are instrumental, then 
they must have some purpose or purposes for which people make them. Regardless of 
any other (or secondary) purpose works of art might possess, Beardsley believes that all 
works of art possess the capacity for producing aesthetic experiences. By framing it in 
terms of capacities, he escapes the undesirable conclusion that something is not an 
artwork if at least one person does not have the appropriate aesthetic experience. This 
fundamental idea that art exists primarily for aesthetic experience is the main thought I 
take from Beardsley. In what follows, I will explain some of the concepts and beliefs that 
help set up his core idea in order to further distinguish my own view. To show the 
development of his notion of aesthetic experience, I will include some criticisms by 
George Dickie, with whom he had a lengthy debate about aesthetic experience. 
 
Beardsley’s View in Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism (1958) 
Though Beardsley’s main book in aesthetics is quite comprehensive (almost 600 pages 
long), Beardsley makes no effort to define art; he prefers the term ‘aesthetic object’, 
which will be explained more fully in the next chapter. To briefly describe what he 
means, Beardsley writes, “we can group together disjunctively the class of musical 
compositions, visual designs, literary works, and all other separately defined classes of 
objects, and give the name ‘aesthetic object’ to them all.”231 Part of the reason for this 
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preference is due to the implausibility of precisely defining art that was suggested two 
years earlier (1956) by Morris Weitz. So, an aesthetic experience occurs when one has a 
particular kind of experience involving an aesthetic object. We now turn to Beardsley’s 
initial account of aesthetic experience. 
 People have various kinds of experiences, e.g. emotional experiences and 
religious experiences. It seems uncontentious to think that aesthetic experiences will have 
overlapping features with other kinds of experiences, though not necessarily always. 
However, one goal for anyone offering an explanation of aesthetic experience is to show 
how it differs from other kinds of experience. Beardsley, in this early work, offers four 
features (or generalizations) of aesthetic experience, which he believes most people will 
accept (he was mistaken in this belief).232 First, one must have his attention firmly fixed 
on an aesthetic object, by which the object can be said to cause the experience. This 
involves the beholder contemplating the object. Some people, Beardsley notes, suggest 
that the distinction between the phenomenal object and the phenomenal subject disappear 
in the midst of the experience. He thinks this disappearance is overstated, but the basic 
idea is that the object captures the beholder. This is similar to what I will call the active 
engagement of the beholder with the work. It is not the case that the beholder simply 
glances nonchalantly at the object. Second, an aesthetic experience involves some degree 
of intensity. In other words, a certain amount of feeling or emotion corresponds with the 
experience. The last two criteria are both aspects of a more general and contentious (see 
Dickie’s criticisms below) feature, for which Beardsley uses the term unity. So, the third 
component of aesthetic experience is that the experience is coherent. Beardsley describes, 
“One thing leads to another; continuity of development, without gaps or dead spaces, a 
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sense of overall providential pattern of guidance, an orderly cumulation of energy toward 
a climax, are present to an unusual degree.”233 Some works of art are sequential (or 
temporal), progressing through time. People experience these either by watching, 
listening, or reading. For these kinds of art, Beardsley claims that coherence plays a role 
even when the work of art is interrupted: an intermission, putting the book down, turning 
the cd player off. When the work of art resumes, the beholder’s experience of it can pick 
up right where it left off. Fourth, the other aspect of unity is completeness. Beardsley 
describes this feature as the satisfaction of expectations. As he writes, “The impulses and 
expectations aroused by elements within the experience are felt to be counterbalanced or 
resolved by other elements within the experience, so that some degree of equilibrium or 
finality is achieved and enjoyed.”234 Due to developments of his thinking and criticisms 
from others (especially a debate he had with Dickie), Beardsley eventually altered his 
view. He offers five criteria for an aesthetic experience. Prior to detailing his last word on 
the subject, I will present the first set of criticisms offered by George Dickie, which focus 
on this notion of unity. 
 
George Dickie’s Criticism in “Monroe Beardsley’s Phantom Aesthetic Experience” 
(1965) 
Dickie dismisses most versions of the causal view of aesthetic experience. The causal 
view of aesthetic experience means that an object (e.g. a painting, sculpture, drama, etc.) 
produces a particular kind of experience, which is usually thought to be valuable. So, the 
object causes the experience. However, Beardsley’s causal theory, claims Dickie, 
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deserves our close attention but not acceptance. Thus, Dickie offers criticisms of 
Beardsley’s view of aesthetic experience, specifically the notion of unity. 
 Dickie begins by citing two quotations from Beardsley. The first basically claimed 
that it is fine to think that the object causes the experience.235 The second quote claims 
that these features apply “not only to the phenomenally objective presentations in the 
experience, but to the whole experience, which includes affective and cognitive elements 
as well.”236 Dickie clarifies these quotes by saying that “a perceived aesthetic object is 
asserted to cause something, not to be identified as the object, which is, among other 
things, coherent and complete.”237 To summarize, Dickie points out that Beardsley 
believes that there are two unified things: (1) the aesthetic object itself; and (2) the 
aesthetic experience which is the effect of the aesthetic object. Since, as Dickie points 
out, Beardsley talks about the two aspects of unity (coherence and completeness) in 
different ways, Dickie will critique them individually, beginning with coherence. 
 Agreeing with Beardsley that the aesthetic object is coherent, Dickie believes that 
this fact is the only thing Beardsley’s argument proves. Everything mentioned by 
Beardsley—“continuity of development, without gaps or dead spaces, etc.”—is “a 
perceptual characteristic and not an effect of the perceived characteristics.”238 So, Dickie 
claims that Beardsley has not offered any reason to believe that the experience itself is 
coherent, only the object. As with coherence, Dickie grants that aesthetic objects can be 
complete, but questions whether the experience itself should be called complete. 
Subdividing completeness, Beardsley speaks of both impulses being counterbalanced and 
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expectations being satisfied. It makes sense to say that a painting is balanced, but does it 
make sense to say that the experience itself is balanced? Dickie claims that looking at a 
balanced painting does not cause the beholder to feel balanced. He writes, “The only 
occasions on which we can be said to feel stable or balanced are occasions when we have 
calmed down after being upset or nervous.”239 In terms of resolved expectations, Dickie 
claims that works of art that are temporal (or sequential) might create expectations that 
are resolved, such as a play or movie. But this, again, is observing the unity of the work 
of art; it is not an effect caused by the work of art. For both aspects of completeness, 
Dickie thinks that Beardsley shows only that the work of art is complete, not the 
experience. As he writes, “it is the experience of completeness of the work of art which 
fixes attention so firmly as to exclude alien elements, not the completeness of 
experience.”240 Thus, Dickie concludes that Beardsley has failed to show that unity is part 
of the experience of aesthetic objects. 
 
Beardsley’s Last Word in “Aesthetic Experience” in The Aesthetic Point of View (1982) 
The debate between Beardsley and Dickie went for a few more rounds, but the details are 
not pertinent for present purposes. So, I move to the last thing Beardsley wrote on 
aesthetic experience prior to his death in 1985. Beardsley ends his writings on aesthetic 
experience by laying out one final attempt to distinguish aesthetic experiences from other 
kinds of experiences. He proposes five criteria that comprise the aesthetic character of 
experience. About this, he writes, “an experience has aesthetic character if and only if it 
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has the first of the following features and at least three of the others.”241 (1) Object-
directedness. This feature is necessary for the experience to be aesthetic, but there must 
be more than just an object. Beardsley describes this feature as a “willingly accepted 
guidance of one's mental states by phenomenally objective properties (qualities and 
relations) of a perceptual or intentional field on which attention is fixed with a feeling 
that things are working or have worked themselves out fittingly.”242 This feature includes 
what most people would refer to as works of art, e.g. paintings, sculptures, musical 
performances, plays, and dance. In other words, it refers to objects and events that can be 
perceived by the senses, which could include natural objects. But that is not all. 
Beardsley is using the word object in a broad sense here. He also has in mind things that 
are purely ‘intentional’, such as thinking about the imaginary world described in a novel, 
a poem in our memory, symbolic significance of a figure in a painting, etc. (2) Felt 
Freedom. This feature invokes an idea of being ‘present’ in the moment, being free from 
thinking about past and future. Beardsley admits that this feature is the most difficult to 
talk about with precision. But it basically is that feeling one might get when suddenly 
captivated by a work of art; for those moments, nothing else seems to matter. For 
example, one might completely forget the troubles of the day for a few moments. (3) 
Detached Affect. This feature is present when the object(s) of one’s interest is a little at a 
distance from oneself in terms of emotions. This does not mean that the experience is 
deprived of emotion; it means we do not confuse the emotional reaction with the object 
itself. Beardsley’s example is the Gaetano Zumbo sculptures, which depict corpses. No 
matter how disturbing the images are, we do not confuse these sculptures with real 
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corpses. (4) Active Discovery. This involves that the beholder is “actively exercising 
constructive powers of the mind.”243 Some works of art create tensions that the viewer 
must attempt to make cohere. If a work of art is too obvious in its ‘meaning’, then the 
beholder will likely find it to be trivial. But if the work causes the beholder to wrestle 
with different interpretations and ideas, then the work has caused the beholder to be 
actively engaged with it. (5) Wholeness (or unity). Beardsley thinks this feature could 
almost be as essential as the first feature, though he does not assert this view. Unity 
originally had two aspects: completeness and coherence. But, due to Dickie’s critique, 
Beardsley abandons unity as completeness, focusing on unity as coherence. This feature 
highlights the unity of coherence at two levels: the experience itself and the level of the 
self. The wholeness of the experience itself consists of the different mental acts going on 
inside one person’s mind for a duration of time. The wholeness of the self involves the 
mind's sense that all of its perceptions, feelings, and ideas fit together in a single 
integrated personhood.244 These five features form the basis of Beardsley’s last attempt at 
a theory of aesthetic experience and his final word to Dickie. In what follows, I will 
suggest a residual problem of his theory—that it is still too object-centered—and I will 
point toward a solution to strengthen his theory—that it is the bi-directional nature of 
aesthetic experience that grounds the unity and gradation of aesthetic experiences. 
 
A Residual Issue in Beardsley’s notion of Aesthetic Experience 
What are we left with in this discussion of Beardsley’s view of aesthetic experience? 
Beardsley no longer claims that unity is a necessary condition of aesthetic experience. 
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However, he maintains that it is very important; he just allows that some aesthetic 
experiences might lack wholeness or unity, though this is probably rare in his opinion. 
Also, he no longer argues that unity of completeness is an essential aspect to the unity of 
experience. Even though some aesthetic experiences might have this trait, Beardsley 
succumbs to Dickie’s criticisms and focuses solely on the unity of coherence. Further, 
Beardsley suggests but does not develop the gradation of aesthetic experiences that can 
be had by different people with different objects. In other words, some aesthetic 
experiences will be more intense, emotional, or pleasurable than others. This idea was 
present from the beginning, but it is more strongly asserted in his later work. Lastly, 
Beardsley stills seems to emphasize a one way causal relationship from the object to the 
person experiencing the object. As John Fisher claims, “What makes it difficult to 
penetrate the concept of aesthetic experience is that we are constantly pushed back into 
the object.”245 The unity of the artwork itself still becomes the focus, rather than the unity 
of the experience. And this is a residual problem: Beardsley’s view leads one to think that 
the object alone causes the aesthetic experience. Hence, the object’s unity causes the 
unity of the experience. There seems to be some truth to this idea; the object might be the 
catalyst for the experience. However, in the next chapter, I suggest that the relationship 
between the beholder and the aesthetic object is more integral than Beardsley’s view 
seems to acknowledge. There is an interplay between the aesthetic object and the 
beholder, which is required for the aesthetic experience, especially the more intense 
aesthetic experiences. So, I will discuss the role that the beholder must play when 
confronting aesthetic objects, which is often overlooked in the contemporary discussions. 
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Contemporary Decline of the Concept of Aesthetic Experience 
The concept of aesthetic experience has recently been dismissed by many contemporary 
philosophers who believe it has lost all usefulness as a concept. They have replaced it 
with the concept of interpretation, particularly in the realm of art. In other words, the goal 
of art, for these philosophers, is creating something for people to interpret. Richard 
Shusterman, in his seminal article “The End of Aesthetic Experience,” presents a ‘hasty 
genealogy’ of the decline of interest in the concept of aesthetic experience. He tracks this 
decline in both the analytic and Continental traditions of philosophy, showing how they 
arrive at basically the same conclusion. Part of my project is to show that aesthetic 
experience is a basic human good, but this goal would be thwarted if the concept of 
aesthetic experience were meaningless. So, I want to show why the concept has declined 
in contemporary thought in order to show that we cannot simply assume that aesthetic 
experience is important either for art or our lives in general. In order to claim that 
aesthetic experience is valuable, I must offer a theory or explanation of it (and its 
importance for people) and show why interpretation is not sufficient for all works of art. 
 Prior to presenting his genealogy, Shusterman lists four common features of 
aesthetic experience.246 He highlights these features because these comprise the most 
essential elements in the tradition of theories about aesthetic experience, and these are 
precisely the constituents that are attacked. Not all four must be present for something to 
count as an aesthetic experience; these are just the most common characteristics. First, 
there is the evaluative dimension. “Aesthetic experience is essentially valuable and 
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enjoyable.”247 Second, there is the phenomenological dimension. An aesthetic experience 
is intensely felt, and it demands the attention of the individual. The individual can often 
lose track of her surroundings while savoring the experience. This feature demonstrates 
how an aesthetic experience stands apart from other ordinary experiences. Third, there is 
the semantic dimension. An aesthetic experience is not an unintelligible experience or 
mere sensation; it is meaningful. Some have referred to it as transfigurative. Fourth, there 
is the demarcational-definitional dimension. Shusterman explains, “it is a distinctive 
experience closely identified with the distinction of fine art and representing art’s 
essential aim.”248 These features have been integral in shaping the tradition of aesthetic 
experience, but they have also caused tensions among philosophers, as will be seen in 
Shusterman’s genealogy. 
 
The Continental Critique of Aesthetic Experience 
Following Shusterman’s ordering, I will begin with his analysis of the concept of 
aesthetic experience in the continental tradition. Specifically, he highlights four thinkers: 
Adorno, Benjamin, Gadamer, and Bourdieu. Shusterman writes, “From critical theory 
and hermeneutics to deconstruction and genealogical analysis, the continental critique of 
aesthetic experience has mostly focused on challenging its phenomenological immediacy 
and its radical differentiation.”249 Shusterman begins by writing how Adorno rejects 
aesthetic experience’s claim to pleasure “as the ideological contamination of bourgeois 
hedonism.”250 However, Adorno follows an idea that seems virtually unanimous, namely 
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“that aesthetic experience is not only valuable and meaningful but that the concept of 
experience is crucial for the philosophy of art.”251 The artwork captivates the beholder in 
such a way that the beholder submits to the work of art. As Shusterman describes, “Here 
we see the transformational, passional aspect of aesthetic experience; it is something 
undergone or suffered.”252 But it is not just an experience of sensation. Adorno asserts 
that the experience of artwork must be accompanied by thought. In Aesthetic Theory, 
Adorno writes, “Each work, if it is to be experienced, requires thought, however 
rudimentary it may be, and because this thought does not permit itself to be checked, 
each work ultimately requires philosophy as the thinking comportment that does not stop 
short in obedience to the prescriptions stipulated by the division of labor.”253 Adorno 
argued for the autonomy of artwork, even though social forces conditioned the essence of 
aesthetic experience. In other words, changes in the non-aesthetic arena will affect the 
nature of experience, which in turn affects aesthetic experience. Adorno, therefore, 
concludes that aesthetic experience cannot be a natural kind.254 
 Walter Benjamin sympathizes with this idea that the aesthetic cannot be a natural 
kind. He specifically set out to illustrate this fact as he shows the development of art in 
comparison to the development of mechanical reproduction. Benjamin claims that, prior 
to mechanical reproduction, one’s experience of art was a whole, meaningful experience. 
Shusterman describes Benjamin’s assessment of the situation at his time, “Through the 
fragmentation and shocks of modern life, the mechanical repetition of assembly-line 
labor, and the haphazardly juxtaposed information and raw sensationalism of the mass 
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media, our immediate experience of things no longer forms a meaningful, coherent whole 
but is rather a welter of fragmentary, unintegrated systems—something simply lived 
through rather than meaningfully experienced.”255 Benjamin believed that modernization 
and technology had diminished (possibly even destroyed) the possibility of having an 
aesthetic experience with autonomous works of art. Technology brought art into our 
everyday lives. Moreover, art, to use Benjamin’s words, has lost its unique aura. He 
defines the aura of art as a kind of distance.256 Art loses its aura through reproduction 
because it is brought closer to the individual. It is ripped away from its tradition. It no 
longer has a unique existence, since there are many copies of it. People may now possess 
the work of art in a way that would not have been possible prior to mechanical 
reproduction. Furthermore, artists themselves can mass produce their own art. 
Shusterman summarizes Benjamin’s position as follows, “Benjamin’s critique does not 
deny the continuing importance of aesthetic experience, only its romantic 
conceptualization as pure immediacy of meaning and isolation from the rest of life.”257  
 Gadamer, following Heidegger, criticizes aesthetic experience by attacking “the 
same two features of immediacy and differentiation, which are even conceptually 
linked.”258 When art is separated from the world in which it was made, it is reduced to 
that which can be immediately perceived and experienced. But this devalues the work of 
art, which ought to be seen in relation to its cultural and historical context. Gadamer 
writes, “The appeal to immediacy, to the genius of the moment, to the significance of the 
‘experience,’ cannot withstand the claim of human existence to continuity and unity of 
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self-understanding.”259 As with the others, Gadamer is not denying the importance of 
experience for aesthetics or works of art. He is trying to do justice to aesthetic 
experience, to bring it back to its proper place. Shusterman notes that both Derrida and 
Barthes (through their views of deconstructionism) have a similar stance to Gadamer, so 
he does not present their views separately.  
 Pierre Bourdieu, from the perspective of sociology, attacks the same things. 
Immediacy cannot be the sole vehicle for an aesthetic experience. The aesthetic object 
has a history that needs to be taken into account. One cannot think that one’s perception 
of the object is sufficient for complete aesthetic experience. Bourdieu seems to take this 
issue further when he writes, “Now this experience, with all the aspects of singularity that 
it appears to possess (and the feeling of uniqueness probably contributes greatly to its 
worth), is itself an institution which is the product of historical invention and whose 
raison d’être can be reassessed only through an analysis which is itself properly 
historical.260 Two things are at work here: the development of the institution of art and the 
various habits of aesthetic contemplation. Shusterman writes, “Both take considerable 
time to get established, not only in the general social field but also in the course of each 
individual’s aesthetic apprenticeship. Moreover, their establishment in both cases 
depends on the wider social field that determines an institution’s conditions of possibility, 
power, and attraction, as well as the options of the individual’s involvement in it.”261 
Thus, according to Bourdieu, aesthetic experience cannot possibly be based solely on the 
immediate perceptions of the beholder. 
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 What conclusions can be drawn from the Continental critique of aesthetic 
experience? Shusterman thinks two charges have been raised for theories of aesthetic 
experience. First, “Aesthetic experience cannot be conceived as an unchanging concept 
narrowly identified with fine art’s purely autonomous reception.”262 For one thing, 
theories of aesthetic experience must account for non-artistic experience, such as the 
experience of nature. Furthermore, aesthetic experience is, in some sense, conditioned by 
other cultural factors. For example, through a development of technology and musical 
invention, heavy metal came into existence. Now a view of the aesthetic experience of 
music must consider whether heavy metal music should be added to the ‘list’ of possible 
sources for aesthetic experience. Second, “aesthetic experience requires more than mere 
phenomenological immediacy to achieve its full meaning.”263 Frequently, one’s first 
reaction to a work of art is naive and mistaken. One must engage in interpretation to 
intensify and elevate the aesthetic experience that a given work can provide. Shusterman 
largely agrees with these charges, but he adds some concerns. “The claim that aesthetic 
experience must involve more than phenomenological immediacy and vivid feeling does 
not entail that such immediate feeling is not crucial to aesthetic experience.”264 Just 
because immediacy is not sufficient does not mean that it is not necessary. The fact that 
aesthetic experience needs cultural mediation does not automatically preclude art’s 
content from being “experienced as immediate.”265 Shusterman uses the English language 
as an example. English developed over many years and in different historical (and 
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cultural) contexts, yet people who speak English can experience its meanings 
immediately. 
 
The Analytic Decline of Aesthetic Experience 
Beginning with Dewey, Shusterman recounts the decline of the interest in the concept of 
aesthetic experience among the analytic philosophers: Dewey, Beardsley, Goodman, and 
Danto. Since Dewey’s theory was already presented above, I will only highlight those 
aspects that Shusterman finds important. Shusterman explains the shift away from Dewey 
as follows, “Dewey’s essentially evaluative, phenomenological, and transformational 
notion of aesthetic experience has been gradually replaced by a purely descriptive, 
semantic one whose chief purpose is to explain and thus support the established 
demarcation of art from other human domains.”266 Unlike the later philosophers who 
want to demarcate aesthetic experience from other aspects of life, Dewey sought to de-
compartmentalize aesthetics from everyday life. What people typically think of as an 
aesthetic experience, according to Dewey, is merely qualitatively different than ordinary 
life experiences; it is not a different kind of experience. Contrary to Dewey’s hope to 
make aesthetic experience reconnect to daily life, the progression in analytic philosophy 
has been to dismiss the concept of aesthetic experience completely due to its vagueness, 
while favoring an interpretive view about art. 
 Beardsley, influenced by Dewey’s ideas, tried to develop a theory of aesthetic 
experience, which was presented above. For now it will suffice to give the main ideas as 
they relate to Shusterman’s thesis. A key difference between Dewey and Beardsley is that 
the latter wants to show how art and aesthetic experience are different from other 
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practices and experiences. Beardsley grounds his view of art on aesthetic experience. The 
primary function of art is to provide the possibility for aesthetic experience. So, 
Beardsley tries to show that this function—providing aesthetic experience—is what sets 
art apart from other things, making it unique and giving it value. Though Beardsley 
rejects Dewey’s transformative aspect of aesthetic experience, he “retains the Deweyan 
evaluative, affective, and phenomenological features of aesthetic experience.”267 
Beardsley claims that an aesthetic experience is enjoyable, intense, and unified. Contrary 
to Beardsley, Dickie thinks the notion of aesthetic experience is problematic, and he 
wants to get rid of the concept altogether. Suffice it to say, Shusterman claims that 
Dickie’s critique leads to the abandonment of the evaluative dimension and the first-
person phenomenological aspect of aesthetic experience. This conclusion leads to the 
shift toward semantic approaches to aesthetic experience. 
 Nelson Goodman shares with Beardsley the analytic goal of demarcating aesthetic 
experience from other kinds of experience. Goodman thinks that aesthetic experience can 
be defined neither in terms of the phenomenological perspective of the beholder nor the 
experience’s emotive character. However, Goodman believes that the nature of aesthetic 
experience is more cognitive. He defines it as “cognitive experience distinguished [from 
science and other domains] by the dominance of certain symbolic characteristics.”268 
Toward explaining this cognitive nature of aesthetic experience, Goodman proffered five 
features called the symptoms of the aesthetic: syntactic density, semantic density, relative 
repleteness, exemplification, multiple and complex reference. Whenever the function of 
an object possesses these symptoms, the object is probably a work of art. By contrast, 
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when an object exhibits none (or almost none) of the symptoms, then it is probably not a 
work of art. The symptoms are not, however, the necessary and sufficient conditions of 
what counts as a work of art. Art is too vague a concept to admit a certain definition. So, 
Goodman maintains that aesthetic experience is a cognitive activity that hones in on 
distinctive types of symbols found in artwork, and it is valuable insofar as the work of art 
is cognitively efficacious, meaning that it is successful in conveying knowledge. 
 The last analytic philosopher in Shusterman’s genealogy is Arthur Danto. Using 
an argument from indiscernibles, Danto claims that “perceptual properties alone, 
including those involved in aesthetic experience, are insufficient for distinguishing 
between artworks and nonart, between Warhol’s Brillo Boxes and their nonartistic 
counterparts.”269 The idea that aesthetic experience can help to demarcate art from nonart, 
according to Danto, is not possible. Further, aesthetic experience has traditionally been 
defined as evoking some kind of positive pleasure, but it seems that some works of art 
evoke negative feelings. So, it seems odd to say that something is not a work of art, if it 
evokes negative responses. For one thing, it is possible that a work could evoke a positive 
response for one person and a negative response for another. This conclusion seems to be 
absurd, that a piece is a work of art for one person but not for another. Danto thinks this 
view leads to a trivializing of art, by relegating it as something merely suited to cause 
pleasure, rather than a vehicle for meaning and truth.270 Danto, therefore, advocates a 
view of art that relies on interpretation. In The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art, 
he writes, “The interpretation is not something outside the work: work and interpretation 
arise together in aesthetic consciousness. As interpretation is inseparable from work, it is 
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inseparable from the artist if it is the artist’s work.”271 So, Danto ends up adopting a 
similar position to that arising from the Continental critique, interpretation is necessary, 
which leads to the demise of the concept of aesthetic experience. 
 Shusterman acknowledges that the notion of aesthetic experience is difficult, due 
to ambiguities and other sorts of problems. However, Shusterman offers a parable that he 
believes illustrates the value of aesthetic experience, even though we cannot fully pin 
down the concept. Suppose there are two beings viewing art: one is a human and the 
other is a cyborg. In this parable, Shusterman assumes that the human has normal 
functioning and is able to experience a certain amount of pleasure in viewing art, while 
the cyborg is not capable of experiencing qualia of any kind. Both of these beings could 
understand the interpretive elements of a given work of art. But the human, it seems, 
possesses a certain kind of experience; he is thrilled to discover all that the artwork has to 
offer. Shusterman takes this parable further by asking what the world would be like if all 
humans were replaced by these cyborgs. Specifically, he asks, “Art might linger on a bit 
through inertia, but could it continue to flourish and robustly survive? What would be the 
point of creating and attending to it, if it promised no enriching phenomenological feeling 
or pleasure?”272 He believes that this parable suggests the importance of aesthetic 
experience to art, not in the form of necessary and sufficient conditions, but perhaps in 
the form of a “background condition for art.” Aesthetic experience might not be the thing 
to demarcate art from nonart, but it might still be part of the point of art. Otherwise, why 
make art at all, if it is only for interpretation? It seems easier to simply write prose. 
Shusterman says the following concerning the state of aesthetic experience, “Once a 
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potent embodiment of art’s sense and value, aesthetic experience is now 
‘hermeneutered’.”273 Shusterman does not offer a theory of aesthetic experience, but he 
does try to show that it has value and is not a useless concept. Philosophy can remind 
artists, philosophers, and the public that aesthetic experience is something meaningful 
and valuable, even though precision might not be possible. Thus, Shusterman concludes 
that the concept of aesthetic experience is, at the very least, directional. When reminded 
of this concept, it nudges us toward having the experience. Citing Wittgenstein, 
Shustmerman quotes, “The work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders for 
a particular purpose.”274 So, aesthetic experience should not be abandoned, we just need 
to be reminded of the value it has for us, regardless of whether or not we can define the 
concept perfectly. 
 I recounted this hasty genealogy that Shusterman offered because it is important 
to see the current state of discussions about aesthetic experience, how thoughts about it 
have developed in recent history. It might have been thought that the notion of aesthetic 
experience can be taken for granted, but this genealogy shows that not to be the case. 
With Shusterman, I firmly maintain that aesthetic experience is clearly valuable for our 
lives. The possibility of aesthetic experience is what drives people to want to behold 
works of art, not mere interpretation. One just has to think about planning to go to an art 
museum. It seems odd to say that one is excited only to interpret the various works of art. 
But it seems normal and reasonable to say that one hopes to see some beautiful things. 
This attitude in itself does not prove anything, but it sets the stage for my claim in 
Chapter Four that aesthetic experience is the most fundamental (but not necessarily the 
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only) purpose of art, even if interpretation is a secondary purpose. Furthermore, it is art’s 
formal aesthetic properties, such as beauty, that make any interpretation worth the effort. 
In other words, if a given work of art is quite terrible, then either people will be less 
likely to care about taking the time to think about its interpretation or the interpretation 
will be unclear because the work has not succeeded in its job. The aesthetic experience 
helps to inspire or enable the possibility of any interpretation. Thus, it seems perfectly 
fine for a work of art to exist that has excellent formal properties without any 
interpretation. But the converse does not seem to apply, that the work of art can have an 
excellent interpretive framework without having any aesthetic properties. Of course, the 
latter might be logically possible, but terrible works of art usually do not hold the 
attention of a beholder long enough for them to bother interpreting them.  
 Outside of art, people do other things that display the importance of aesthetic 
experience. In Chapter Five, I will illustrate this point more fully when I present reasons 
for thinking aesthetic experience is a basic human good. For instance, people plant 
flowers to beautify their yards; they try to create an aesthetic environment in their daily 
lives. Even though some believe that interpretation is the main purpose of art (with which 
I disagree), aesthetic experience still finds its way into these other aspects of people’s 
lives. Thus, I conclude that we should not abandon it, but continue to try to understand it. 
After I offer the main constituents for a theory of aesthetic experience in the next chapter, 
I present reasons why interpretation is not the fundamental purpose of art and the 
aesthetic experience is not a mere category of knowledge, claiming that aesthetic 
experience is indeed the main purpose of art. 
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Conclusion 
Though the idea of aesthetic experience is important for many philosophers in history (in 
the next chapter I present some ideas from Aquinas), I have begun the discussion of its 
development with Kant. Since Kant is responsible for framing many of the issues in 
modern aesthetics, it is important to present the salient features of his theory, especially 
as it relates to aesthetic experience (or judgment). I skip over a lot of the history of 
philosophy by going right to Dewey. Part of the reason for this is because capturing the 
history of aesthetics is not the primary focus. But, more importantly, Dewey emphasizes 
the role that aesthetic experiences can play in our everyday lives, which is important to 
my project, though not in the exact way that Dewey claims. Then, I move on to give an 
account of Beardsley’s notion of aesthetic experience, since I align myself with the 
tradition that he endorses, aesthetic functionalism, and employ some of his ideas in my 
own view of aesthetic experience. I end this chapter with Shusterman’s genealogy of the 
decline of interest in aesthetic experience in much recent philosophy. The idea of 
aesthetic experience has been an integral part of aesthetic theory for a long time, which 
should give anyone pause before eliminating it from one’s aesthetic theory. I am 
confident that the concept of aesthetic experience can be recaptured, which I begin to do 
in the next chapter, since the experience of the aesthetic certainly pervades our lives.  
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CHAPTER 4 
CONSTITUENTS FOR A THEORY OF AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed some contributions to a theory of aesthetic experience by 
three leading philosophers and then described the decline of the concept of aesthetic 
experience in recent philosophy. Contrary to the alleged ‘end of aesthetic experience’ 
thesis, Shusterman asserts that aesthetic experience, though not precisely definable, is 
clearly an important aspect of art and life, with which I firmly agree. My own view of the 
nature of art aligns with the aesthetic theories of art (or aesthetic functionalism), which 
basically claim that all works of art should provide the possibility (or have the capacity) 
for an aesthetic experience. Rather than abandoning aesthetic experience in favor of 
interpretation like others have done, I present constituents for a theory of aesthetic 
experience that can apply to all the various arts but is able to allow for changes in the 
arts. Thus, my primary goal in this chapter is to present the main components for a theory 
of aesthetic experience, which can be applied to both art and nature. However, a 
secondary goal is to present reasons for endorsing a particular view about the nature of 
art called aesthetic functionalism. 
 Aesthetic experience lacks perfect precision, and necessarily so. It needs the 
flexibility to apply to experiences of a wide range of objects. It applies to experiences of 
nature and experiences of artifacts. And it can be employed in different cultures. But this
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 lack of precision is not a problem that is unique to aesthetic experience or even aesthetics 
more generally. A term like ‘science’ has a similar problem; it lacks necessary and 
sufficient conditions that ensure something is science.275 The concept of science has 
changed throughout the course of history, even if some core ideas have remained 
basically the same. At the very least, what counts as science has been altered since the 
time of Aristotle. So, a theory of aesthetic experience can be developed in such a way as 
to allow (and account for) change; unsurprisingly, a rigid definition of aesthetic 
experience is unlikely.  
 In this chapter, I propose that an aesthetic experience is the enjoyment of, for its 
own sake, aesthetic objects, which involve the presence of the beautiful or sublime. 
Toward this end, I begin by offering some brief explanations of key terms of my account 
of aesthetic experience, and then I explain the main constituents of aesthetic experience. 
Aesthetic experience by definition—‘aesthetic’ implies the use of the senses—requires 
the presence of an object. In the previous chapter, object-directedness was listed as the 
only necessary condition in Beardsley’s notion of aesthetic experience. In order to have 
an aesthetic experience, an appropriate object must be present to one’s senses. What 
makes an object be an appropriate object is its internal properties; it must possess the 
proper aesthetic properties, of which the two most important are beauty and the sublime. I 
adopt Beardsley’s term ‘aesthetic object’ because I think it is important for a theory of 
aesthetic experience to include the experience of both natural and artifactual objects. So, 
‘work of art’ is a sub-category of aesthetic object.  
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 Though an aesthetic experience provides some degree of pleasure to the onlooker 
(called affectiveness by some), I focus more on the activity rather than passivity of the 
beholder. An aesthetic experience does not just occur on unsuspecting passersby, though 
it certainly may happen without warning or preparation. But the beholder must be (or 
become) actively engaged with the object. Jacques Maritain, a Thomist philosopher, 
applies the concept of knowledge by connaturality, which Aquinas mentions in the 
context of morality, to aesthetics, particularly the creative activity of the artist. I will 
extend Maritain’s use of connaturality to the beholder of works of art. Knowledge by 
connaturality—knowledge which is gained by habituation rather than speculation—
provides a way of explaining the beholder’s role in making the aesthetic experience 
possible and why some people will have lesser and greater experiences. This is important 
because aesthetic experience requires an object to be experienced and a person to 
experience it. 
 After presenting the essence of my account of aesthetic experience, I am equipped 
to show why the concept should not be abandoned in favor of interpretation in the context 
of art. Beholding works of art should affect a person more than is required by an act of 
interpretation, though one could potentially be affected through interpreting. 
Additionally, aesthetic experience is more than just knowledge as Finnis has supposed. 
Though an aesthetic experience overlaps with knowledge, it is more than knowledge. In 
this, I establish that aesthetic experience is still a relevant and important concept. 
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Some Preliminary Terminology 
Prior to discussing the main constituents of aesthetic experience, I need to comment on a 
few important terms (and one phrase) for my theory of aesthetic experience. I have said 
that an aesthetic experience is sought and enjoyed for its own sake, which I will explain 
first, and then I will explain how I use the terms contemplation, judgment, and pleasure. 
In offering brief explanations of these concepts, I will refer to some of the constituents of 
aesthetic experience that will be discussed more fully after this section. 
 First, I want to offer a brief explanation about what it means to say that aesthetic 
experience is sought ‘for its own sake’. Some of the specifics become more clear in the 
next chapter when I give reasons for thinking aesthetic experience is a basic human good. 
But, for now, I want to contrast this inherent value with an instrumental value. Kant’s 
view seems right that an aesthetic experience (or judgment of taste) does not need a 
practical purpose beyond itself. But he thinks we need to posit ‘purposiveness without a 
purpose’. In terms of artwork, I think that the aesthetic experience is the purpose for 
which the work was made, which will become more clear below. The experience is 
something that is sought for its own sake; it is basic and intelligible. One does not need 
another reason to seek out an aesthetic experience; it is an end in itself. 
 Second, contemplation is another part of my notion of aesthetic experience that 
needs some clarification. Contemplation is often contrasted with activity, though this 
contrast is somewhat misleading. Contemplation is a kind of activity, but it does not yield 
a tangible result that can be shown to others.276 Though contemplation is connected with 
knowledge in Thomistic philosophy, it is not simply knowledge. “Poetic [or aesthetic] 
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Contemplation is not sought for its own sake as a source of knowledge, nor does it 
terminate in truth or an understanding of some secret of reality revealed by means of 
it.”277 Knowledge is something that exists in the mind of the individual. Once knowledge 
about an object is in one’s mind, then that object no longer needs to be present. But 
contemplation, in the context of aesthetic experience, requires the presence of an object. 
The beholder’s attention is fixed on the aesthetic object, and the beholder rests in the 
object. 
 Third, judgment is a word riddled with negative connotations in our society as 
people try to convince themselves that we should not judge. But judgment does not need 
to be a negative concept. For example, I judge that it might rain today, so I bring my 
umbrella. In its most general sense, “[j]udgment is the act by which we mentally affirm 
or deny.”278 In the context of an aesthetic judgment, it is the act of denying or affirming 
an object’s aesthetic quality, most frequently its beauty (or lack thereof). Kant seems to 
suggest that the judgment of taste is determined by the feeling of the spectator, even 
though it has universal appeal. But the first part seems wrong because one could make a 
judgment about an object’s beauty (or ugliness) and not necessarily have the appropriate 
feelings. Some kind of feeling usually accompanies an aesthetic judgment, but it is not 
necessary for the judgment to occur, though it is necessary for an aesthetic experience. I 
think the judgment is not dependent upon pleasure (or lack of pleasure), but it depends on 
the qualities of the object. For instance, objects worthy of appreciation (based on their 
properties) should be judged as beautiful (or at least favorably), while objects that are not 
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worthy of appreciation should be judged as ugly (or unfavorably). And, of course, there is 
a gradation between beauty and ugliness. As a side note, I should mention here that 
certain factors can effect one’s ability to make a judgment concerning the aesthetic, but 
this will be discussed more when I discuss the role of the beholder later in this chapter. 
 Fourth, pleasure, to some degree, is frequently associated with an aesthetic 
experience as its main effect; and, in this context, I am referring to what philosophers 
have called aesthetic pleasure. Generally speaking, the greater the object of one’s 
appreciation, the more intense will be the experience of pleasure. This pleasure occurs as 
a result of the contemplation of the beautiful or sublime, and it occurs as the beholder 
rests in the apprehension of these properties. The pleasure need not always be an intense 
feeling; it could be the beholder simply relaxing in the order (or fittingness) of her 
environment. But, usually, it is a feeling of some kind as the mind delights in harmony, 
wholeness, and radiance. These traits will be explained in the section on beauty. Jerrold 
Levinson offers this definition: “Pleasure in an object is aesthetic when it derives from 
apprehension of and reflection on the object’s individual character and content, both for 
itself and in relation to the structural base on which it rests.”279 Levinson’s definition is 
very good because it acknowledges the aesthetic character of the work (involving beauty 
or sublimity), but it also allows any expression or communication to be enveloped by the 
aesthetic character by claiming that the pleasure is derived from the manner in which it is 
expressed. So, it is not just the expression, imitation, or communication, it is the way it is 
done that produces the pleasure. 
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Paradigm Cases of Aesthetic Experience 
Since not all artifactual or natural objects will produce the same intensity of aesthetic 
experience in relation to other objects nor the same intensity for each person, it is 
important to put forth certain central (or exemplary) cases as well as peripheral (or even 
deficient) cases. To put it differently, aesthetic experience is an analogical term, as 
opposed to univocal or equivocal; thus, it does not always occur in exactly the same 
manner. Though Dewey does not directly spell out the idea of paradigm cases of aesthetic 
experiences, the idea is implied in his writings. Dewey thought that all experiences had a 
degree of the aesthetic in them, but that some had the aesthetic as the primary quality. 
And these are what I will call the paradigm (or exemplary or central) cases of aesthetic 
experience. Thus, these exemplary cases will exhibit the constituents of aesthetic 
experience (discussed below) in a more perfect manner. Referring to legal systems as 
analogical, Joseph Raz explains, “The general traits which mark a system as a legal one 
are several and each of them admits, in principle, of various degrees. In typical instances 
[or central cases] of legal systems all these traits are manifested to a very high degree.”280 
Other peripheral or deficient cases will exhibit these traits is a less perfect manner. Again, 
Raz explains, “[I]t is possible to find systems in which all or some are present only to a 
lesser degree or in which one or two are absent altogether. It would be arbitrary and 
pointless to try and fix a precise borderline between normative systems which are legal 
systems and those which are not.”281 Likewise in aesthetics, a precise borderline is likely 
not forthcoming, especially one to which most would agree.  
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 However, the main point is that we can call attention to some central cases that 
can act as a guide to other cases. Describing this idea of central cases as it is employed by 
Aristotle, Mary Louise Gill writes, “If several items are called by the same name or by 
related names (as ‘medicine’ and ‘medical’), [Aristotle] looks for the central application 
and explains the others with reference to that one.”282 But we need a principled way to 
select which objects count as central cases, as opposed to peripheral cases, so that it does 
not become one person’s preferences versus another’s preferences. And the selection of 
central cases of aesthetic experience will be different for nature and art.  
 It seems easier to pick out central cases in nature—natural beauty seems less 
debated—of things that provide the capacity for aesthetic experience. One might first 
consider popular travel locations, such as the Grand Canyon or the beaches in Hawaii. 
Obviously, there might be other reasons to travel to these kinds of locations, like 
relaxation or adventure. But people frequently (if not always) mention the beauty and 
sublimity of these natural environments. Places are also deemed World Heritage Sites on 
the basis of cultural or natural significance. One of the criteria (number 7) for natural 
places is that they have “areas of exceptional natural beauty and aesthetic importance.”283  
And these sites have been selected by the World Heritage Committee, consisting of 
people from different countries. The point is that the places they have selected had almost 
universally been considered places of extraordinary beauty. So, these places—such as 
Yellowstone National Park (U.S.), Purnululu National Park (Australia), and Yakushima 
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(Japan)284—are on the list because they exemplify aesthetic properties (notably beauty) to 
a very high degree. 
 In terms of art, it is reasonable to appeal to what is often called ‘the test of time’. 
The passage of time has already allowed for people to select the exemplary works of art 
from previous periods, and this selection is based on the excellencies exhibited in those 
works. Beyond that, people have also differentiated between a given artist’s normal work 
and his masterpieces. These masterpieces display the constituents of beauty—a core 
component of aesthetic experience—to a supreme degree. Additionally, the masterpieces 
represent the ‘mature’ work of the artist, so not every work by a particular artist will 
count as a central case of art that provides a significant chance for an aesthetic 
experience. The test of time criteria also eliminates many current works of art as 
paradigmatic, even though one day some of these will be seen as central cases. This 
consequence is acceptable because, for example, many art movements were not 
immediately accepted as good by the society in which they developed, such as 
impressionism. So, central cases of art that are expected to provide an aesthetic 
experience are works like Michelangelo’s Sistine chapel ceiling, Van Gogh’s Starry 
Night, and Bernini’s The Ecstasy of Saint Teresa. These are central cases because they 
continue to exhibit to a high degree aesthetic properties, specifically beauty as will be 
discussed below. In other words, these are genuinely beautiful objects enjoyed as such. 
Deficient cases of art are those that fail to live up to the main purpose of art, which is to 
provide the possibility for an aesthetic experience. Or ones that provide the experience in 
a deficient manner by lacking some of the main constituents of an aesthetic experience, 
like beauty. A deficient aesthetic experience will still be an aesthetic experience in some 
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sense, but it will be a lesser experience than one involving an object of the central case. 
As Raz described about legal systems, these peripheral (or deficient) cases will be lacking 
(not necessarily completely) in one or two of the essential characteristics of the aesthetic 
experience. Probably, the most common deficiency is that a particular object is not as 
beautiful as the ones that count as central cases. Or the aesthetic qualities are lacking in 
some way causing the experience to be lessened. 
 
Aesthetic Objects 
For Beardsley, object-directedness is a necessary condition for aesthetic experience, and I 
fully agree with this assertion. In so far as there are any necessary conditions for aesthetic 
experience, I think this must be one. We can begin with a slightly more general question 
about the nature of experience. James Reichmann writes, “Primary experience cannot of 
itself be defined. It is simply that which is given; that of which we become aware. 
Properly speaking, primary experience is of things. It is awareness of things that exist 
independent of ourselves.”285 Reichmann asserts that experience is always about things 
and they are given to our awareness. The awareness here refers to the fact that a person 
would not hear anything, if there was nothing to hear. So as not to become entangled in a 
technical discussion of the given, I will focus on the assertion that experience is always of 
things (objects and events). Even though Reichmann claims experience is the awareness 
of the other (or non-self), the object does not need to be present once knowledge is 
gained from the experience. However, for an aesthetic experience, the object must be 
present to one’s senses, in order for one to delight in the object. This is similar to Kant’s 
idea of the purposeless of an object of taste. The concept of the object cannot exist in the 
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mind before the experience, which would give it a purpose, according to Kant. Without 
using the term object-directedness, it seems that the idea is still present in Kant’s work on 
judgments of taste because it is the object that causes the free play in the beholder’s 
imagination. The person gets lost, so to speak, in the experience of the object. 
 At this point, it will be helpful to bring some clarity to what is meant by an 
aesthetic object, largely influenced by Beardsley’s view. A preliminary concern is why 
doesn’t he just use the term ‘work of art’? Beardsley prefers the term ‘aesthetic object’; 
and I think his reasoning is worth considering.286 First, finding precise criteria of what 
counts as a work of art is a daunting (if possible) task.287 Presumably, we would think of 
works of art as things that are made by humans which require a certain amount of skill. 
However, the term ‘work of art’ might be too narrow because we might want to include 
natural objects in our discussion of aesthetic experience. For example, we might notice 
the beauty of a Van Gogh landscape painting, and also notice the beauty of an actual 
landscape. Beardsley writes, “It seems arbitrary to leave out at the beginning perceptual 
objects that are not works of art, in the strict sense, if they have something else to 
recommend their inclusion.”288 When discussing aesthetic experience, the term aesthetic 
object is useful because it allows for the inclusion of natural things. The second difficulty 
with the term work of art is that it is embedded with a normative value. For example, 
someone might say, “That’s nice, but is it art?” Even though we could attempt to remove 
all normative value from the term art, it can easily slip back in.289 So, Beardsley prefers 
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the more general expression ‘aesthetic object’. Aesthetic object is surely a normative 
term of some kind, but it is less weighted and contentious than the word art. 
 The term aesthetic object stills needs some clarification. I will only present those 
aspects of the term that are useful for developing a theory of aesthetic experience. 
Toward developing a concept of aesthetic objects, Beardsley makes some helpful 
distinctions. The first one is the distinction between the perceptual and the physical 
object. Beardsley lists a series of statements that could be made about a painting:290 
1. It is an oil painting. 
2. It contains some lovely flesh tones. 
3. It was painted in 1892. 
4. It is full of flowing movement. 
5. It is painted on canvas. 
6. It is on a wall in the Cleveland Museum of Art. 
7. It is worth a great deal of money. 
 
It is not unreasonable to assume that the pronoun “it” refers to the same object in each of 
the above sentences. Yet, according to Beardsley, “there is a fundamental distinction that 
can be made among the statements.”291 The distinction is drawn out when we ask what 
justifies each of the statements. For statements 3, 6, and 7, we would have to consult facts 
beyond the edges of the canvas—facts from history, geography, and the auction room. 
For statements 1 and 5, we would only need the painting, but simple observation might 
not be enough to conclusively know these things. We might require some kind of 
chemical analysis to know for sure. But for statements 2 and 4, we need only to look at 
the painting itself; we do not need to touch it or go beyond it in any way. The distinction 
arises primarily between the latter two pairs of statements. The first pair (statements 1 
and 5) concern the physical object, while statements 2 and 4 concern how the object 
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appears, namely the perceptual object. Beardsley defines, “A perceptual object is an 
object some of whose qualities, at least, are open to direct sensory awareness.”292  
 It is possible that someone would think of the perceptual object as entirely 
subjective. How something appears to me might not be how it appears to you. But 
Beardsley offers another helpful distinction between phenomenal objectivity and 
phenomenal subjectivity. For example, someone might think that a Marc Chagall painting 
is happy because of the bright colors, while someone else might think that the subject 
matter is dark, which makes the bright colors more ironic than actually happy. Do these 
two contrary interpretations refer to two different perceptual objects but same physical 
object? Or do they each refer to the same perceptual and physical object? So, we need a 
distinction between the aesthetic object and its effects. “It is one thing to say what an 
aesthetic object is; it is another thing to say what it does to us.”293 Sometimes the effects 
are easy to distinguish from the work. For example, while watching a sad play, someone 
begins to weep. The weeping, it seems, is the effect of the play on the spectator. But other 
times the effect is not so easy to distinguish. When someone claims that the Chagall 
painting is happy, is she claiming only that the painting makes her feel happy? Someone 
might claim that when a painting makes someone feel a certain way that person is no 
longer talking about the painting but about herself. However, Beardsley claims that when 
a person says that a painting is happy, this person is referring to the perceptual object, not 
the physical object. The objector might respond again by saying that, even so, objects of 
any kind cannot be happy (or have any other emotion); only people can have emotions. 
Beardsley responds, “Of course, when I say that the Matisse [or any other painting] is 
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cheerful I cannot mean by the word ‘cheerful’ just what I mean when I say that a person 
is cheerful; it is a metaphorical extension of the term.”294  
 The problem is not yet fully resolved. Beardsley offers the following explanation: 
Let us use the general term “phenomenal field” to refer to 
all that one is aware of, or conscious of, at a given time. 
Thus my phenomenal field at this moment consists of 
various colors and shapes (the visual field), the sounds of 
typewriter and nearby birds and cars (the auditory field), 
my thoughts, memories, feelings, expectancies, and so on. 
Some of the parts, or ingredients, in my phenomenal field 
are phenomenally objective; some of them are 
phenomenally subjective.295 
 
Of course, there must be a way to discover when parts of the phenomenal field are 
objective or subjective. Sometimes the discovery of these parts is quite clear. Suppose 
you have a brand new novel in your hands. The cover is red and yellow; it has a 
particular weight; it has a particular size. These are clearly phenomenally objective; these 
qualities will remain when you are not perceiving the book. However, the pleasure that 
arises from your anticipation of reading the book is not a quality of the book itself, but of 
yourself. Therefore, this quality is phenomenally subjective. To sum up, if the quality is 
outside of you (in the object), then it is phenomenally objective. If the quality is inside 
you, then it is phenomenally subjective. But this still does not explain how we can 
apprehend the difference in those cases that are not as clear. “There are degrees of 
objectivity, and fluctuations of it, so there may be borderline experiences, without a 
decisive orientation either toward the phenomenal self or away from it.”296 In other 
words, some gray areas exist where people will have some legitimate disagreements. But, 
in principle, we can distinguish between the phenomenally objective and subjective. 
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Suppose we have a painting by Marc Chagall. It might be that red is a dominant color, the 
canvas is a vertical rectangle, and a giant sheep is in the foreground. These seem to be 
likely candidates for the phenomenally objective. However, if I say the painting is 
cheerful, is this claim equally phenomenally objective? It seems that I am mentioning 
how I feel. Though humans are certainly capable of feeling happy, cheerful, or sad, they 
are also capable of recognizing these feelings in others, regardless of how they 
themselves happen to feel. So, I might notice someone is happy, even though I am sad. It 
seems that we can do this with works of art. I can see that Chagall’s painting is cheerful, 
yet I happen to feel sad at the moment. So, clearly, in this case, I am not simply 
projecting how a painting makes me feel onto the painting. I recognize that a painting is 
cheerful, despite how I feel. In fact, it might make me feel irritated, if I am in a bad 
mood, because it is cheerful. Thus, it seems reasonable that a painting can be cheerful or 
sad by way of metaphorical extension. 
 We are now in a position to actually define the term ‘aesthetic object’. Beardsley 
offers four possible definitions of aesthetic object. The first three are psychological 
definitions, while the last one, which Beardsley endorses, is an objective one. First, an 
aesthetic object could be defined in terms of motive.297 Aesthetic objects are those objects 
that are deliberately made by human beings to be works of art, which automatically 
excludes natural objects thereby creating an immediate difficulty. Despite that problem, if 
this definition was to be developed, one would have to explain what counts as an 
‘aesthetic’ motive or intentional state. Beardsley, however, raises some trouble for this 
view. Many things that we count as aesthetic objects would have to be reconsidered. Are 
cave paintings art? We really cannot discover if those ‘artists’ had the correct aesthetic 
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motive. Is religious art done for devotional purposes or to be an aesthetic object? The 
problem is a definition based on motive leaves too many ambiguities to know what 
should count as an aesthetic object. Second, an aesthetic object could be defined in terms 
of its effects. Using this definition, something would count as an aesthetic object only if it 
produces the right kind of experience in the perceiver. So, we would first need to 
distinguish an aesthetic experience from all other experiences. Even though Beardsley 
wants to claim that aesthetic objects are the kind of thing that can cause an aesthetic 
experience, he is careful and wise not to define an aesthetic object as that which 
automatically causes an aesthetic experience. This would make objects depend upon the 
mind or reaction of the observer for their status as aesthetic objects; further, this would 
lead to objects being both aesthetic and non-aesthetic at the same time. So, aesthetic 
object must be defined without depending solely on its psychological effects, particularly 
in reference to aesthetic experiences. Third, Beardsley says we could define aesthetic 
object in terms of our attitude toward the object. For this definition to work, we would 
have to define something like an aesthetic attitude, and then any object could count as an 
aesthetic object if we take it to be one. The problem with this view is that nothing would 
be an aesthetic object in itself; it would depend on someone positing it as one or having 
the correct relation with it. Further, if one person has the right attitude and another does 
not, then we would have to say that the object both is and is not an aesthetic object, which 
is a contradiction. Thus, each of these three psychological definitions of aesthetic objects 
are rejected by Beardsley. 
 Toward offering his own definition, Beardsley writes, “The safest and most 
informative way of distinguishing aesthetic objects from other perceptual objects would 
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not be by their causes or effects or relations to people, but by their own 
characteristics.”298  For something to be an aesthetic object, it must have the appropriate 
properties that make it an aesthetic object rather than another kind of object (of course it 
is possible for an object to have more than one role). The first step toward such a 
definition would be to divide perceptual objects according to their sensible fields: some 
objects are seen, some are heard. The auditory and visual senses are not the only possible 
senses to perceive perceptual (or even aesthetic) objects, but they are the most common. 
So, I will limit the discussion here to them. For the auditory, we would have to 
distinguish between musical compositions and other noises (birds singing, the tuning of 
instruments, etc.). For the visual, we would have to mark off paintings and sculptures 
from other visual objects (like a heap of bricks or a newspaper). For Beardsley, there are 
certain properties that allow for these things to be candidates as aesthetic objects; in other 
words, the requisite properties are present in the object itself. It is not in the purview here 
to present the kind of detailed explanation of the properties that correspond to each 
sensible field, but it was necessary to mention what would need to be done. We can 
summarize Beardsley’s notion of ‘aesthetic objects’ in his own words, “But if we want to 
carry out this project we can then group together disjunctively the class of musical 
compositions, visual designs, literary works, and all other separately defined classes of 
objects, and give the name ‘aesthetic object’ to them all.”299 And this is not just because 
they are musical compositions or visual designs because some of these will fail to live up 
to the status of aesthetic object. I think here Beardsley is assuming that these objects, to 
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varying degrees, will possess worthy aesthetic properties, like beauty. In other words, 
these objects merit a particular (and even appropriate) response. 
 
The Important Aesthetic Properties: Beauty and Sublimity 
In order to have an aesthetic experience, the object must possess certain properties 
worthy of the experience. The object must be an aesthetic object (in Beardsley’s sense) 
which has the appropriate characteristics internal to itself. And the most important 
aesthetic properties are beauty and the sublime. No exhaustive list exists which can 
pinpoint the exact number of possible aesthetic properties. For example, we might claim 
the following as aesthetic properties: dainty, dumpy, elegant, and so on. But I claim that 
of all the possible aesthetic properties the two most desirable for a work of art to have are 
beauty and the sublime. And now I offer explanations of what it means for something to 
be beautiful and sublime. 
 
Beauty 
Aquinas famously claimed, “Beauty is that which pleases when seen.”300 This might 
sound, at first glance, like a subjective theory about the nature of beauty; beauty is 
whatever pleases the individual. However, upon a closer examination, it becomes clear 
that Aquinas maintained an objective view of beauty. I think a way that brings this 
objectivity out more clearly is the following revised version of his definition: beauty is 
something that is well formed, the contemplation of which causes pleasure. The word 
‘seen’ implies a kind of ‘contemplation’, which means that the object is not merely 
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glanced at (or perceived in any other way) but thought about. Like Plotinus,301 Aquinas 
thinks that the senses of sight and hearing are uniquely equipped to perceive beautiful 
objects, though some people think that the others senses might have this capacity, albeit 
to a lesser degree. Jacques Maritain explains,302 
Beauty is essentially the object of intelligence, for what 
knows in the full meaning of the word is the mind, which 
alone is open to the infinity of being. The natural site of 
beauty is the intelligible world: thence it descends. But it 
falls in a way within the grasp of the senses, since the senses 
in the case of man serve the mind and can themselves rejoice 
in knowing: ‘the beautiful relates only to sight and hearing 
of all senses, because these two are maxime cognoscitivi. 
 
Even though the senses are involved in the apprehension of beauty; it is the whole person 
by using the senses and the mind who contemplates the beautiful.  
 What makes something beautiful? Thomists, following Aquinas, assert three main 
constituents of beauty and one necessary condition for its presence:303 actuality, 
proportion, integrity (or wholeness), and radiance. The first, actuality, is not properly a 
constituent of beauty as such. Actuality is a necessary precondition for the possibility of 
beauty; something must exist in order to be beautiful. This connects with Beardsley’s 
necessary condition that an aesthetic experience has object-directedness; there must be an 
object for there to be beauty. Where this is a little more interesting is found in the notion 
of form. For Aquinas, form is what gives being to something;304 therefore, form is also 
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the cause of something’s beauty. As something attains to its proper form to that degree it 
is beautiful. 
 Second, proportion is a constituent of beauty as the mind delights in harmony and 
order.305 We only need to consider complete disorder and chaos to see that we tend 
toward and delight in things that are more orderly. Proportion (or harmony or symmetry) 
has been long considered an aspect of beauty. In fact, it must have been so important in 
the ancient world to provoke Plotinus to argue that proportion cannot be the sole aspect 
of the beautiful.306 Plotinus offers a succinct definition of proportion or harmony: “the 
symmetry of parts towards each other and towards the whole.”307 So, proportion concerns 
the composition of the work of art. The parts need to be balanced with each other and 
with the whole so that they work together to produce the desired effect.  
 A corollary from proportion or harmony being a constituent of beauty is what 
Scruton refers to as fittingness. Scruton writes, “If you want to stand out, then you have 
to be worthy of the attention that you claim.”308 People generally want things to fit 
together in an orderly fashion, and this depends upon the interests of the person and the 
importance of the objects. If people tried to make everything standout, then either nothing 
would stand out or there would be a tension among all of the things competing for 
attention. And this result would be chaotic, rather than unified. Scruton seems to be 
referring more to everyday beauty in this passage, such as the arrangement of buildings in 
a city or, on a smaller scale, the arrangement of things in our homes. But the principle of 
fittingness can also be put to use in a work of art. In a painting, none of the parts of the 
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composition should demand so much attention that all the other parts are ignored, though 
this is not to say that there should not be a focal point. A good artist knows how to create 
a focal point that does not destroy the other parts of the work of art but works with them.  
 Third, wholeness refers to the idea that something achieves perfection in being 
and action. In other words, something that is closer to perfection in being (or action) will, 
all things considered, be more beautiful than something that is less perfect or whole. The 
idea of wholeness is similar to Aristotle’s notion of virtue in that an object’s wholeness 
could be violated by excess or deficiency. Just like a person missing an arm would be a 
deficiency, so would having a third arm be an excess. Again Maurer explains, “Lacking 
any of the parts required for the perfection of its form, or failing in its perfect operation, it 
falls short of the wholeness due to it, and to that extent it is ugly.”309 For example, in 
terms of action, a dancer asleep is still a dancer, but it is only when the dancer is actually 
dancing (action) that he or she is demonstrating the beauty of dance. In terms of an 
object, something should have the proper parts and number of parts. It should be noted 
that what constitutes wholeness for works of art is not always spelled out in advance nor 
agreed upon, but a beholder will have a sense that something is missing or that some 
parts of a work are too much. Wholeness has been considered by some to be a kind of 
proportion,310 but it is so important that it is given an independent status. The basic 
difference is that proportion describes the relationship between parts and each other and 
parts and the whole, while wholeness involves whether something has the appropriate 
number of parts. 
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 Fourth, radiance (claritas) is connected to the notion of light or luminosity. 
Maurer explains, “There is beauty in a sunset, in a dream or fantasy, a logical argument, 
an heroic deed, because each in its way ‘shines’ before us, lights up our senses, 
imagination or mind and thereby gives us pleasure.”311 Some have considered radiance to 
be the most important constituent of beauty because it is the one constituent that is 
uniquely an aspect of beauty. Other things can have proportion and wholeness, and yet 
not be beautiful. As Gilson explains, “It is in order to be that an object needs to be whole 
or perfect; it is in order to be one, therefore again in order to be, that the same object 
needs the harmony which form imparts to it; but radiance is what, in it, holds the eye. 
Therefore it is the objective basis of our own perception of the beautiful.”312 Despite its 
importance among Thomist philosophers, radiance is the most difficult to define of the 
constituents of beauty, which is due in large part to its metaphorical character. Recall that 
Kant thought it was not possible to teach someone to create beauty; it seems possible that 
radiance could be that aspect of beauty to which Kant was unwittingly referring. These 
four constituents may not comprise an exhaustive list, but they serve to illustrate the 
kinds of elements regularly found in beautiful objects. Furthermore, it is not necessary 
that all four be found in an object for that object to count as beautiful; these are simply 
the most common features of things that are considered beautiful. Yet a supremely 
beautiful object will likely possess all of these to a very high degree. 
 Beauty is not merely an emotional (or subjective) response to an object as 
sometimes is believed because of common expressions, like “Beauty is in the eye of the 
beholder.” But neither is beauty merely the result of a mathematical or logical theorem. 
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Beauty is connected to cognition in that the mind abstracts the form of an object from that 
object. And if beauty is connected to the object’s form, then knowing the form is 
knowing the object’s beauty. Beardsley explains, “Cognition or knowing consists 
essentially in abstracting the form that makes a thing what it is, and so beauty (since it 
provides immediate contemplative pleasure) must be connected with the form of the 
object, that is, its formal cause.”313 To use some of Beardsley’s distinction, beauty is 
connected with the perceptual object’s phenomenal objectivity; all of the above 
constituents of beauty are found in the object and not in one’s mind. Because the qualities 
are found in the object, beauty must be objective. And this is one way in which aesthetic 
experience differs from theoretical knowledge, the object must be present to one’s senses 
in order to have an aesthetic experience of it. After all, aesthetic experience is the 
enjoyment of the form in the sensible properties. Though people may not always 
comprehend the beautiful (or other aesthetic property) or agree with one another, this is a 
result of human finitude not the subjectivity or relativity of beauty. The mind of the 
beholder apprehends these qualities in the object thereby perceiving the object’s beauty 
through an act of cognition. This cognition provides the foundation for an aesthetic 
experience. 
 I should write a word of caution here. Though I am fully committed to the 
objectivity of beauty, I do not think this means that anyone has infallible knowledge of 
what is and is not beautiful.314 This is a result of the limitations of being human. In the 
same way, no person has infallible knowledge about reality. I mention this point for two 
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main reasons: first, this is too often a criticism of the objectivity of beauty; and second, I 
think beauty has a mysterious aspect to it. The first point arises when people question 
whether anyone can say what is or is not beautiful with absolute certainty. (“Who are you 
to tell me what is beautiful?) There are some things, I think, we can be reasonably certain 
are indeed beautiful, like a sunset and human faces that conform to the golden ratio. 
However, this does not disallow some differences of opinion, especially concerning the 
degree to which something is beautiful. One person might think an object is supremely 
beautiful, while another thinks it is only mildly beautiful. The objectivity of beauty is like 
a target at which we strive. In fact, many artists, like Charlie Chaplin, believed that they 
never achieved what they had striven toward. This brings up the next point. Beauty has 
an element of mystery to it. This is precisely why Kant believed that it was not possible 
to teach someone how to create beauty. We can teach (or learn) how to have proportion, 
mix colors, and so on, yet we might never learn how to paint a beautiful picture. Thus, we 
must allow for there to be an element of mystery to beauty; try as we may, we will never 
apprehend it completely. 
 
The Sublime 
Focusing more on beauty, many have advocated that aesthetic experience is only 
something pleasurable by which a positive experience is implied. But I would add that 
aesthetic experiences could also involve negative pleasure (and emotions) as Kant 
thought, like tension, anger, and sadness. A fuller treatment of the subject is wanting, but 
I claim that these negative emotions (and possibly others) could fall generally, but not 
always, under the heading of the sublime. The modern concept of the sublime finds its 
development in several philosophers, most prominent are Kant, Burke, and 
167 
Schopenhauer. I will not present the differing views of the sublime from all of these 
perspectives, though I will rely on Kant’s explanation more closely than the others. So, I 
will present a general understanding of the sublime and show how it acts as a negative 
pleasure for aesthetic experience. The sublime is not an experience of displeasure; it is 
mixed with both negative and positive aspects. It can involve the experience of fear, the 
unknown, or violence alongside joy or pleasure. One frequently confronts the 
massiveness of nature when experiencing the sublime—something too great to 
comprehend with the senses, like the seemingly endless ocean. This experience makes the 
beholder feel his insignificance by comparison; it can even be terrifying. Yet, as Kant and 
Schopenhauer argue, the overall experience of the sublime could still be considered a 
kind of pleasure, albeit a negative pleasure.315  
 Some themes that recur in works of art are not positive, and I think that they could 
frequently be placed under the heading of the sublime. First, obvious examples used by 
Kant focus on the sublime in nature, which have been the subject of many artists, notably 
Caspar David Friedrich. Friedrich would often paint scenes depicting nature’s power or 
vastness. For example, in Monk on the Seashore (1808-1810), a monk is standing by the 
sea, but he is barely seen as the massiveness of the sea and sky envelope his small frame. 
Also, in this painting, one cannot quite make out where the sea ends and the sky begins. 
Next, many works of art have focused on death, which is a theme that terrifies many 
people with its mystery. Often described as the first modernist work of art, Jacques-Louis 
David’s Death of Marat (1793) depicts the death of a French revolutionary leader, named 
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Jean-Paul Marat after he had been murdered.316 This painting is not positive, yet it could 
stimulate an aesthetic experience in so far as it is beautiful and depicts the sublime. The 
last main theme is war. Francisco Goya painted many disturbing images about war. 
Possibly his most famous example is The Shootings of May Third 1808 (1814). In this 
painting, Goya shows members of the Spanish resistance being shot at close range by 
soldiers of Napoleon’s army, during the Peninsular War. It would be difficult to say that 
this painting is not disturbing. Yet it could elicit a negative pleasure as the sublime 
subject matter confronts its beholders. And pleasure (both positive and negative as I have 
explained them) are present, to some degree, in every aesthetic experience. 
 Do these examples of art possess the property of being sublime? Since the 
sublime usually requires an object that is bigger than one’s sense can grasp, it is unlikely 
that these paintings are sublime. It is better to say that they are beautiful in their 
depictions of situations that are sublime. However, it is conceivable that a painting could 
count as sublime, if one is referring to Kant’s understanding of the mathematical sublime. 
I think this type of sublime renders it possible for more works of art to be sublime as 
opposed to merely depict the sublime, but I am only suggesting this as a possibility. 
Remember from the previous chapter that this type of sublime refers to something which 
the imagination cannot fathom. For example, Doris Salcedo has made sculptures out of 
everyday objects (like chairs or shoes) that represent people who have been taken away 
by political violence in Colombia. The real people that her works represent make it 
difficult to imagine the pain and suffering that many of them have undergone. Plus, one 
realizes that there are even more victims than her works suggest. So, it is possible that 
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works of art like those by Salcedo could be called sublime in the sense of the 
mathematical sublime. But, generally speaking, works of art at best only depict the 
sublime. Beauty is more properly called an aesthetic property of art, but the depiction of 
the sublime is also highly important for the overall experience. Thus, beauty and 
sublimity, as I have described here are the two most important aesthetic properties for 
having an aesthetic experience. But these properties require an audience (at least one 
beholder) to make the aesthetic experience possible. 
 
The Importance of the Beholder for Aesthetic Experience 
When talking about the beholders of art, the focus usually rests on how the work of art 
affects them, rather than what responsibility they might have in viewing art. People can 
hinder and help their ability to have aesthetic experiences. To be sure, some degree of 
affectiveness is an integral aspect of having an aesthetic experience. Affectiveness 
consists of the feelings of pleasure that comprise an aesthetic experience. To show the 
value of affectiveness in aesthetic experience, recall Shusterman’s example of a cyborg 
and a human both viewing a work of art.317 His example is designed specifically to show 
that they could both interpret the work, but the human is able to have an affective 
response to the work that the cyborg cannot have (at least not in this example). 
Ultimately, Shusterman’s point is that the affective aspect of aesthetic experience is a 
necessary part of adequately beholding works of art. The way that a work of art affects 
the beholder is not the only relevance of the beholder in the aesthetic experience. In other 
words, the beholder is not simply a passive recipient; the beholder should also be actively 
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engaged in the experience. I will now present three reasons why the beholder is important 
for an aesthetic experience. 
 First, the beholder of a work of art (or aesthetic object) is obviously a necessary 
condition for there to be an aesthetic experience, since there cannot be an experience 
without an experiencer. But an aesthetic experience does not occur in a person who is not 
actively engaged in the contemplation of the object. A beholder may have an aesthetic 
perception318—simply noticing a beautiful object—but the active engagement of the 
beholder is necessary for it to move to an aesthetic experience. This might happen 
relatively quickly. Three things are implied by this view of the beholder. First, I agree 
that some works of art, for differing reasons, elicit immediate responses as soon as they 
are viewed or heard; one obvious example is what might be termed ‘shock-art’. However, 
not all works of art will provide the full potential of their effect in a few moments; 
sometimes it takes time to truly appreciate a work with all its intricacies. Or in terms of 
sequential works of art (like a play or novel), it seems that someone who is only half 
watching or listening will not be able, all things considered, to access the full experience. 
So, it is the beholder who must continue to be attentive to the work of art. It is not the 
case that the beholder is merely a passive receiver of the artwork. Most works of art can 
be ignored, if the potential beholder strongly desires to ignore them. For example, 
artworks are not analogous to being shoved. If someone is shoved, there is some kind of 
automatic response, a reflex, that occurs. Art is more analogous to a conversation, where 
each participant contributes something (one speaks while the other listens). By claiming 
that viewing art is like a conversation, I do not mean to imply any theory about art’s 
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ability to communicate. I wish to highlight only the integral relationship between art and 
spectator. Works of art and spectators need each other, in order for aesthetic experiences 
to occur. 
 Second, there is a gradation of aesthetic experiences that are attainable. Beardsley 
also believed in a gradation of the intensity of aesthetic experiences, but he never really 
developed this thought. I think it is more important than his lack of attention might 
suggest. Several things contribute to the gradation: the individual, other people, and the 
object. I will say more about the individual below, but here I will just claim that the 
individual’s attitude can affect whether or not he has an aesthetic experience and the 
degree of the experience’s intensity. For instance, a person who is passively hearing a 
musical composition will likely have a less intense experience than someone who is 
actively engaged in the composition. Next, other people can help and hinder an aesthetic 
experience, both directly and indirectly. Consider a noisy gallery or art museum. Some 
people might be able to ignore the movement and noise around them, while for others it 
might provide too great a distraction, directly hindering their enjoyment. Other people’s 
opinions might indirectly influence our potential experience of a work of art, such as 
reading bad reviews of a movie might contribute to our dislike of the movie. Lastly, the 
object itself might warrant less or more intense experiences. For example, a quaint little 
flower patch in the corner of one’s yard should yield a less intense experience of nature 
than the Grand Canyon. In terms of artifacts, it seems normal to create objects with 
varying degrees of aesthetic excellence. Roger Scruton describes, “Were we to aim in 
every case at the kind of supreme beauty exemplified by Sta Maria della Salute, we 
should end with aesthetic overload. The clamorous masterpieces, jostling for attention 
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side by side, would lose their distinctiveness, and the beauty of each of them would be at 
war with the beauty of the rest.”319 Scruton argues that in the context of urban landscape 
or people’s homes, the goal is for everything to fit together. Nothing should stand out that 
is not worth our attention.320 This ‘fittingness’, for Scruton, is a trait of beauty. Thus, 
these three things (the individual, other people, and objects) can together or separately 
account for the gradation of aesthetic experiences, and the beholder should try overcome 
these situations or distractions. 
 Third, it is the active engagement of the beholder that can account for the unity of 
the aesthetic experience. One of Dickie’s criticisms, explained in the previous chapter, 
was that the only unity proven by Beardsley’s argument is the unity of the artwork itself. 
The unity (coherence) of the artwork is not very contentious; a work of art is typically a 
unified whole, in some sense. Dickie’s concern is that Beardsley relies on the unity of the 
artwork to assert the unity of the experience, and Beardsley, according to Dickie, merely 
assumes this is the case. I agree that the unity of an object does not guarantee the unity of 
the experience of that object. But experience is always of something. Thus, an experience 
has a phenomenological aspect. So, due to the nature of experience, aesthetic experience 
must necessarily be connected to an object or event, which is in full agreement with 
Beardsley’s first feature of aesthetic experience, object-directedness. But the beholder has 
some responsibilities that are not mentioned by Beardsley. The person may have an 
immediate emotional reaction to a work of art, but this should not automatically be 
confused with a full aesthetic experience. For example, many people have probably had 
an extreme reaction (whether good or bad) to a work of art, and then, the more they 
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contemplated the work, they began to change their mind about it. Sometimes the beholder 
must employ willpower to get passed her initial reactions to a work of art. Yet despite the 
effort, sometimes the initial response still remains. But this whole process of interacting 
with the work of art is part of the aesthetic experience; the experience could develop and 
go through changes over time, especially for chronological works of art like plays or 
novels. And the beholder actively prolongs the experience by continuing to perceive and 
contemplate the work of art (this might only take a few minutes), which suggests that the 
beholder is an active participant of the experience. Hence, both the object and the 
perceiver are essential for the aesthetic experience. 
 As previously noted, the beholder’s attitude can effect the experience of art, but 
we should be more explicit about the effects of how one approaches (or prepares to 
approach) works of art. For instance, sometimes one’s attitude can hinder one’s ability to 
experience a work of art. For instance, some people cannot get passed the stigma of 
graffiti to ever appreciate some of the works that graffiti artists have made. Or someone’s 
attitude could overextend his aesthetic experience. For example, someone who loves 
Pierre-Auguste Renoir might be more open to an aesthetic experience of all of his 
paintings, even ones that most would think are not very good. Further, some might be 
inclined to think that if a work of art is good, it should affect you whether you are 
prepared for it or not. And there are cases of this happening, where someone did not want 
to like a work of art, but somehow the work moved her, despite her attitude. But this is 
not always the case. Some others might think that ‘preparing’ oneself to experience a 
work of art inhibits the work from causing the experience in the beholder. Responding to 
this type of criticism, Moses Mendelssohn writes, “Listen, now, my noble young man, to 
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how I prepare myself to enjoy something pleasurable.”321 He goes on to describe the 
process by which he contemplates beautiful objects or works of art. While it might be too 
extreme to expect each person to have a preparation procedure in order to experience 
works of art, Mendelssohn reminds us that our approach to works of art plays a role in 
our ability to experience art. 
 
Connatural Knowledge and the Artists 
In common language, people might say that it is someone’s ‘second nature’ to give 
money to the poor, and this expression means that the person has developed a habit of 
giving money to the poor. In other words, giving to the poor has become part of who the 
person is. Aquinas gives this the name connaturality. In the context of moral judgment, 
Aquinas claims that there are two ways to acquire a rectitude of judgment. First, one 
could use reason to discover the morally correct behavior, which is not contingent on the 
person actually being a moral person. Second, one could acquire a “certain connaturality” 
with the action about which a judgment is to be made. As an example, Aquinas writes, 
“Thus, about matters of chastity, a man after inquiring with his reason forms a right 
judgment, if he has learnt the science of morals, while he who has the habit of chastity 
judges of such matters by a kind of connaturality.”322 Connaturality is a kind of intuition 
(or knowledge) that arises out of the habits of an individual. I will explain this concept as 
it is used by Aquinas in the context of morality and moral judgment. And then, I will 
connect the concept of connaturality to my view of aesthetic experience, employing the 
works of Jacques Maritain who first made this connection to aesthetics. 
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 In the beginning of Aquinas’ Summa Theologica, Aquinas presents two kinds of 
judging, which produce a twofold wisdom. He writes, “A man may judge in one way by 
inclination, as whoever has the habit of virtue judges rightly of what concerns that virtue 
by his very inclination towards it. Hence it is the virtuous man, as we read, who is the 
measure and rule of human acts. In another way, by knowledge, just as a man learned in 
moral science might be able to judge rightly about virtuous acts, though he had not the 
virtue.”323 It seems clear that Aquinas believes these two to both be equally valid for 
making judgments. But they are not equally valid for defending one’s judgments. Kevin 
O’Reilly explains the difference between these two kinds of judgment, “The principal 
difference emphasised by Aquinas between the two manners of judging concerns the rule 
or measure which is employed in each case.”324 In the case of knowledge by 
connaturality, “the inclination of the virtuous man is invoked.”325 But in the case of 
knowledge through reason, “it is the intellectual knowledge concerning moral matters 
which furnishes the measure; this is so even when virtue is lacking in the case of the one 
who judges.”326 The basic idea of reasoning about moral judgments seems fairly 
uncontentious; people use reason to the best of their ability to make moral judgments, 
even though the specifics about how to make such judgments (or on what basis) might 
differ. But what about making judgments based on knowledge through connaturality (or 
inclination)? This concept still needs to be explained more fully. 
 Through performing certain good actions, someone develops an inclination 
toward these good actions. Then, when faced with a decision, the virtuous person will be 
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inclined toward the good action, even though she might not be able to give a rational 
account of why she chose one action over another. As Maritain writes, “It [connaturality] 
is not rational knowledge, knowledge through the conceptual, logical, and discursive 
exercise of reason. But it is really and genuinely knowledge, though obscure and perhaps 
incapable of giving account of itself.”327 It is a kind of knowledge attained by 
experiencing (or perceiving) an object or action. In other words, it is developed through 
habit; the person becomes co-natured with the object or action. It is sometimes called 
knowledge by inclination, but it should be clear that this inclination is not random. It is 
developed through habit; it is not whimsical.  
 Aquinas first mentions knowledge through connaturality in the context of 
morality, Maritain takes this concept and is the first to apply it to art and aesthetics. 
Maritain, throughout his writing career, presents several lists cataloging the types of 
connatural knowledge. As a general definition, connatural knowledge is knowledge that 
is developed through habit. And there are two primary divisions: intellectual and 
affective. The distinction between these two corresponds to the distinction between the 
speculative and practical intellect. The speculative intellect gains knowledge for its own 
sake, while the practical intellect gains knowledge for some purpose. This distinction 
does not show that there are two separate intellects, but the one (unified) intellect has two 
primary aspects. Intellectual connatural knowledge is a habitual knowledge attained for 
its own sake, while affective connatural knowledge is habitual knowledge attained for the 
sake of some action or other purpose. In the context of art and aesthetics, Maritain 
focuses on the affective connatural knowledge, especially as it applies to the artist. 
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Affective connatural knowledge is further sub-divided by Maritain into three kinds:328 (1) 
supernatural or mystical contemplation, which involves knowledge of the divine; (2) 
prudential or practical knowledge, which involves knowledge of morality or moral 
experience; (3) poetic knowledge, which involves the knowledge of poetry and art. 
Speaking specifically of connaturality as it relates to art, Maritain adopts this last version, 
namely poetic knowledge. O’Reilly explains, “For Maritain, poetic knowledge is a 
specific form of knowledge through inclination or connaturality; it is a knowledge 
through affective connaturality which pertains essentially to the creativity of the spirit 
and which expresses itself in a work of art.”329 It is important to note that claiming 
connatural knowledge is part of an aesthetic creation (and in the next section aesthetic 
experience) is not to reduce aesthetic experience to knowledge. Connatural knowledge 
helps to cultivate one’s capacity for creating (and experiencing) the aesthetic. 
 One last distinction is necessary to grasp Maritain’s use of connatural knowledge. 
The reality that is understood connaturally may be either conceptual or non-conceptual. 
What Maritain calls intellectual intuition is the only type of connatural knowledge that 
understands reality as conceptualizable. This means that “it is possible for the reality that 
is grasped connaturally to be understood conceptually and expressed linguistically.”330 
The basic concept here seems fairly straightforward; however, the idea of grasping reality 
as non-conceptualizable seems more troublesome. The reality grasped as non-
conceptualizable is still a reality, and it is still grasped connaturally. It is through 
experience and habit that this knowledge comes to be grasped. But it is grasped 
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obscurely. It is in the inner recesses of one’s own subjectivity. To help explain this 
concept, we can turn to an example from activities that require a certain amount of 
training, such as sports. The first time someone sits in a kayak, completely enclosed from 
the waste down, he might feel quite precarious. The kayak might feel quite unstable, but 
it certainly feels foreign. However, with practice and training, the kayak and paddle, in a 
sense, become extensions of one’s body; so, someone might claim that maneuvering a 
kayak has become a person’s second nature. Or to be slightly more technical, one has 
become co-natured with the kayak. One might not be able to explain any of the physics, 
anatomy, or other technical theories behind the use of the kayak, but this person can 
certainly know what to do when the kayak flips over. I use this example first as a more 
concrete example of how connatural knowledge is developed through habit, but 
connatural knowledge is not limited to know-how.  It applies also to knowledge-that; it 
could be that someone becomes co-natured with the good or some other more abstract 
quality, albeit not infallibly. And so, I maintain that someone can become co-natured with 
the beautiful and sublime by experiencing these properties to a sufficient degree of 
habituation. 
 I have mentioned the notion of poetic knowledge, and it is necessary that it be 
explained in more depth as it is a species of affective connatural knowledge. Maritain’s 
use of this expression is focused mostly on the creation of works of art by the artist, and I 
will extend it (in a more explicit way than Maritain) to the beholder’s of works of art. To 
begin with, Maritain writes, “In such a knowledge [poetic knowledge] it is the object 
created, the poem, the painting, the symphony, in its own existence as a world of its own, 
which plays the part played in ordinary knowledge by the concepts and judgments 
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produced within the mind.”331 When making a judgment, it is the proclamation (verbal or 
written) through language that makes it known. But, poetic knowledge comes to fruition 
in the completed work of art. Maritain describes, “In the mind of the poet, poetic 
knowledge arises in an unconscious or preconscious manner, and emerges into 
consciousness in a sometimes almost imperceptible though imperative and irrefragable 
way, through an impact both emotional and intellectual or through an unpredictable 
experiential insight, which gives notice of its existence, but does not express it.”332 Poetic 
knowledge arises through the emotions, but Maritain is quick to clarify that he is not 
advocating an emotional or sentimental theory of poetry or art. The intellect is completely 
involved in this kind of knowledge, but it proceeds through the “instrumentality of 
feeling.”333 The emotion involved here is not an ‘emotion as thing’, expressed by the 
artist. For example, it is not that the artist is depressed and uses this depression to make 
works of despair. Trying to clarify what he means by emotion, Maritain writes, “It is an 
emotion as form, which, being one with the creative intuition, gives form to the poem, 
and which is intentional, as an idea is, or carries within itself more than itself.”334 It is a 
subjective knowledge in the sense that it is knowledge of one’s subjectivity, one’s inner 
states. 
 
Connatural Knowledge and the Beholders of Artworks 
In the same way that the habituated virtuous person may be able to pick the morally 
correct action, referring to Aquinas’ example, someone habituated with art and beauty 
can appreciate it more than one who is not habituated. Though Maritain may have 
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thought that connaturality applied to the beholder of art, he focused primarily on the 
creative activity of the artist. I want to make explicit how connaturality can help us 
understand the way that people experience works of art. As a trivial point, it seems 
obvious that people who have seen many paintings are better able to experience paintings 
than someone who has never seen a painting. But connatural knowledge (or poetic 
knowledge), for the beholder, can be extended in other ways as well. 
 Prior to explaining the ways connatural knowledge helps us understand the role of 
the beholder, I should say a word about connatural knowledge and taste. On one hand, I 
think that developing connatural knowledge in the realm of aesthetics is developing one’s 
taste. In other words, people generally seem to believe that one’s taste can be developed, 
so connatural knowledge is an explanation of how it could develop. But, on the other 
hand, connatural knowledge differs from some common understandings of taste. 
Connatural knowledge is a kind of knowledge of the good, true, or beautiful, while taste 
is often thought to be linked solely with the feelings of the individual, which are 
necessarily subjective. However, people criticize one another for having bad taste or 
praise one another for good taste. If taste is merely a feeling, then it seems that criticism 
and praise are pointless. I think that taste is developed through habituation with things 
that are beautiful and sublime. But people’s taste will differ for at least two reasons. One 
is that people will have differing degrees of habituation. The other is more subjective; for 
some reason people will be drawn to different instantiations of beauty and sublimity. Just 
because there is this subjective notion of preference does not preclude that some people’s 
tastes are better (more developed) than others. To conclude this excursus on taste, I think 
that because taste involves the beautiful and sublime, there is an objective standard 
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toward which people should try to develop their taste through habituation. But because 
taste also involves preferences, there is some subjectivity (or flexibility). As an analogy, 
one could acknowledge the health benefits of eating carrots, but he might not like the way 
they taste. Likewise, one might acknowledge the beauty of a work of art, but it might not 
be the kind of art she prefers. I now move on to show how connatural knowledge can 
help the beholder of art. 
 First, the idea of becoming habituated to types of art should be further explained. 
A person could become habituated to a particular type of art. Suppose a person, say 
Eleanor, has spent a great deal of time and energy viewing abstract expressionist art. 
Eleanor would be able to pinpoint subtleties and differences between different abstract 
paintings. Further, she might claim that one painting is better than another. If asked why 
she makes this claim, she might not be able to give a precise answer. It might be what 
Maritain would call an intuition; in other words, she might not be able to conceptualize 
her judgment. So, Eleanor’s enjoyment and experience of abstract paintings is based on 
this obscure, connatural knowledge that developed over time as she experienced 
numerous abstract paintings. By way of contrast, intellectual knowledge must devise 
principles and concepts of abstract art in order to explain which painting is better and to 
list all of the subtleties of a given painting. It should be noted that connatural knowledge 
is not necessarily limited to a given genre of a given art. One could possess connatural 
knowledge about paintings of all genres.  
 Second, connatural knowledge applies to aesthetic properties. Aquinas’ original 
example involved someone who had connatural knowledge about the good, so he could 
make decisions in any area, and it would presumably be morally good. Likewise, 
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someone could develop connatural knowledge about beauty. This person can appreciate 
beauty anywhere he finds it, even if it comes in a form of art with which he is unfamiliar. 
Again, this knowledge is obscure and cannot always be put into precise concepts. So, he 
may not be able to rationalize his opinion about a given object being (or not being) 
beautiful. In a like manner, connatural knowledge could be applied to other aesthetic 
properties, like the sublime. Moreover, one’s connatural knowledge could be even more 
specific than beauty. For example, someone could have a well-developed sense of 
composition. She could look at new (to her) kinds of art and have a sense of the goodness 
(or badness) of the composition.  
 How does this extension of connatural knowledge to beholders effect a theory of 
aesthetic experience? Prior to explaining this connection, I should issue a warning about 
connatural knowledge at it relates to aesthetic experience. It should be noted that gaining 
knowledge by connaturality does not have a precise method. So, there is not a number of 
paintings that any given person must view in order to become co-natured with paintings. 
It could be different for different people. Plus, it is a continual (and unending) process; a 
person never gets to the point where his connatural knowledge of a given field is 
complete. Just like any other kind of knowledge, connatural knowledge for human beings 
is not infallible. A belief based on connaturality might not be well developed or possibly 
wrong.  
 First of all, connatural knowledge helps to explain why one person has an 
aesthetic experience of a given object, while another person has no such experience or a 
more or less intense experience. For instance, a person who has become habituated 
toward blues music will appreciate it more than someone who has not ‘acquired the 
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taste’. To put it differently, one can become attuned to a type of art by being exposed to 
it. This idea highlights the fact that the beholder has some responsibility in his or her 
appreciation of artistic objects. The beholder is not simply passive. If one wants to have 
the appropriate responses to works of art, then one must be actively engaged in the 
perception of those works. Plus, one must habituate oneself to the necessary art or 
aesthetic property, in order to be more equipped to appreciate it. 
 Second, connatural knowledge helps explain why one person’s view about works 
of art can change over time. For example, someone might not appreciate the nuances of 
jazz music. But then, over time, this person learns through repeated listenings to 
genuinely appreciate jazz music. I am not suggesting that someone can force himself to 
appreciate a kind of art. I just mean that someone could (choose to) become habituated to 
a kind of art over time and grow to appreciate it more fully. 
 Third, connatural knowledge helps explain why one person is more attune to 
certain aesthetic properties, like beauty and sublimity, than other people. In the same way 
that Aquinas says someone could become co-natured with the good, someone, I maintain, 
can become co-natured with beauty or sublimity. This person would then be able to 
recognize beauty in all kinds of objects, even if she could not present rational grounds for 
her judgments. 
 
The Possibility of Aesthetic Experience 
Recall that Shusterman showed how aesthetic experience, in terms of art, had been 
replaced by interpretation during the 20th century. If works of art conveyed meaning (and 
this was their sole function), then it would seem rather circuitous that artists spend 
months, even years, completing particular works just to communicate a message of some 
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sort. Would it not be simpler just to clearly state the meaning without the trouble of 
making an aesthetic object (not to mention the years of practice that went into perfecting 
the skills necessary for making the object in the first place)? I take for granted that most 
people believe, wrongly or rightly, that art has a special power to communicate, and it 
does so, in a unique way from a simple verbal expression. This ‘unique way’ is the 
beginning idea, albeit very thin at this point, for a theory of aesthetic experience. For 
present purposes, I am not proposing any theory of the ability of art to communicate; I 
am simply acknowledging that many people adhere to some view that art communicates. 
What I am trying to establish is that art necessarily does something more than simply 
communicate; otherwise, artists could be wasting their time because direct verbal 
communication might be more effective and clear. Plus, even a cursory glance at the 
interpretations of a given work of art will show that the ‘meanings’ provoked by the work 
of art are not always clear. Many different, sometimes contradictory, interpretations are 
offered for a single work. What is it that compels the artist to make these works that are 
frequently less accurate forms of communication? It seems to me that artists want their 
audience to have some kind of experience, rather than simply the acquisition of certain 
knowledge. What I am suggesting is that the possibility of aesthetic experience is found 
in the fundamental purpose of art itself. Works of art should be made so that aesthetic 
properties (most notably beauty) are present, which leads to a kind of experience that is 
connected to works of art and is above any other purpose that works of art possess.  
 I should address one objection that is necessary to overcome in order to continue 
down this line of thought. Someone might claim that art expresses what cannot be 
expressed with words. For example, it happens that sometimes people have a feeling and 
185 
they cannot quite explain it; someone might claim that this is the kind of thing that art can 
express. There are two problems with this view. First, it is not clear that this would 
encompass all art, even if we allow it for some art. We would still need to explain the art 
that communicates things that can be expressed (oftentimes more precisely) with words. 
And some art might not communicate at all. Second, I would challenge the belief that art 
expresses these difficult ideas any more clearly than verbal descriptions. For instance, I 
might have a feeling that I cannot fully describe. But I could certainly offer some 
description; I could say whether the feeling was positive or negative. I think a painting 
(or other work of art) could probably do the same thing; furthermore, it might simply 
evoke negative or positive feelings without expressing them. Regardless of what may or 
may not be communicated through art, it seems clear that there is also something more 
going on by the fact that the artists choose to use art as their medium. And this 
‘something more’, again, is the motivation for a theory of aesthetic experience. 
 Though it is possible that a set of necessary and sufficient conditions exist to 
guarantee something is art, the changing face of art prevents a finite being from being 
able to perfectly discover this set. And some would say that necessary and sufficient 
conditions for art simply do not exist.335 This is why when someone proposes one thing 
that art is supposed to do—such as express the ideas of emotion336—it is usually easy to 
find counterexamples or other problems with such a theory. Thus, if not all art expresses 
the ideas of emotions, then the expression view cannot be correct. What is needed is a 
theory about the nature of art that is inclusive enough to account for commonalities in art, 
yet flexible enough to allow for art’s development. In this section I will present a more 
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adequate account of the nature and purpose of works of art, based on the capacity of these 
to provide a uniquely aesthetic kind of experience—the enjoyment of, for its own sake, 
aesthetic objects involving the presence of the beautiful or sublime. 
 Aesthetic functionalism is a theory of art that allows for the development of art, 
while maintaining that all art has a purpose—art provides the possibility for aesthetic 
experience.337 Versions of this theory have been developed and defended by Monroe 
Beardsley and Nick Zangwill. As a general account of this type of theory, Stephen Davies 
writes, “Aesthetic functionalism maintains that something is an artwork if it is intended to 
provide the person who contemplates it for its own sake with an aesthetic experience of a 
significant magnitude on the basis of an appreciation of its aesthetic features, provided 
the percipient is in an appropriate frame of mind.”338 Rather than focusing on 
communication and interpretation, aesthetic functionalism claims that the nature of art is 
such that works of art provide the possibility of a uniquely aesthetic experience.339 Artists 
that claim to be expressing some kind of meaning still seem to want the beholder to 
experience something. By depicting war scenes, for instance, an artist might want the 
beholder to feel outrage or despair. But it would seem odd for artists to go through the 
trouble of fine-tuning their talent, just to communicate some generic message about war 
being bad; they want to create an experience for their audience.  
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 Perhaps, art is not simply a vehicle for communication, and its purpose is to 
provide the possibility of aesthetic experiences to onlookers. But what if aesthetic 
experience is simply a category of knowledge? Finnis maintains that aesthetic experience, 
which I have claimed is the fundamental purpose of art, is just a form of knowledge.340 In 
Natural Law and Natural Rights, Finnis listed aesthetic experience as a distinct basic 
good; in later work it was considered just a sub-category under the basic good of 
knowledge. His motivation for this belief is that he regards aesthetic experience as the 
appropriate response to the aesthetic object.341 The word ‘appropriate’ indicates 
normativity. So, he adopts a view of aesthetic experience as a form of knowledge to 
protect it from subjectivity, since ‘experience’ is necessarily a subjective category. If 
aesthetic experience is a basic good for all human beings, then aesthetic experience 
cannot be wholly subjective, i.e., relative to each individual. In other words, his goal was 
to emphasize the ‘aesthetic’ part of the term, which he deems objective, rather than the 
‘experience’ part, which is subjective. Since the apprehension of beauty—which is the 
goal of an aesthetic experience for Finnis—involves cognition, Finnis believes this 
grounds his view that aesthetic experience is just a form of knowledge and objective. So, 
he suggests that the aesthetic aspect be given greater importance than the experience 
aspect. Because if the experience (and subjective) part dominates, then Finnis worries 
that aesthetic experience will be reduced to something wholly subjective. 
 In what way could aesthetic experience count as knowledge? Since Finnis has not 
written anything specifically explaining what kind of knowledge is attained through an 
aesthetic experience, I will attempt to construct a broadly Thomistic picture of what such 
                                                            
340 Though Finnis is not properly an aesthetician, he is important for my project in that I distinguish my 
view from his by claiming aesthetic experience is a distinct basic good. 
341 From a personal conversation (August 2011, at Princeton University). 
188 
an account might look like. I am not offering a defense of this view of knowledge here; I 
am merely trying to sketch what it could mean to claim that aesthetic experience is a kind 
of knowledge. I begin with a claim that Finnis did make—that aesthetic experience is 
exclusively the experience of an object’s beauty. In Finnis’ own words, “Aesthetic 
experience, unlike play, need not involve an action of one’s own; what is sought after and 
valued for its own sake may simply be the beautiful form ‘outside’ one, and the ‘inner’ 
experience of appreciation of its beauty.”342 For now, I speak of aesthetic experience as 
the apprehension (through the senses) and appreciation (through a judgment) of an 
object’s beauty. (For my own view, I include one other important aesthetic property, the 
sublime.) The term ‘form’ is the key word for the Thomistic view of knowledge and 
beauty. Aquinas writes, “Now since knowledge is by assimilation, and similarity relates 
to form, beauty properly belongs to the nature of a formal cause.”343 Beauty, for Aquinas, 
relates to the form of the object. To know an object is for the form of that object to come 
to exist in the mind of the knower. As Aquinas explains, “the sensible form is in one way 
in the thing which is external to the soul, and in another way in the senses, which receive 
the forms of sensible things without receiving the matter, such as the color gold without 
receiving gold.”344 If the mind apprehends the form of an object and the form is 
connected with its beauty, then the mind apprehends the beauty of the object through 
knowing its form.  
 In this very broad sense aesthetic experience could be considered knowledge, but 
this intellectual grasp of form is different from other knowledge. Unlike in theoretical 
knowledge, this grasp of the form is subordinated to the experience of pleasure which it 
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enables. For example, I might see a cup sitting on a desk; I know that it is white and 
purple, a particular size, and so on. So, in this generic way, I know this cup on the desk 
through sense perception, leading to intellectual cognition. Thus, in both knowledge and 
aesthetic experience, there is a passive reception and intellectual cognition of an object’s 
form, but there is a difference in the act of judging. In knowledge, the knower judges that 
the world is a particular way. And the knowledge is present with the knower after the 
object is gone. But in aesthetic experience, the beholder rests in the object’s form—
contemplates its form—and makes a judgment (or some other kind of response) about its 
beauty. And the object must be present to the beholder for the aesthetic experience.  
 If aesthetic experience were simply a kind of knowledge, then attaining 
knowledge would envelop all of what it means to have an aesthetic experience. Yet it 
seems that an aesthetic experience, though it presupposes knowledge in the above 
Thomistic sense, is something more than knowledge. To put it differently, attaining the 
object’s form (like Beardsley’s object-directedness) through sense perception is 
necessary for an aesthetic experience, but it is not sufficient. When we perceive any 
object, we gain knowledge in a broad sense, but it is not the case that each instance of 
perceiving an object is an aesthetic experience. This ‘something more’ (a response) is all 
that is necessary to ground my argument that aesthetic experience is, by its nature, 
different from knowledge. An aesthetic experience does not automatically occur when the 
sensible form enters the mind, even if the form is beautiful. This first stage could be 
called aesthetic perception.345 But this is not yet an aesthetic experience; it is more like 
noticing (and beginning to be attentive to) the qualities of an object. So, it is not only 
apprehending the form, which is also the beginning of all knowledge, that creates an 
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aesthetic experience; it is also what one does with the form once apprehended (i.e. 
appreciate or contemplate the beauty of the object). 
 An aesthetic experience does not consist of simply noticing a beautiful or sublime 
object; it requires an active engagement on the part of the beholder. By ‘active 
engagement’, no implication of a time limit is intended. Some people might be actively 
engaged immediately, while others may have to work up to that point. It is active more in 
terms of attitude than duration, though it obviously requires some amount of duration. 
This active engagement is already suggested in Aquinas’ definition of beauty and Finnis’ 
notion of aesthetic experience. Aquinas defines beauty as follows, “beautiful things are 
those which please when seen [contemplated].”346 The word ‘seen’ in this statement 
implies, not just seeing, but perceiving (with any of the senses) and contemplating.347 So, 
there is a cognitive component.348 But even in Aquinas’ text aesthetic experience is not 
simply knowledge, it is knowledge of the forms that produces pleasure. Furthermore, 
Finnis’ own view—that aesthetic experience is the appropriate response to beauty—
already presupposes something more than knowledge, namely a response. The fact that it 
is ‘appropriate’ involves a degree of knowledge by attaining the object’s form, but the 
‘response’ is more than knowledge in that it involves the judgment or contemplation of 
the object’s beauty. As a minimal requirement or starting point, this pleasure (or 
response) is the ‘something more’ that I need in order to show that even the Thomistic 
theory of knowledge is not enough to support the belief that aesthetic experience is fully 
encompassed by knowledge. In other words, pleasure (or response) is something that is 
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not automatically connected with all knowledge; thus, despite some overlap, aesthetic 
experience is distinct from knowledge. 
 
Conclusion 
I have proposed two main constituents of aesthetic experience: object-directedness and 
aesthetic properties (particularly beauty and sublimity). Each of these must be present, 
but neither of them is sufficient to guarantee an aesthetic experience. One thing that is 
lacking in many explanations of aesthetic experience is the role of the beholder who must 
adopt an aesthetic point of view. Usually the beholder is mentioned only to talk about 
how the object affects her, sometimes called its affectiveness. Though some degree of 
affectiveness is necessary for an aesthetic experience, I developed a particular view of the 
role of the beholder. When a person views a work of art, he does not passively obtain an 
aesthetic experience. The beholder must be actively engaged with the object of his 
apprehension. The notion of connatural knowledge as developed by Aquinas and applied 
to aesthetics by Maritain offers insight into how a person can become attuned to works of 
art or aesthetic properties. Against the belief that interpretation is the main goal of art—
interpretation might at best be a secondary purpose—I have presented reasons for 
thinking that all works of art are made for the purpose of providing an aesthetic 
experience. This does not mean that all art is successful (or equally successful). Now that 
a concept of aesthetic experience has been presented, we are in a position to ask about 
whether or not aesthetic experience is a basic human good and what that means for the 
individual and the state.
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CHAPTER 5 
AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE AND THE COMMON GOOD 
 
Introduction 
In the first two chapters, I articulated a disagreement between political anti-perfectionists 
(Rawls and Dworkin) and political perfectionists (Raz and Finnis). I also raised a 
problem for the political anti-perfectionists that they cannot justify theoretically state 
support for the arts. Finding too many problems with the anti-perfectionist stance, I 
believe that political perfectionism, particularly of the natural law tradition, offers not 
only a compelling resolution to this problem concerning state involvement with the arts 
and aesthetic experience, but also a better theory of the state. This justification has not yet 
been forthcoming. Toward arriving there, I had to present a theory of aesthetic experience 
(chapter 4), which required some historical and contextual explanation (chapter 3). 
Aesthetic experience is what grounds the connection between art and the state. I claimed 
that providing the capacity for aesthetic experience is the main purpose of art. Now I will 
provide reasons for believing that aesthetic experience is a basic human good. It is this 
classification, I will argue, that justifies the state in protecting (and occasionally funding) 
art and in discouraging things that work contrary to aesthetic experience, like obscenity. 
 I offer an explanation, from the natural law tradition, of what it means for 
something to be a basic good or basic reason for action. The basic goods provide a 
foundation for the common good, so I will explain my notion of the common good. Since
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people should pursue the goods that fit their rational plan of life, the state’s role is not to 
impose any of the goods on its citizens. The political common good is then offered to 
help set the boundaries of what the state can do. The political common good is merely 
instrumental, consisting basically of justice and peace. Lastly, I will present reasons to 
think that aesthetic experience is a basic good and deserves protection and promotion by 
the state. 
 
What is a Basic Good? 
Aquinas writes, “Every agent, of necessity, acts for an end.”349 And he continues, “For if 
the agent were not determinate to some particular effect, it would not do one thing rather 
than another: consequently in order that it produce a determinate effect, it must, of 
necessity, be determined to some certain one, which has the nature of an end.”350 In other 
words, there always exists a reason why people perform different actions, even the 
simplest actions. For example, suppose someone is sitting, and then he decides to get up. 
Assuming this person is a normal-functioning human being, there must be an end he has 
in mind for getting up. It could be to get food or drink. It could be to stretch his legs. It 
could be to go to work. The possible reasons are many, but it seems highly unlikely that 
there is literally no purpose for which he got up.  
 In the Natural Law tradition, the basic goods (or basic reasons) are the first 
principles of practical rationality. In order to better grasp this concept, it would be helpful 
to examine each part of this term. The reason these are ‘basic’ is because there does not 
need to be a further reason beyond them. In other words, it is intelligible to pursue them 
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for their own sake. The word basic is usually contrasted with the term instrumental. 
Something is instrumental when it is done for the sake of something else. The other part, 
good, is more difficult. Frequently, people hearing this word assume that it is referring to 
some kind of moral good, as opposed to moral evil. But it is important to note that it is 
used in this context prior to any moral considerations. As Robert George writes, “They do 
not resolve questions of which option(s) may uprightly be chosen in situations of morally 
significant choice. Indeed, the multiplicity of these most basic practical principles creates 
situations of morally significant choice, and makes it necessary for us to identify norms 
of morality in order to choose uprightly in such situations.”351 Thus, the main idea behind 
the basic goods is that they are intelligible reasons to act, requiring no other justification 
than themselves. Indeed, the basic goods are self-evident, which was explained in detail 
in Chapter Two when discussing the view of Finnis. 
 Not only are the goods not moral categories, it a mistake to assume that they will 
each be pursued (or equally pursued) by everyone. Each of the basic goods is something 
the pursuit of which can be beneficial to the pursuer, but it does not imply that each 
person will (or should or can) pursue each good to the same degree or in the same way. 
They are called ‘good’ because each in intelligible to pursue for its own sake. But this 
fact does not mean someone should pursue any particular good over the others. The 
goods are incommensurable with each other; they are equally basic. Montague Brown 
describes, “Each [of the goods] is self-evidently good, and none can be understood as a 
mere aspect of another. One way of showing this is to argue that each good can 
reasonably be held to be the most important. If each can, from a certain perspective, be 
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considered the most important, none is absolutely the most important.”352 Each person 
decides which good(s) to pursue in conjunction with his or her plan of life. And choosing 
to pursue one good can lead someone with less time and energy for the other goods, so it 
is important to balance one’s pursuits. For example, one might seek out knowledge to 
such a degree that she is not able to maintain as many meaningful friendships as someone 
pursuing knowledge to a lesser degree. There is no way to avoid this dilemma; it is 
simply not possible to pursue each of the goods to the fullest degree. So, we must make 
choices in accordance with a rational plan for our lives. And sometimes when an option is 
rationally under-determined, one could ‘choose’ to do one of the actions simply on the 
basis of one’s feelings. 
 Additionally, people can pursue the same good in different ways. For example, 
two people might both pursue the good of play. One might devote himself to the game of 
Go. He might read books about it, watch videos of masters playing it, and, of course, play 
the game himself. Another person might play soccer. She might exercise in particular 
ways, watch many games, and, of course, play the game herself. These are very different 
ways of instantiating the good of play. One is very sedentary, while the other is very 
physically active. But they are both intelligible since they are done for play. 
 The basic human goods are the first principles of practical reason. They provide 
the basic foundations for a theory of morality, though the goods themselves are premoral. 
But they also provide the foundations for political and legal philosophy. “The basic goods 
are the ultimate foundation of the notion of a common good.”353 If the goods are common 
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to all human beings, then “the basic goods provide the foundation for the possibility of a 
common pursuit of goods.”354  
 
 
How Do we Know the Basic Goods? 
People might think that the idea of a basic good is fine but remain skeptical that we could 
ever know, with certainty, which things should count as the basic goods. Mark Murphy, 
in Natural Law and Practical Rationality, explains two strategies for uncovering the 
basic reasons for action: inclinationism and derivationism. I have claimed that the basic 
goods are not derivable in any normal logical sense, but this claim needs some further 
explanation. Murphy describes one of the problems with derivationism as follows, “The 
central difficulty with derivationism is, unsurprisingly, its presupposition that practical 
judgments can be logically derived from nonpractical judgments, a violation of the ‘no 
ought from is’ principle.”355 The advocate of derivationism must deny that the is-ought 
fallacy from Hume is actually a fallacy. Hence, he must show how the derivation would 
proceed and be successful. Second, Murphy explains, “The difficulty with this position is 
that it seems to have the implication that very few persons would have access even to 
rudimentary practical knowledge.”356 The reason is that not everyone will do the 
necessary derivation in order to find out about practical reason; it might even be too 
difficult (or abstract) for some people. Again, the burden of proof is on the derivationist 
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to show why people seem to have a clear grasp of the natural law without having a 
developed philosophy of nature or metaphysics. 
 Aligning with Finnis and Murphy, I place my own view in the inclinationist 
strategy. A motivation for this strategy is the fact that people regularly seem to grasp the 
value of the basic goods without a theoretical knowledge of metaphysics, from which the 
derivation would presumably take place. Finnis writes,  
The basic forms of good grasped by practical 
understanding are what is good for human beings with the 
nature they have. Aquinas considers that practical 
reasoning begins not by understanding this nature from the 
outside, as it were, by way of psychological, 
anthropological, or metaphysical observations and 
judgments defining human nature, but by experiencing 
one’s nature, so to speak from the inside, in the form of 
one’s inclinations.”357  
 
The idea of inclinations, which is the beginning for a theory of basic goods in the 
Thomistic natural law tradition, finds its roots in Aquinas’ Summa Theologica, I-II, Q. 
94, a. 2. In this passage, Aquinas refers to natural inclinations, which have been the 
subject of a variety of interpretations. Following Stephen Brock358 and others (like Finnis 
and Grisez), I understand these natural inclinations to be ordered by reason. Aquinas says 
that the good has the nature of an end, and reason directs people to their end.359 Our 
natural inclinations may point us toward the goods, but the inclinations do not justify the 
good as good. As Murphy explains, “the presence of these inclinations is simply a 
condition that occasions reason’s consideration of and grasp of the good of knowledge 
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[or any of the basic goods].”360 So, in an ontological sense, the basic goods are grounded 
in human nature, but they are discoverable without having a developed theory of human 
nature. 
 In Finnis’ book on Aquinas, he references a principle (which ultimately originates 
in Aristotle361) that guides his natural law theory. He writes, “the nature of X is 
understood by understanding X’s capacities or capabilities, those capacities or 
capabilities are understood by understanding their activations or acts, and those 
activations or acts are understood by understanding their objects.”362 In the way it is 
originally written above, it is an epistemological principle; but if you reverse the order of 
the statement, Finnis has said that it is a metaphysical principle.363 So, ontologically 
speaking, the basic goods are grounded in the nature of human beings; in other words, the 
goods would be different if human nature was different. But the goods are not 
discoverable only after one has a fully developed metaphysics. The goods can be 
discovered without any conscious knowledge of metaphysics. Contrary to those who 
claim Finnis has no metaphysics (or philosophy of nature),364 it is clear that he does but 
does not think a metaphysical theory is necessary for discovering the basic goods or the 
natural law. 
 Coming to know (or discover) the basic goods is important, especially if one 
believes that a simple deduction from human nature is not likely (if possible). As stated 
previously, we cannot attain knowledge of the basic goods by what we feel because 
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people’s ‘feelings’ can lead to many problematic actions, like incest and murder. 
Following Finnis’ epistemological principle, we could create an assemblage of reminders 
about what makes the lives of humans good. We could also use a dialectical method of 
questioning people about why they do certain things, and we will ultimately get to certain 
purposes for which there is no further purpose. Yet another method would be to examine 
certain candidates for basic goods and see what the lives of humans would be without 
them (or with less of them). In other words, just like a life is better with the basic goods; 
it is worse without them.365  
 In Natural Law and Natural Rights (1980), Finnis proposed a list of seven basic 
human goods. In “Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends,” Finnis, writing 
with Germain Grisez and Joseph Boyle, alters his list slightly. And again, Finnis alters 
slightly his list in “Natural Law Theory and Limited Government” (1996). Mark Murphy 
offers another (very similar but different) list of the basic goods in Natural Law and 
Practical Rationality (2001). For example, both Murphy and Finnis include life, 
knowledge, and excellence in work and play. Is there a definitive list of the basic goods? 
If so, could we ever really know this list? Concerning the list of goods, Finnis writes that 
the reader need not accept the list of goods precisely as he has presented it.366 But the list 
of goods must include only things that are truly basic and analytically distinct from one 
another. But someone might ask what would happen if two people had two completely 
different lists of basic goods. Finnis is confident that his seven goods are widely 
recognized, and he claims that sociologists and psychologists would agree with him. 
However, Finnis presented his original list in 1980, does his list still hold true? 
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 To answer this question, it is not necessary to be so strict about the terms one uses 
for the basic goods. For instance, one person might say that aesthetic experience is a 
basic good, while another might say that aesthetic appreciation is a basic good. The main 
point is not the exact terms but the purposes for which people generally act. Without 
recounting all of the details here, I will present some of the ideas offered by Sabine 
Alkire367 to show that there is significant overlap in various lists of basic goods, values, 
or capabilities, i.e. basic reasons why people act. Alkire begins with Finnis’ lists, and 
then she brings in the lists of the following people: James Griffin (philosopher), Martha 
Nussbaum (philosopher), Manfred Max-Neef (economist), Milton Rokeach 
(psychologist), Shalom Schwartz (psychologist), Robert Cummins (psychologist), and 
Maureen Ramsey (compiled the lists of ten psychologists). It should also be noted that 
some of these studies took place in cultures other than America. Based on an examination 
of the lists of basic values presented by these researchers, Alkire compiles one using only 
those goods that are in each category. The list is as follows:368 
1. life (health, security, reproduction) 
2. understanding for its own sake 
3. skillful performance and production 
4. creative expression (play, humor, sport) 
5. friendship and affiliation 
6. meaningful choice and identity 
7. inner harmony between feelings, judgements, and behavior 
8. harmony with a greater-than-human source of meaning and value 
9. harmony with the natural world 
 
As one can clearly see, this list is very similar to Finnis’ original list from 1980, and 
thirty years separate these two lists. So, what does this prove? It does not prove, in a 
deductive sense, that these goods are absolute. But it suggests that there are some basic 
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reasons for which people tend to act, which are widely (if not universally) recognized. 
Moreover, it suggests that it is highly unlikely for two people to have completely 
different lists of goods. Different people might call them by different names or explain 
them in a slightly different way, but there seem to be certain values that appear with all 
people. And these are the basic human goods. 
 Since I claim that aesthetic experience is a basic human good, it might appear that 
the lack of it on the above list provides a reason to not accept my position. However, 
those that include aesthetic experience as a good usually place it under the heading of 
knowledge or understanding. Finnis, for instance, originally listed aesthetic experience as 
a separate good, but then he later moved it under broader heading of knowledge. I 
maintain that aesthetic experience is indeed a distinct good because it cannot be fully 
enveloped by knowledge (which I argued for in the previous chapter); hence, it overlaps 
with knowledge but it is something more than just knowledge, giving it distinction. Even 
if someone finds this distinction unconvincing and continues to believe that aesthetic 
experience is just a form of knowledge, then my overall argument still remains intact. 
Aesthetic experience would still remain a basic good as knowledge is considered a basic 
good.  
 Another distinction is important to make prior to discussing why aesthetic 
experience should be listed as a basic good. The distinction is between two kinds of 
goods: substantive and reflexive. Substantive goods consist of life, knowledge, aesthetic 
experience, and excellence in work and play. “Although the substantive goods provide 
reasons for acting, their instantiations, even when caused by chosen actions, do not 
involve choices. Everyone shares in substantive goods even before deliberately pursuing 
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them. They are first received as gifts of nature and parts of cultural heritage.”369 For 
example, just by experiencing the world around one, he comes to know things without 
making a choice. And one benefits from the good of life simply by living, not by 
deciding. But, obviously, we can choose actions that will likely instantiate these goods as 
well. We can make choices about what kinds of knowledge we want to pursue, what kind 
of work we want to do, and what kinds of actions we can perform for a healthy life. 
Moreover, we benefit from other people acting for these goods; for example, we benefit 
from people pursuing knowledge of medicine. But there are other goods that more 
directly involve deliberation and choice, which are called reflexive goods; they “include 
the choices by which one acts for them.”370 These goods “are certain forms of 
harmony.”371 And they consist of friendship, inner peace, harmony among one’s 
judgments, and ‘religion’. For example, although it seems natural to desire friendships, 
one must make choices to establish and maintain friendships with others in order for there 
to be harmony in the relationship. And people must act, but it is necessary to deliberate 
and make wise choices about which actions align with one’s judgments or beliefs in order 
to maintain harmony with one’s self. This distinction is important as there are, generally, 
two different lines of argument to show that we act for something as a basic good and 
that we are benefitted by something, even when we do not choose to act for it. 
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Aesthetic experience as a basic good 
I have claimed that aesthetic experience is a basic good (distinct from knowledge). In this 
section, I provide reasons for thinking this is true. As a succinct definition, I claim 
aesthetic experience normatively understood is the response (to varying degrees) to an 
object that possesses aesthetic properties (especially beauty or sublimity), which actively 
engages a beholder. The beholder will value this experience for its own sake, if it is being 
valued as an aesthetic experience. By ‘response’, I include judgment, contemplation, and 
pleasure. I limit the definition to two aesthetic properties, beauty and sublimity, because 
these are the most important ones for entering into an inherently good experience. For 
clarification, I am using the term ‘beauty’ in a broad sense—an object is beautiful if it 
merits pleasure when perceived and contemplated. The object pleases when it possesses 
certain constituents of beauty, such as proportion, radiance, and wholeness (or 
integrity).372 Philosophers have emphasized beauty as the key property for an aesthetic 
experience; and they have therefore tended to focus on the pleasure being positive. 
Following Kant, I add that aesthetic experiences could potentially involve negative 
responses (and emotions), like tension, anger, and sadness. Of course, the presence of 
negative emotions is not sufficient for the sublime, but the sublime does invoke a kind of 
negative pleasure, which was explained in the previous chapter. 
 But why should we think that aesthetic experience, an experience of beauty or the 
sublime, is a basic human good (or reason for action)? Believing these two properties to 
be subjective renders any impact of this basic good somewhat precarious. If subjective, 
then an aesthetic experience would be wholly different from person to person and there 
                                                            
372 This view of beauty is derived from Thomas Aquinas and 20th C Thomists, like Etienne Gilson, Armand 
Maurer, and Jacques Maritain. 
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would be no guiding principles for trying to create the possibility for aesthetic 
experience. This seems to clearly go against experience. Others have offered compelling 
reasons for the objectivity of beauty,373 and I have given reasons for this in the previous 
chapter. The main constituents of beauty—proportion, radiance, and wholeness—are 
found in the object, and the person through his senses and intellect discovers them. And 
even though people will disagree about what is or is not beautiful, few people would 
dispute the existence of beautiful things.374 Or we might say that people are moved by 
things that are beautiful or sublime. This idea—that people believe in the existence of 
beautiful and sublime things—is the minimum requirement to make the present argument 
work. People find things to be beautiful and sublime, and they are motivated to action in 
order to have (or create) aesthetic experiences. But in order for these experiences to have 
objective value, they must be underwritten by objects that are genuinely beautiful or 
sublime. 
 The basic goods are not derivable from a series of premises (no inference from 
fact to value), so one cannot prove their goodness deductively.375 We can reflect on 
things that people actually do, which Finnis calls an “assemblage of reminders,” in order 
to illustrate that aesthetic experience is a basic and distinct reason for action. Listing 
aesthetic experience as a distinct basic good is not unique; Mark Murphy (in Natural Law 
and Practical Rationality) and Finnis (in Natural Law and Natural Rights) list aesthetic 
experience as separate from knowledge. But in light of Finnis now considering aesthetic 
experience to be under the heading of knowledge, I want to provide support for the claim 
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that aesthetic experience is a distinct reason for action. To clarify, the claim that aesthetic 
experience is a basic good does not mean that all humans seek aesthetic experience at the 
same level of quantity and quality; how to pursue aesthetic experience will depend on a 
person’s rational life plan. In terms of quantity, some people will strive for more aesthetic 
experiences than others. In terms of quality, some people will want to experience 
primarily the ‘high arts’, like opera, while others will be content with movies and 
commercial novels. Regardless of the quantity and quality of the experience, people seem 
to desire these experiences as things that are good (or ends) in themselves; they are 
desired for their own sake. 
 Now why should we believe that aesthetic experience is a distinct basic good? 
Through observation, we can see that people act in various contexts and to differing 
degrees for aesthetic experience. And we can see that these actions are not fully 
encompassed by knowledge, even though some overlap with knowledge. Though more 
contexts might exist, I will present only three main areas that illustrate the impact of 
aesthetic experience in our lives.  
 First, aesthetic experience plays an integral part of people’s everyday lives, as 
Dewey claimed, even though they may not always realize it because they are not always 
specifically (or consciously) acting for that good. In thinking about the term ‘aesthetic 
experience’, people are more likely to remember very powerful and vivid experiences, 
such as the view from a mountain. But less intense aesthetic experiences fill our daily 
existence. As Mark Murphy explains,  
But the presence of this experience as a common feature of 
our lives, a feature that makes our lives better, even if we 
are not always acting for its sake, might best be brought 
into focus by imagining it away: the most that we can do is 
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to try to imagine a functional but colorless world to move 
about in, one stripped of any positive aesthetic features. (It 
is difficult to imagine this properly, because at least some 
of what makes a world functional makes it beautiful—that 
is, orderliness.)376 
 
The following kinds of things are evidence of the presence and value of aesthetic 
experience in our daily lives: planting flowers, eating or cooking good foods, drinking 
fine wines, and cleaning or decorating our homes. These things might not be done solely 
for the sake of aesthetic experience—at least not a high level aesthetic experience of the 
beautiful—but aesthetic experience is at least part of the motivation, albeit a less intense 
aesthetic experience. Generally, the goal is for everything in one’s home (and other 
surroundings) to fit together; this ‘fittingness’, for Roger Scruton is an aspect of 
beauty.377 Additionally, people enjoy regularly reading good books, watching films, and 
listening to music. All three of these activities supply an experience that is sought for its 
own sake; people do not need another reason to seek out these activities other than the 
enjoyment of the activity itself. These lower level experiences indicate the pervasiveness 
of aesthetic experience in our daily lives, which shows the influence of Dewey on my 
view. As a substantive good, aesthetic experience benefits people even when they are not 
specifically acting for it. These kinds of activities are not sufficiently public to warrant 
support from the state, but I mention them as a ground for my belief that aesthetic 
experience is important for our everyday lives, not just those times when we have these 
more intense aesthetic experiences. These more specifically aesthetic experiences, which 
are open to the public, are the ones that the state has reason to support.  
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 Second, people sometimes act specifically for the sake of experiencing beauty and 
sublimity. For example, people travel great distances to gaze upon and contemplate 
objects or environments (both natural and artifactual) that are beautiful and sublime. In 
reference to natural things, people spend money and time going to places that they 
believe (based on photos and testimony) will give them a certain experience that is good 
for its own sake. Some popular natural examples include Niagara Falls, the Grand 
Canyon, and Serengeti National Park (Tanzania). It could be inferred from the last two of 
these examples that one of the motivating factors for adventurers is aesthetic experience. 
For instance, experiencing the sublime is an appropriate response to the view from one of 
the rims of the Grand Canyon. In reference to artifactual things, people travel around the 
world to see things made by other human beings, both contemporary and historical. Some 
famous examples would include the Louvre Museum (in itself and the art within its 
walls), the EMP (Experience Music Project by Frank Gehry), and the Taj Mahal in India. 
While I do not believe that people visit these kinds of things only for the aesthetic 
experiences that might be had, I maintain that aesthetic experience is certainly one of the 
primary motivations.378 But it would be intelligible if aesthetic experience were the only 
reason someone visited these places. 
 Third, the desire to make art for the purpose of aesthetic enjoyment is 
demonstrated by the necessity to create and seek out beauty even379 in unpleasant and, 
frequently poor, situations. People will use anything available to them in order to make 
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art and create the possibility of aesthetic experiences for their communities. Even the 
earliest people, living in the harsh environments of the caves at Lascaux, placed an 
emphasis on art. “The physical environment of the cave peoples over thousands of years 
would not appear to be favorable to the creation of an art of quality and sophistication; 
survival alone would seem to have required most of their energies.”380 Contrary to those 
who might claim that humans only need food, water, and shelter, I submit that aesthetic 
experience is necessary for human flourishing, even in very difficult situations. For 
example, blues music developed among Africans in America during the times of slavery 
and then poverty from sharecropping. The blues grew out of unaccompanied vocal music 
that the workers would sing while laboring. Eventually, musicians began playing 
homemade or warped guitars because it was all they had.  
 Turning toward a more contemporary example, graffiti demonstrates the 
motivation to beautify one’s surroundings. In this context, I am not referring to senseless 
vandalism or gang tags, but I am referring to the kind of graffiti that could be dubbed 
“artistic graffiti.”381 As a disclaimer, I admit that there is a problem with graffiti: it is 
usually a form of vandalism and, therefore, against the law.382 Despite this commonality, 
graffiti is an interesting phenomenon that highlights something beyond its surface, which 
involves addressing the question: why do people write graffiti? Graffiti is often 
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associated with gang activity, but is all graffiti associated with gang activity? No, in fact, 
in a documentary called Rock Fresh, one graffiti artist, called Tyer, claimed that when 
they produce artistic graffiti on a wall that was once dominated by gang tags, which led 
to shootings, the gang activity ceases around that wall because the gangs respect the art. 
Furthermore, graffiti writers frequently paint on walls that are otherwise abandoned, such 
as in a vacant lot. So, they create beauty from what was once ugly or desolate. Moreover, 
many graffiti writers believe that museums keep artistic beauty away from the people, but 
they are trying to bring art and beauty back to the public and the everyday. As Checho, a 
graffiti artist, has said, “If you do a drawing and you keep it or you give away or sell it to 
someone, it’s private, belonging to one person. But graffiti is put in a place in such a way 
that everyone can enjoy it.”383 Thus, graffiti artists believe they are helping the public 
achieve aesthetic experiences by bringing it back to the everyday. And this drive to create 
artistic graffiti is a further reminder that aesthetic experience is one of the basic goods for 
which people act. 
 To summarize these reminders, aesthetic experience is important to people in all 
communities. People with more resources will travel to seek out aesthetic experiences. 
People with fewer resources will still use whatever they have (e.g. a spraycan or beat up 
guitar) to create beauty for themselves and their communities. Most fundamentally, 
people will generally do things in their daily lives to make their surroundings more 
aesthetically pleasing, to make it fit together. As knowledge is better than ignorance, so 
beauty is better than ugliness. Thus, people’s lives are better when there is a sufficient 
amount of beauty (order and harmony), rather than ugliness (chaos and disorder). From 
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these examples, it seems reasonable to infer that aesthetic experience is a basic human 
good—a basic reason why people act. 
 
The Common Good and the Political Common Good 
Having a list of basic goods that include aesthetic experience is not enough; I still need to 
show how this matters for the state. I will show that a common good exists in every 
community that has common action, and the political community is no exception. But the 
political community is slightly different, so, with Finnis, I posit the political common 
good. And this is how the state supports the basic goods, which is justified by the 
necessity of the state authorizing action for the goods to be adequately pursued. 
 Any time a group of people need to work together (e.g. a religious group or a 
study group), a common good guides their activities, like a goal toward which they strive. 
Likewise, a political community has a common good. And the state exists to promote and 
protect the common good of its citizens; this statement in itself might not seem too 
controversial. However, disagreement arises concerning what counts as the common 
good of the political state. Since there are varying interpretations, it is important to 
explain what I mean by the term common good (and political common good). I begin by 
briefly explaining what I mean by common good in a broad sense for different kinds of 
community, and then I explain what I mean by the political common good. 
 A common good is an essential component in any cooperative group (or 
community) situation: families, friends, businesses, and churches. Each type of 
community might have a different common good based on the kind of group and the 
particular reasons for the community’s existence. And the political community will have 
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its own kind of common good, discussed below. For some of these groups, the common 
good might also be a basic good. For example, concerning friendship, Finnis writes, “the 
good that is common between friends is not simply the good of successful collaboration 
or co-ordination, nor is it simply the good of two successfully achieved coinciding 
projects or objectives; it is the common good of mutual self-constitution, self-fulfillment, 
self-realization.”384 The same might be said of a church that the common good is 
identical to (or part of) the good of religion. But the political common good (or public 
good) is not identical to any of the basic goods because it is not a basic reason for action; 
it is an instrumental reason, as I will explain below. A common good is an essential 
aspect of every community: families, organizations, and the political community. I will 
not specifically explain each of these kinds of communities. I will instead discuss the 
common good as it relates to these kinds of communities, which are different from the 
political community. 
 According to Yves Simon, for a common good to exist, there must be common 
action.385 It is not enough for people to act (or live) near each other; there must be 
something for which the group acts. Common action, in the political context, can also 
include the fact that people all pursue some combination of the basic goods. This, of 
course, does not mean that a particular group of people must share each action in 
common. I am referring to a group of people that has a shared goal requiring coordinated 
action. The idea of a shared goal can be understood in two ways. First, the individuals 
have the same goal. For example, they wish to build a house. They each have a different 
role in the production, but they have the same final goal, the construction of the house. 
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Second, the individuals might have individual goals, but, in order to accomplish their 
separate goals, they need to work with others. For example, suppose four students shared 
an apartment, and they had access to only one computer. In order for them each to use the 
computer for their different coursework, they must coordinate times for each person. In 
trying to develop a schedule for the computer, they have a shared goal. Even though they 
will each receive their own grade, their success in their courses will be helped (in part) by 
their coordinated activity of sharing the computer. We might think of this kind of 
coordination in terms of a business agreement. Finnis also shows how coordination plays 
a role in the common good of playing a game.386 Everyone should obey the rules for the 
sake of the game. Thus, any group with common action participates in a common good. 
In these examples, each participant has a similar (if not the same) goal or good. What 
happens when a diversity of aims exist, which is the case in a political community? Or 
goals that can change at various points in time? In the political realm, a common good 
exists that allows for the diversity of people’s different plans of life, but it is determinate 
enough to “exclude a considerable number of types of political arrangement, laws, 
etc.”387 For example, laws that damage instances of the basic goods are ruled out as they 
harm the common good of the community. 
 When trying to formulate a notion of the goodness of the common good, Mark 
Murphy explains, there are two constraints that need to be overcome: epistemological and 
practical.388 “The epistemological constraint is that inasmuch as the common good serves 
as a starting point for political deliberation, it must be something to which we can have 
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some sort of cognitive access.”389 The practical constraint is simply that the common 
good should be something that the citizens of a society should want to pursue, promote, 
and protect. In trying to expound upon the sense in which the common good is common, 
Murphy cites three possibilities:390 (1) instrumental—the common good is composed of 
whatever conditions are required to help members of the community achieve their 
“worthwhile ends.” (2) distinctive—the common good means that some “intrinsically 
good state of affairs” is achieved that is good for the community as a whole unit; (3) 
aggregative—the common good “consists in the realization of some set of individual 
intrinsic goods, characteristically the goods of all (and only) those persons that are 
members of the political community in question.”391  
 While the common good is identical with the totality of the basic human goods (in 
the sense that they collectively provide the foundation for all action), the political 
common good is necessarily more limited. Murphy has identified three interpretations of 
the political common good: aggregative, the distinct good, and instrumentalist.392 First, I 
will explain the aggregative conception. In explaining this conception, Murphy tells the 
reader to suppose that there is an individual A in a political community and suppose A is 
flourishing—“that is, is enjoying the goods that genuinely make human life go well.”393 
In reference to political action, A’s flourishing should be a consideration when political 
leaders make decisions or policies. In other words, it needs to be considered whether a 
given decision will help or hinder A’s flourishing. If it helps, then that is one reason, all 
things considered, to do it. If it hinders, then that is one reason not to perform the action. 
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Murphy explains, “There may be other considerations, of course, that outweigh, or in 
some way exclude, the reason to adopt or reject the law or policy that is based on its 
effect on A’s good.”394 But A’s good is directly relevant to the different political actions 
that have an effect on A. For instance, a state of affairs in which A is flourishing is good. 
However, a state of affairs in which both A and B are flourishing is better. Murphy 
explains why it is better. He writes, “the state of affairs A and B are flourishing includes 
all that is of importance in the state of affairs A is flourishing, and more as well.”395 The 
more people that will flourish for a given political action, then the stronger the reason is 
to go ahead with it. Likewise, the more people whose flourishing will be hindered by a 
political action, the stronger the reason is to oppose this action.  
 The second possible interpretation of the political common good is what Murphy 
calls the distinctive good view, which Murphy claims is Aquinas’ view. This view is 
similar to the aggregative view in that both believe the political common good is 
intrinsically good, while the instrumentalist view (discussed below) maintains that it is 
only instrumentally good. The aggregative view is that the common good is made of the 
goods of the individuals in that society. Though similar to his view, Murphy describes the 
distinctive good view as follows: “the good is the good of the community as a whole, 
what perfects the political community as such.”396 To put it differently, there are different 
irreducibly social goods, like friendship and religion, and the political common good is 
simply one of these social goods. 
 The third interpretation, which is advocated by Finnis, of the political common 
good is the instrumental conception. Finnis defines the political common good (also 
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called the public good) as “a set of conditions which enables the members of a 
community to attain for themselves reasonable objectives, or to realize reasonably for 
themselves the value(s), for the sake of which they have reason to collaborate with each 
other (positively and/or negatively) in a community.”397 The two main conditions are 
justice and peace. As Finnis explains, “Justice, as a quality of character, is in its general 
sense always a practical willingness to favour and foster the common good of one’s 
communities, and the theory of justice is, in all its parts, the theory of what in outline is 
required for that common good.”398 Explaining peace, Finnis writes, “In its fullest sense, 
peace {pax} involves not only concord (absence of dissension, especially on 
fundamentals) and willing agreement between one person or group and another, but also 
harmony {unio} amongst each individual’s own desires.”399 One broad implication of 
harmony is coordinated development in a particular society, including cultural 
development. It would create problems if there was no harmony in how the culture of a 
society developed, especially in light of diversity. So, peace does not imply only the lack 
of conflict (both internal and external), but it also points to the harmonious development 
of culture, such as education and the arts. Thus, for Finnis, the political common good is 
instrumental and consists primarily of justice and peace. 
 Though none of these interpretations is unreasonable, I affirm the instrumental 
conception of the political common good. Limiting government and respecting 
individuals are the main motivations for adhering to this interpretation over the others. 
The main reason for identifying a specifically political common good is to differentiate it 
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from the common good that is identical with the sum total of basic goods. The state 
cannot directly promote each basic good in every possible way, so the state exists to 
create the conditions for people to pursue the goods, both which goods to pursue and how 
to pursue each chosen good. Another way to frame the issue comes from the ‘master 
principle’ of morality proffered by Finnis et al. Finnis writes, “And so the first principle 
of a sound morality must be as follows: in voluntarily acting for human goods and 
avoiding what is opposed to them, one ought to choose and will those and only those 
possibilities the willing of which are compatible with integral human fulfillment.”400 This 
first principle of morality is directed specifically at the individual, but the state is also 
responsible for promoting integral human fulfillment. Individuals can strive toward 
integral human fulfillment only when the society in which they live is conducive for 
human flourishing. The political community exists as a cooperative project. As such, the 
state is authorized to manage the state of affairs of the political community to allow 
individuals to pursue their proper good. The state accomplishes this by achieving the 
conditions of justice and peace. 
 
Political Perfectionism 
I have set up my view as differing from the political anti-perfectionists (Rawls and 
Dworkin). In this section, I will explain more clearly what I mean by political 
perfectionism. The state, for the political common good, tries to create an environment of 
justice and peace, so that the citizenry can pursue the basic goods and flourish. The state 
must make choices involving values (i.e. the basic human goods); it promotes some 
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things that encourage or enable the pursuit of the basic goods, while it discourages some 
things which hinder the basic goods. But what exactly does this mean on a practical 
level? Though the state should not coerce someone to like the Mona Lisa or Beethoven’s 
Fifth Symphony, it is not obviously wrong for the state to encourage the arts in a more 
general way. And this view is clearly a perfectionist position. There are many ways the 
state could act out perfectionist policy. Political perfectionism is not just one theory with 
one interpretation, which has already been shown by the differing approaches of Raz and 
Finnis (Chapter 2). It is possible that a political perfectionist would also be a political 
paternalist, but these two views are not necessarily connected, which is clear in the case 
of Finnis. I want to first explain how paternalism and perfectionism differ, and then I will 
explain how I am using the term political perfectionism. 
 In order to show how paternalism differs from perfectionism, I will offer basic 
definitions of each. Paternalism, in its basic form, is the belief that the state can 
sometimes use coercive means to make people do something or prevent them from doing 
something, and the justification is that it is simply ‘for their own good’. For example, in 
the United States, many states have helmet laws for people who wish to ride motorcycles. 
In these states, if you wish to ride a motorcycle, then you must wear a helmet or suffer the 
consequences. Perfectionism, on the other hand, does not require coercion. The state 
might only encourage (or discourage) ways of life that are worthy (or worthless). For 
example, in so far as the state supports anti-smoking ads, the state is discouraging its 
citizens to smoke, which is without coercion. So, a paternalist view is always a 
perfectionist view, but a perfectionistic view might not be very paternalistic. 
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 Though perfectionism seems to imply at least a small amount of paternalism, 
being a perfectionist does not mean that one must embrace a strong paternalism. Raz 
explains also that some anti-perfectionist philosophers (he calls them ‘liberty lovers’) can 
adhere to some paternalistic principles, albeit an indirect paternalism. He describes, 
“They clamor for laws improving safety controls and quality controls for manufactured 
goods, and apply similar reasoning to demand strict qualifications as a condition for 
advertising one’s services in medicine, law, or other professions.”401 Though these kinds 
of laws do not coerce anyone, they claim that these choices, for the consumers’ well-
being, should not be options. Thus, Raz finds certain forays into paternalistic ideals, even 
in liberal thought. The question is not whether or not the state should interfere with the 
lives of its citizens. The question is, since the state occasionally needs to interfere with 
the lives of citizens (directly or indirectly), which situations are allowable and which are 
not. 
 Perfectionism is not only about trying to prevent people from being harmed; it 
must also promote a positive (and objective) account of the human good. In other words, 
political perfectionism occurs when the state encourages (to varying degrees) its citizens 
to become better, to be perfected. The term perfectionism is used in differing ways. For 
example, Joseph Chan, in “Legitimacy, Unanimity, and Perfectionism,” presents a 
lengthy taxonomy of all the different distinctions that can fall under the general heading 
of perfectionism.402 It is not necessary to recount all of his distinctions, but it is important 
to note that perfectionism does not denote a single doctrine. The common element among 
the different formulations of political perfectionism is that the state is allowed to support 
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valuable forms of life. Steven Wall explains, “For perfectionists, there is no general 
principle in political morality that forbids the state from directly promoting the good, 
even when the good is subject to reasonable disagreement.”403 Perfectionism, however, 
does not require a monistic account of the good; it allows for pluralism.  
 Prior to getting into the specifics of perfectionism, an important set of distinctions 
needs to be made. Perfectionism appeals to conceptions of the good, but these 
conceptions, according to Chan, refer to four different kinds of judgment.404 First, there 
are specific judgments on agency goods, which are “virtues or dispositions that constitute 
the good life: e.g., reason (especially practical wisdom), courage, justice, temperance, 
integrity, and sincerity.”405 Second, there are specific judgments on prudential goods, 
which are “goods or values that contribute to a person's good life: e.g., aesthetic 
experience (music and beauty), human relationship (friendship, family), amusement and 
play, knowledge, etc.”406 Third, there are local comparative judgments on particular ways 
of life—a way of life is “a person's pattern of living, which embodies a particular ranking 
of agency and prudential goods and a particular way of realizing them.”407 Fourth, there 
are comprehensive doctrines that involve comprehensive ranking of goods and ways of 
life. Chan believes the first three are uncontentious, and it is only this last one which is 
problematic. He limits his version of liberal perfectionism to only the first three kinds of 
judgment. On the other hand, I allow comprehensive doctrines but not in the same sense 
as Chan describes. 
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 Chan, like both Rawls and Dworkin, seems to think that comprehensive doctrines 
require a ranking of goods and ways of life and is an extreme version of perfectionism (as 
opposed to moderate), but this is not necessarily the case. Finnis, for example, claims that 
the basic goods are incommensurable. Whether someone, for instance, chooses to pursue 
religion a little more than play may not make a difference; it is not automatically a better 
or worse choice of how to live. My view is comprehensive in that I believe that there are 
ways of life (or actions) that are objectively valuable, but it is also pluralistic in that there 
is no essential ranking among which goods one should pursue. Likewise with the state, 
the most basic function of the state is to bring about the political common good, to 
instantiate justice and peace. And, all things considered, the state has to make choices 
about which goods to promote and how to promote them. But as long as, in performing 
these actions, the state does not do intentional damage to any of the goods in the lives of 
its citizens, then the state acts for the common good of its citizens. 
 To reiterate an interesting thing about Finnis’ natural law philosophy, it is at once 
both comprehensive and pluralistic. It is comprehensive because the first principles (i.e. 
the basic goods) apply equally to everyone. It is pluralistic because there is no set formula 
for how to pursue the goods and which goods one ought to pursue. And because the 
goods are incommensurable, according to Finnis, his view does not allow for an absolute 
ranking of the goods. Further, commitment to a comprehensive doctrine does not require 
coercive means, though it does not mean that coercion is automatically disqualified as 
being disrespectful or unfair. A comprehensive perfectionist theory claims that the state 
should encourage the pursuit of valuable things. For example, consider the good of 
aesthetic experience. The state could use noncoercive methods, like tax breaks, to 
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encourage the wealthy to financially support the arts. The state here does not need to try 
to force people to appreciate the arts. Now it can be shown how the political common 
good relates to aesthetic experience. 
 
The Political Common Good and Aesthetic Experience 
Aesthetic experience, in different ways, is an important motivation for people’s actions as 
was shown in Chapter Four. People tend to value having experiences that are uniquely 
aesthetic. What does this, if anything, mean for the state? Should the state try to regulate 
aesthetic experiences? Or should it recommend certain experiences over others? In the 
next chapter, I will provide an extended discussion to illustrate how this might practically 
be applied to the workings of the state, namely to arts funding. Prior to that, it will be 
helpful to explain what my view does not mean. 
 First, the state cannot coerce anyone to have (or try to have) aesthetic experiences. 
Recall that the natural law view of Finnis, though comprehensive, is pluralistic. People 
have the right to pursue any of the goods they wish; further, they can pursue a particular 
good any legitimate way available. Thus, the state can encourage the pursuit of aesthetic 
experience, in a general sense, as it would encourage any of the basic goods, but it should 
not coerce anyone to pursue it. Specifically in the case of aesthetic experience, it is 
unlikely (if not impossible) for the state or anyone to successfully foist an experience 
upon someone. A beholder must be actively engaged in the pursuit of the aesthetic 
experience, as it is not the result of a simple passive receptivity. 
 Second, nothing in my view implies that the state is the final arbiter concerning 
what is or is not beautiful and sublime, though it does need to make some judgments for 
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things like arts funding and public arts projects. People will always disagree about what 
they believe to be beautiful and sublime. This fact does not, however, imply that aesthetic 
attributes are subjective; it more correctly implies that people are finite and cannot fully 
comprehend these attributes. When a decision needs to be made concerning the aesthetic 
quality of a building, landscape, or something else, it might have to come down to a vote 
or determination by a committee, similar to the National Council on the Arts (though not 
always on that large of a scale). When making these decisions, certain aesthetic 
properties seem more definite, like proportion, but others are less exact, such as the 
choice among several shades of green. In other words, people will generally care more 
about the difference between chaos and proportion than between a light green and a 
slightly darker green, though color choice can certainly play a role in the fittingness of an 
object (or objects). But the point is that someone or some group who has the authority 
must make a decision. And there are many good paths to choose from, and this authority 
must choose one (or more than one but not all).  
 The focus for many discussions about art and the political realm focuses on the 
protection of art. Many people, including Finnis, believe that the primary way to protect 
art is under the First Amendment, frequently using something like the expression theory 
of art promulgated by Langer. If the state’s only role was to protect art by preventing 
censorship, then this strategy might actually be the best one. But since the state should 
also promote the arts and other things that have the capacity for aesthetic experience (like 
beautiful parts of nature), then the First Amendment protection needs to be 
complemented by legislation that preserves art, funds museums, and establishes schools 
for the arts. I have argued that art’s most fundamental purpose is to provide a uniquely 
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aesthetic experience. And I showed why I further advocate that aesthetic experience, 
though presupposing a general knowledge, is more than knowledge—it requires a 
response in the form of pleasure, contemplation, or judgment. So, the real reason that art 
should be protected by the state is that it instantiates one of the basic goods—aesthetic 
experience. The basic goods make up the common good. Since the state cannot directly 
promote and help citizens pursue each basic good, the political common good is invoked 
in order to enable and protect the citizens’ pursuit of the basic goods. Not only can the 
state protect art for the common good, but the strategy of employing the political 
common good justifies the actions of the state to promote and fund art, arts institutions, 
and arts education as well.  
 Of the two aspects of the political common good (justice and peace), peace is the 
more relevant here. According to Michael Pakaluk, Finnis’ account of peace consists of 
at least three facets: (1) protection from aggressors, both internal and external; (2) things 
that enable trade and commerce, like roads and regulations; (3) ways to advance culture, 
like schools, museums, and libraries.408 It is clear from this explanation that peace, for 
Finnis, is not simply a lack of conflict; it is also the development and protection of 
culture. The third facet of peace provides the basis for why the state should protect and 
promote art since art is a part of culture. Art is important for culture as it enhances the 
solidarity people feel with their fellow citizens both as citizens and more generally as 
human beings. People need beauty to thrive because beauty is better than ugliness. Also, 
it seems that people possess a natural desire to create, and this desire is best fulfilled in a 
society that maintains peace and freedom.  
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 If part of promoting the common good means finding ways to advance culture, 
then part of the state’s responsibility is to have ways of protecting or promoting art. Thus, 
the state is fulfilling its task when it protects natural spaces from developers because of 
their beauty. Similarly, a state that funds museums, and thus provides a safe place for 
works of art, is fulfilling its task.409 Of course, the works of art that are found in museums 
are mostly works that have already been declared important by the art community and 
culture. A reason why the state should fund art museums is that it is uniquely equipped 
for the task. Most individuals could not single-handedly fund an art museum, so the state, 
using collective resources from the people, is able to help fund museums.  
 But the state can also look to the future of art. Sometimes, it might not be 
beneficial for the state to fund individual artists and projects. Yet the state should 
encourage the production of art and the development of new artists. For example, the 
state should be hesitant before cutting art programs in schools when financial concerns 
arise. Art programs should at least receive fair consideration before being cut. School art 
programs might inspire some new artists, but they have a broader purpose by helping 
people appreciate the arts, even if they do not become artists. Since the state often 
regulates public education, it is, again, uniquely equipped to help protect these programs 
(possibly through financial support). Since aesthetic experience is a basic human good, 
creating the possibility of aesthetic experience through art and art education enhances 
people’s lives in positive ways.  
 In order to bring the state’s role out more clearly, I will contrast my proposal with 
an imagined libertarian notion about the relation of the state with the arts. Many 
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libertarians advocate the cessation of most (if not all) taxes.410 This cessation would 
prevent the state from having the ability to fund art or do much of anything. But with a 
limited amount of money the state could still encourage its citizens to appreciate and 
produce works of art. However, since libertarians are necessarily anti-perfectionists, it 
seems that the state has no basis for advocating the arts without overstepping its bounds. 
Similarly, some libertarians might believe that religion is good for people, but that the 
state should not necessarily encourage anyone to be religious or follow a particular 
religion. So, it is not a matter about whether libertarians care for the arts; they just do not 
think it is the state’s job to fund or encourage the arts. One just has to think about 
Nozick’s minimal state (i.e. the night watchman) that exists to defend its citizens from 
internal and external harm. There is no room for funding or encouraging the arts in this 
scheme. 
 What would be the consequences of a libertarian view? It is not likely that the art 
world as a whole would be annihilated if funding from the state ceased. However, certain 
particulars could come to an end and at certain times some arts are more likely to be 
effected than at other times, like during a recession. First, some art venues—which are 
crucial to the experience of art—would not likely exist (or not to the same extent) without 
government subsidy. For example, the Metropolitan Museum of Art would have major 
trouble keeping its doors open without support at the local, state, and federal levels. The 
City of New York funds “the utilities for the museum’s main building.”411 The New York 
State Council on the Arts gave more than $148,000 to the Museum for operating support 
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in 2011.412 At the Federal level, the Museum regularly benefits from grants awarded by 
the National Endowment for the Arts for special exhibits. Additionally, due to its 
nonprofit status, the Metropolitan museum does not pay property taxes, which would be 
very high with its 5th Avenue location. Without support from the government at all levels, 
the Metropolitan Museum would either have to charge exorbitant prices for tickets 
(which are already $25 for an adult) or close its doors. So, some venues for the arts 
depend on state support for their continued existence. 
 Second, at some times, the state may not need to support the arts financially, if the 
economy is thriving. But at other times, certain arts or artists may need some assistance 
(along with non-artists) in order to survive. For example, in the United States, Franklin 
Roosevelt included artists in the Works Progress Administration in 1935. The Great 
Depression was brutal to everyone including artists, though this is not an everyday 
occurrence. In terms of capitalist ideals (as supported by libertarians), the state should not 
support the arts even in times of crisis. If the market can no longer support art, then the 
libertarian might respond that, however unfortunate, it is not the state’s job to make sure 
art (or a given work or structure) survives. Since the state does not have infinite 
resources, it needs to make choices about what to fund, protect, or support in other ways. 
So, sometimes art might not be given as much support, but this is not because the state 
should not support art. All things considered, art, to some degree, should be supported by 
the state (not necessarily always financially) unless prevented by other circumstances. 
Each society needs to see how much (and in what ways) the state should support the arts. 
As a general guideline, the state should support those arts or arts institutions (like 
museums) that will reach a wider audience. 
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 Now which art should the state support? Raz claims that autonomy requires a 
plurality of good options.413 Though I think the word ‘require’ might be too strong, a 
plurality of valuable options is better than only one option. If people are going to be able 
to pursue the good of aesthetic experience in their own way, then there should be a 
sufficient amount of valuable options. So, if a particular kind of art is thriving or is more 
self-sufficient, then the state might lend support to an art that is not doing as well. For 
instance, opera in the U.S. receives only about 5% of its support from the state. Most of 
its support comes from private groups or individuals as well as ticket sales. If opera were 
to lose all state funding, it would likely continue to survive. Also, since opera is less 
likely to benefit as many people as an institution like the Metropolitan Museum of Art, it 
is fair that the Museum receives a more funding and opera receives less. Which art the 
state should support might be different in different situations. It should be noted that it is 
not the state’s responsibility to create new art forms in order to maintain a certain number 
of different options. But the state should encourage creativity in the arts, and even 
occasionally reward those artists or organizations that have proven innovative. 
Additionally, the state might not fund art (or artists) whose appeal is minimal. The state 
has a responsibility to support art that has wider appeal, since it is using money from its 
citizens. This does not necessarily mean that the state should support art that is already 
popular; it should support art that is believed to offer the possibility of an aesthetic 
experience to a larger amount of people. This is why the state has a responsibility to not 
fund art that is sacrilegious. In these cases, the state is certainly not censoring the art; it is 
enforcing its decision to fund art that has a wider appeal.414 These artists may still create 
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their art, but the state should only fund and support art that does not go against the public 
good.  
 Who should benefit from state funding? If everyone was wealthy, then the state 
would not need to fund as much art because the citizens could more easily afford to 
experience it on their own. But the wealthy should definitely benefit in the form of tax 
breaks for donations to museums and on purchases of art, which will be discussed more 
in the next chapter. Other than tax incentives, it is not the wealthy that need as much 
assistance in the experiencing of art, though they certainly benefit from government 
funded public art and institutions. Most people, however, would not be able to afford to 
go to the larger art museums without the state helping those museums; in fact, the 
museums might not exist without state support. State support enables a larger amount of 
citizens to have access to expensive works of art that they would otherwise not be able to 
behold. Thus, it is more for citizens with less monetary resources that the state funds a lot 
of the arts and institutions.  
 Should the state support the high arts or the low arts? In a sense, it should support 
both. The U.S. supports things like the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), which airs 
programs like Sesame Street, which is generally not considered high art. However, it 
seems that the state ought to lend more support to the high arts because they are not as 
easily accessible to people. The ‘lower’ arts—television shows, popular music, and 
movies—are cheaper; therefore, there is no need for the state to help citizens out here. 
Most people have regular access to a variety of the lower arts. But the ‘higher’ arts are 
more expensive to purchase, travel, and to maintain. Thus, state support is often needed 
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to help offset these high costs that would otherwise hinder more people from 
experiencing. 
 
Conclusion 
We have arrived at the end of the theoretical aspect of this project. In the next chapter, I 
will show how the theory of natural law perfectionism can apply to state support of the 
arts by using arts funding as an example. To summarize this chapter, the state exists to 
maintain the political common good, which I have claimed is instrumental. This means 
that the state creates and sustains an environment that allows individuals (and groups) to 
pursue the basic human goods. Moreover, the state can also protect and promote the 
different goods. I have shown reasons why aesthetic experience should be treated as a 
distinct basic good. And this status as a basic good is what provides justification for the 
state to encourage and protect activities, objects, and people who attempt to provide such 
an experience.
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CHAPTER 6 
PRACTICAL APPLICATION: THE FUNDING OF ART 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapters set up the theoretical justification for why the state can and ought 
to support the arts, by protecting and promoting them. If aesthetic experience is a basic 
good that leads to human flourishing and the fundamental purpose of art is to provide the 
capacity for aesthetic experience, then the state is justified in supporting the arts. Many 
practical conclusions could be drawn from this theoretical framework about how the state 
could support the good of aesthetic experience in environmental contexts. For example, 
one could argue that the state could consider the aesthetic in city planning and preserve 
natural spaces solely for their beauty. On the negative side, one might claim that the state 
could restrict (or even suppress) the construction of a building when it disrupts the beauty 
of a landscape. For example, in Sedona, Arizona, some paint and height restrictions for 
buildings, including homes, are in place to preserve the beauty of the red rocks landscape.  
 In terms of the arts, some people might think that the state can only support the 
arts through encouragement. For example, the state could inform people about the value 
of art, but it should not use any of its money (taxpayer’s money) to do the actual funding. 
This view is not necessarily unreasonable; however, I will provide reasons why the state 
should be able to fund art to some degree. For this, I appeal to the relationship between 
art and aesthetic experience—namely, that art provides the possibility for an aesthetic
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 experience, which is a basic good. In this chapter, I also suggest some other reasons why 
the state might support and fund the arts in order to encourage dialogue among its 
citizens. In other words, I will explain how the theory can be applied to this one practical 
example: the state funding of the arts. And this will illustrate how it could be applied in 
other areas as well. A brief disclaimer is that what I provide below is somewhat open-
ended. There is not just one way for a state to fund the arts, so I merely provide some of 
the more important aspects without taking a firm stance on some of the details. Each state 
must decide for itself how to best serve their people in funding or promoting the arts. I 
have suggested some guidelines toward the end of the previous chapter, but I will 
develop the idea of arts funding in this chapter with some data concerning how the arts 
are actually funded in the U.S. 
 Toward that end, I will explain and critique the views of Ronald Dworkin, who 
offers an argument from political philosophy, and Noël Carroll, who offers an argument 
more from aesthetics. Dworkin thinks he is able to justify arts funding without endorsing 
any version of paternalism (or perfectionism); however, I think his ‘justification’ of arts 
funding goes contrary to other aspects of his political philosophy, which will be 
explained below. In other words, his political philosophy is unable to justify his desire to 
endorse the funding of art. Carroll argues from an aesthetic perspective that the state’s 
involvement in the arts through funding gives too much power to the state. Carroll 
worries that the state will directly or indirectly control what art gets produced. Directly 
would mean that the state begins to dictate to people what art they can make, which 
seems less likely to occur in democratic states. So, his bigger worry is that the funding of 
art will lead artists to create art that they believe the state would fund, and not create the 
232 
art that they otherwise would have created. This seems to be falsified in the history of art, 
which shows artists repeatedly going against the conventions of their day. The 
perfectionist theory I have provided in the previous chapter forms the foundation for why 
the state is justified in funding art, though it is important to avoid the concerns raised by 
Carroll. In this chapter, I will bring out those reasons more explicitly and explain some 
considerations for developing a practice of arts funding, since the state cannot fund all 
art. 
 
Perfectionism and Instrumentalism 
Before continuing, it needs to be explained what kinds of positions people support when 
trying to argue for state arts funding. Lambert Zuidervaart claims that there are two main 
ways to justify arts funding. He writes, “mainstream political justifications of direct state 
subsidies for the arts also divide into two camps, namely, instrumentalism and 
perfectionism. Instrumentalists usually are political liberals, and perfectionists usually 
oppose political liberalism.”415 Generally speaking, instrumentalists appeal to some 
extrinsic benefit that art has other than beholding it for its own sake, like a benefit for the 
future of a society such as historical information. It is important to see that 
instrumentalists do not necessarily deny art’s intrinsic value (or benefit); they claim only 
that the intrinsic value (or benefit) cannot be the reason by which the state is justified in 
funding art.  
 On the other hand, perfectionists, while agreeing that art has some instrumental 
value, maintain that art’s value—in so far as it contributes to the culture, peace, and 
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thereby the common good of the society—is precisely why the state should support it to 
some degree (monetarily and in other ways, like education). Art is beneficial for its own 
sake, in so far as it instantiates the basic good of aesthetic experience. This is not to say 
that all works of art have the same degree of value or that each person will value each 
work to the same degree. This is why the creation of different kinds and styles of art 
should be encouraged. A plurality of art is important because of the diversity of beholders 
that can receive the value that art provides, namely its capacity to provide an aesthetic 
experience. Commenting on the value of the diversity of agreements and disagreements 
about the identification and evaluation of works of art, Richard Eldridge writes,  
[W]orks of art are for us crucial sites of the display and 
testing of both what is deepest and most common among 
us, including shared capacities of felt response to 
presentations of a subject matter as a focus for thought and 
emotional attitude, distinctively fused to the imaginative 
exploration of material, and what is most personal about us, 
as we seek to sustain distinctive personalities and routes of 
interest in social life.416 
 
The diversity of art helps individuals to discover commonalities with others as well as 
distinctions. Art often helps people sympathize with others in ways that mere facts are 
often deficient because they lack an affective component. In 2004, the NEA released a 
study called Reading at Risk: A Survey of Literary Reading in America. In this study, 
they found that readers of literature are declining significantly and that readers tended to 
be more active members in their communities.417 So, art certainly effects the common 
good of the state when its formal excellence inspires people to reflect on its content, but it 
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is also inherently valuable as it has the capacity to produce aesthetic experiences in its 
beholders, regardless of the exact interpretation. 
 This difference—between the instrumentalists and perfectionists—in why art 
should be funded (or in other ways supported) has to do with their different approaches to 
the state’s role in society, which has already been shown in the previous chapters with the 
discussion of political anti-perfectionism and perfectionism. While anti-perfectionists 
take an instrumental stance on arts funding (if they endorse arts funding at all), I will 
argue that funding is best justified on perfectionist grounds. However, I agree with the 
anti-perfectionists that art is valuable in the ways that they suggest, such as the 
contribution to the cultural structure as Dworkin argues (and will be discussed below). 
But I also think that art’s unique ability (and fundamental purpose) to provide aesthetic 
experiences (an inherent benefit) to its beholders is the primary reason it should be 
protected, supported, and funded. In the next section, I present Dworkin’s instrumentalist 
approach to arts funding and show why it is inadequate to justify state funding for the 
arts. 
 
Dworkin’s Argument for Arts Funding 
Dworkin believes there are two approaches to the question of arts funding: the lofty 
approach and the economic approach. He tries to see whether either of these approaches 
can justify arts funding—which is his hope—without becoming paternalistic (or 
perfectionistic). The economic approach basically “takes as its premise that a community 
should have the character and quality of art that it wishes to buy at the price necessary to 
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secure it.”418 The market is what determines how much money should be spent for the 
advancement of culture, particularly as it occurs in the arts. So what would people be 
willing to pay, for example, to have works of art preserved in museums? Dworkin thinks 
the only true way of discovering this figure would be to let the museum charge an 
admission price that truly reflects all of their costs: staff, preservation, electricity, special 
exhibits, etc. Then, we will see whether or not enough of the people in a society wanted 
this museum. He does not believe that museums would stay in business under this 
approach. As it stands this approach does not seem to be fair to those who would love to 
pay for the museum if only they had enough money. Dworkin offers a way to save a 
version of this approach, but, first, I will explain his reasoning against the lofty approach. 
 Rather than worrying about the market and what people would be willing to pay, 
the lofty approach “concentrates instead on what it is good for people to have. It insists 
that art and culture must reach a certain degree of sophistication, richness, and excellence 
in order for human nature to flourish, and that the state must provide this excellence if the 
people will not or cannot provide it for themselves.”419 He has two main concerns with 
this approach. First, experience teaches us that those who would benefit from state 
support of the arts are already those who are better off “because they have been taught 
how to use and enjoy art.”420 As a side note, this statement highlights the importance of 
education in art appreciation, not just financial advantage. So, it is certainly not fair to 
claim that support for the arts leads to flourishing, when it does not really help everyone, 
but only the most advantaged. Second, Dworkin thinks this approach seems ‘haughtily 
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paternalistic’. More people seem to prefer to watch football,421 than to gaze at a painting 
by Titian; therefore, the state cannot use funds, which come from the people through 
taxation, for things that people do not really want just because some people think it is 
needed. So, Dworkin believes that the lofty approach is not salvageable from within a 
liberal perspective. If we want to save the belief that the state can fund art, then we need 
to see if the economic approach can be fixed. 
 Dworkin admits that the previous account of the economic approach is too 
simplified: “the connections between market prices and people’s true preferences are not 
always so tight.”422 He considers the idea that someone would be willing to pay money 
for the arts, but she does not have any extra money to spare. So, another approach might 
claim that things like the arts are public goods; hence, they require public support from 
the public treasury (or the state). Dworkin defines, “Public goods are those whose 
production cannot efficiently be left to the market because it is impossible (or very 
difficult or expensive) to exclude those who do not pay from receiving the benefit and so 
riding free. People will have no incentive to pay for what they will receive anyway if 
others buy it.”423 Dworkin gives the example of an army that is supported through private 
money. If eight out of ten members of a community are willing to pay for an army, then 
the other two do not have much incentive to pay because, by default, they will also 
receive the benefit. So, instead of some people getting a free ride, the state collects 
money from people in the form of taxes to pay for these kinds of things. A problem still 
persists in this view. How can the government know how much the citizens would 
collectively pay for the funding of art?  
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 Dworkin points out that particular cultural experiences—he gives the example of 
an opera—are not counted as public goods because “it is easy to exclude those who will 
not pay.”424 Dworkin suggests that, perhaps, art should be regarded as a mixed (or partial) 
public good. This notion implies that each instance of art might not be open to everyone 
or not everyone chooses to pay the price, but art still benefits them to a significant degree. 
In other words, art has some extrinsic good benefits; for example, the art museums in 
New York City bring in a significant amount of tourism. But he thinks this approach also 
fails because the number of extrinsic benefits could not be high enough to justify the 
amount of public funding. 
 Dworkin asserts his own view, which Zuidervaart labels ‘robust 
instrumentalism’,425 by writing, “The sense I report—that art and culture have intrinsic 
benefits for the public as a whole—rests on an assumption that is familiar and sound: that 
culture is a seamless web, that high culture and popular culture are not distinct but 
influence one another reciprocally.”426 In this statement, high culture is used to include 
things like the fine arts, opera, ballet, and so on. Dworkin uses popular culture to refer to 
standard things, like popular music, novels, magazines, and plays. But he extends this 
term to also include “the whole range of diction and trope and style available within a 
community, as these are displayed in every aspect of communication from reporting and 
televising public and athletic events to advertising campaigns. I mean, in short, the 
general intellectual environment in which we all live.”427 Contrary to what sometimes 
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appears to be the case, these are not two different cultures; they are two aspects of the 
unified culture of a society. The artistic objects of a given culture provide not only those 
objects but also the structural frame that makes these objects valuable for that culture.428 
Dworkin proposes, “We should identify the structural aspects of our general culture as 
themselves worthy of attention.”429 Each option (funding or not funding art) effects the 
cultural landscape equally, though differently. Dworkin thinks, as Brighouse points out, 
that the decision not to fund should not automatically be the default position for liberal 
philosophers.430  
 Toward developing this claim about art being an aspect of the structural frame, 
Dworkin asserts that a society’s language is the center of that community’s cultural 
structure.431 And he sees art as analogous to a community’s language. They are both 
mixed public goods; they are neither exclusively private nor public. Dworkin explains 
mixed public good as it relates to language, “Someone can exclude others, by relatively 
inexpensive means, from what he or she writes or says on any particular occasion. People 
cannot, however, be excluded from the language as a whole.”432 Likewise, people can be 
excluded from certain artistic events, but they cannot be excluded from the art world in 
its entirety, especially in the internet age with things like the Google Art Project. As 
mentioned above, Dworkin maintains that there is a reciprocal relationship between what 
people sometimes call high and low art. They influence each other to form a shared 
cultural structure, though a problem with his view is that he tends to support only 
subsidies for high culture. Dworkin thinks that the state has justification to fund art 
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because it contributes to a society’s cultural structure, though he does not offer what this 
would look like in practice. Additionally, he only seems to care that the state should fund 
high art, which seems to be inconsistent with the reciprocal influence of high and low art 
that make up the cultural structure. So, he does not give any guidelines about which art to 
fund nor how much money art should get compared with other things, like military and 
welfare. 
 Noël Carroll criticizes Dworkin’s position because it proves too much, thereby 
negating its effectiveness. If the state ought to fund art, not because it is valuable in itself, 
but merely because it is part of a cultural structure, then too many other things ought to 
be funded as well for the same reason. For example, Carroll cites punk music, break 
dancing, and hoola-hoops as things that have become a part of our cultural framework. 
Carroll thinks that Dworkin’s argument leads to the conclusion (a conclusion that 
Dworkin presumably does not desire) that these things are eligible for state funding.433 
Dworkin tries so hard to be consistent with his anti-perfectionism (and it is not clear that 
he even succeeded in that goal) that he reduces art to something more trivial than most 
people want to think. It’s part of our culture; therefore, the state should protect it. But, as 
Carroll points out, many things have been part of our culture that we haven’t thought it 
important to preserve using the state’s money, e.g. cabbage patch kids dolls. In the end, a 
political perfectionist position is necessary for endorsing the state funding of the arts, 
since arts funding necessarily requires making a value judgment of some kind. 
 Additionally, Dworkin’s argument rests on the premises that “it is better for 
people to have a rich cultural structure” and “everyone in a culture benefits from a rich 
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cultural structure.”434 These reasons present two problems. First, it is not clear how this 
reasoning does not slip into the kind of values that perfectionists think the state can 
endorse. For example, some people might claim that religion or religious organizations 
contribute to the rich cultural structure of a society, but I imagine Dworkin and others do 
not want the state to financially support religious organizations as it would be supporting 
a particular conception of the good life (even though they do in the United States through 
tax exemptions). Second, liberal philosophers, like Dworkin and Rawls, emphasize 
strongly (to their critic’s chagrin) the individual, and now Dworkin wants to stress the 
value of a community’s shared cultural (and perhaps moral) structure. He fails to raise 
convincing reasons why the communal cultural structure matters in a way that trumps the 
individual’s possible wishes. Even more curious is that the only funding he considers is 
that given to high art. What if the majority of individuals in the future decided that they 
only wanted the ‘lowest’ forms of art and nothing more? Just because high art and low art 
influence one another does not mean that they must necessarily both exist (or exist at 
their current levels). Dworkin might counter that a current society must leave the culture 
as rich (if not richer) as they found it. But, again, why couldn’t a diversity of new popular 
art forms suffice? Why do we specifically need the high arts? Answers to these questions 
are quite lacking in Dworkin’s account, adding to the difficulty of finding it acceptable. 
 
Noël Carroll’s Concerns about the Theoretical Justification of Arts Funding 
Carroll focuses his discussion on prospective arts funding—directly funding the future 
production or consumption of art. He begins by asking whether or not arts funding is a 
legitimate function of the state, and he assumes an anti-perfectionist stance that the 
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government is mostly supposed to prevent harms. Some people argue that our defense 
budget (in the United States) is too big, and that we could lower that expense and put the 
extra money toward the arts. A flaw with this kind of reasoning, according to Carroll, is 
that it assumes that defense spending and arts funding are connected in some sense.435 
Carroll claims that defense spending is obviously a legitimate function of any state, while 
arts funding is certainly not obviously a legitimate function. He admits that our defense 
spending might be extravagant, but lowering those expenditures does not mean that arts 
funding should be increased. So, we still need a justification for why this ‘extra’ money 
should go toward arts funding. 
 Toward this end, Carroll considers the idea that the arts are a part of people’s 
welfare, which he claims “refers to assistance to individuals in need of the basic goods 
that comprise a livelihood.”436 This definition of welfare allows for things that go beyond 
the mere survival of the individual; it seems to also account for, to some extent, those 
things that enable an individual to flourish. But then, Carroll switches from talk of 
welfare to talk about the needs of human beings, by which he limits it to only those things 
that keep people alive. So, he changes the question from does prospective arts funding 
help provide goods for people’s welfare to does the lack of such funding directly harm 
anyone? For example, withholding food from people would harm them; does the same 
hold true for withholding arts funding? Carroll thinks that the answer is clearly no; 
therefore, arts funding is not an essential function of government. 
 Carroll further limits the notion of welfare to consist only of finances. Since 
prospective arts funding would do nothing, says Carroll, to raise people above the 
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poverty line, it does not help anyone’s welfare. This reasoning works (if at all) only if one 
accepts this very narrow understanding of welfare (which I do not). But Carroll also 
entertains the possibility of an ‘aesthetic welfare’. He refers to Monroe Beardsley as a 
proponent of aesthetic welfare—consisting of the aesthetic levels of everyone’s 
experiences at a given time.437 However, Carroll believes that, if aesthetic welfare really 
exists, retrospective arts funding would likely suffice without prospective arts funding. 
We should note though that he is highly suspicious of there being an aesthetic welfare.  
 Carroll’s main contention with aesthetic welfare is that it “doesn’t correlate with 
definable needs, especially basic needs; nor does being below the poverty line imply 
being aesthetically disadvantaged.”438 Though it seems true that we cannot precisely 
define levels of ‘aesthetic need’, I am not convinced of the second half of this statement. 
Through both education and money wealthy people have access to art and artistic 
experiences that are inaccessible (maybe not completely) to those who are living in 
poverty. I am not claiming that poor people have no experiences of the aesthetic, but they 
are limited in what they can experience compared to wealthy people. Not only do they 
not have access to more expensive arts (like opera), they also cannot afford to surround 
themselves with the same level of beauty in their daily lives (such as filling their homes 
with art). Carroll’s claim that artistic experience is not connected at all with economic 
status seems to be unfounded. 
 I should mention another reason that Carroll cites as being a motivation for the 
state to fund art is its moralizing effects. And, unsurprisingly, Carroll does not think this 
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reason is good. Carroll claims that in the U.S. “in the nineteenth century the belief was 
widespread that through art the populace could be morally improved.”439 And this belief 
resulted in some school reforms and the founding of some of the great museums. The 
basic idea about the moralizing effect is that works of art act as moral exemplars that can 
increase the morality of the people. Though some art might indeed increase our moral 
sensibilities, Carroll thinks it is mistaken to assume that all art performs this task. Hence, 
if the state were to fund art solely on the grounds that it has this moralizing effect, then it 
must only fund that art which actually has this effect, which would be difficult to 
determine. If the state only funds this sub-group of artworks, then, Carroll worries, the 
state will have too much power over how the arts develop as artists try to make art that 
fits within the funding restrictions. 
 Concluding his paper, Carroll writes,  
The two strongest justifications seem to be those 
concerning the aesthetic environment and the moralizing 
effects of the arts. However, though these arguments are 
available, it is not clear that they should be acted upon. For 
they endorse the funding of only certain types of art. 
Government support for the arts guided strictly by these 
arguments may indeed disturb the structure of artistic 
production and perhaps destroy the art world as we know 
it.440   
 
This last sentence is highly overstated and seems to be falsified in the history of art. The 
history of art is full of examples of artists going against the conventions of the day as 
advocated by the culture, the state, and the religious organizations. Now these artists 
might not have been funded by the state, but they were often funded by powerful people 
or groups (like influential patrons or the Catholic Church). So, it is possible that some 
                                                            
439 Ibid., 31. 
440 Ibid., 34. 
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artists will sometimes create different works (than they would have otherwise) in hopes 
of pleasing their benefactors. Many patrons had artists paint portraits of them, especially 
before the age of photography. But creating under the guidelines of a patron will not 
apply to every artist nor will it apply to any particular artist at all times in his or her 
career. For example, an artist might do some work to please a benefactor in order to get 
money to do the kind of art she really wants to make. And this allows for the progression 
of art, despite some of the cultural conventions. If Carroll was right, then the story of 
art’s progression would have been different as artists tried to constantly please the 
conventions of their day, imposed by the state, religion, or culture. 
 
The Funding of Art 
Only the most overzealous would think that the state should indiscriminately fund all art. 
This would be obviously implausible. The arts are not the only thing to which the state 
needs to be attentive. The state must make decisions about how to spend money, and the 
state has reason to support financially the arts as they instantiate the basic good of 
aesthetic experience. Beyond providing aesthetic experiences, which has already been 
discussed in the previous chapters, I suggest some additional reasons why the state might 
fund the arts. But where do we draw the line in funding the arts? How much funding 
should the arts receive compared with other things, like military spending and 
infrastructure? Which arts should receive more funding than others (perhaps the arts that 
are appreciated by more people)? Generally speaking, I think the state should try to fund 
central cases (as opposed to peripheral or deficient cases) of art that exhibit the potential 
to provide higher degrees of aesthetic experiences to wider audiences. For an analogous 
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example, the state funds universities, but it does not fund everyday, peripheral, or 
deficient instances of knowledge acquisition. And, in the case of current or future art, this 
cannot be predicted with precision, so we need ways to make wise decisions about which 
art to fund. I will sketch out how the state could fund the arts, using examples and figures 
from how the United States funds art at the federal, state, and local levels. 
 I agree somewhat with Carroll, more as a word of caution, that direct prospective 
arts funding is not always the best use of the state’s money because one cannot predict 
with certainty which art will be hailed as great and worth the funding. However, I do not 
agree completely with Carroll; I think that some amount of the money the state spends on 
arts funding should be used for prospective arts. Usually prospective arts funding does 
not go to someone who has never created any art; it goes to someone who has a track 
record (even a small one) of successful or worthy art. In order for this to work, there 
should be a committee—for example, made up of artists, art historians, art critics, art 
appreciators, philosophers, and laypersons—to decide which things should receive 
funding. No foolproof way exists to predict with certainty the success of any given work 
of art or the impact of any given artist. One just has to recall Tilted Arc by Richard Serra. 
This piece was installed in front of the Jacob Javits Federal Building in Manhattan in 
1981 and taken down in 1989, after a lot of debate and a court trial. But the possibility of 
something not working out should not hinder all such funding. Generally speaking, the 
public has not responded as negatively (as the Tilted Arc debacle) very often. And part of 
the Tilted Arc problem came about because it was a giant wall that people had to walk 
around everyday to go to work; it created a practical problem (or irritation) for many 
246 
people. So, it was not just that people did not like Tilted Arc as a work of art; it was 
viewed as an inconvenient obstacle for those going to work. 
 A distinction needs to be drawn between the means and ends of funding the arts. 
The ‘means’ have to do with things that indirectly help the arts, such as tax breaks (by 
encouraging through incentives people to donate money) and museums (as they provide a 
place to experience works of art). Additionally, a lot of people donate their time, which 
does not have any kind of monetary incentive. “In 2011, 1.3 million adults in the U.S. 
volunteered a total of 65 million hours to arts and cultural organizations. Volunteers 
tended to be highly educated and mainly female.”441 I mention this to show that many 
Americans support the arts in ways that do not have incentives, suggesting that they do it 
solely because they believe in the value of art for society. The ‘ends’ have to do with 
directly funding the arts, like grants from the state. And this is where some prospective 
arts funding would become relevant, but this also includes other ends like arts education, 
which can obviously exist in schools but also in museums and libraries. 
 First, I will discuss the means of supporting the arts, which are indirect ways that 
the state can fund the arts. Museums are sometimes helped with their property taxes, and 
tax breaks can be used as an incentive to buy and donate art to public museums. Here it 
seems necessary for the work of art to have an identifiable value, both monetarily and 
culturally. Someone cannot buy random art and give it away, hoping to receive a tax 
break. Also, it seems reasonable that there could be some kind of tax incentive for a 
company or individual to commission original art work for their business or home. This 
is important because both individuals and corporations give more money to the arts when 
                                                            
441 NEA office of research, How the United States Funds the Arts, 3rd ed. (Washington DC: National 
Endowment for the Arts, 2012), 19. It is estimated that the monetary value of this amount of 
volunteering is about $1.6 billion. 
247 
there are tax incentives; for example, in 2011, “Americans donated approximately $13 
billion to the category, ‘Arts, Culture, and the Humanities.’”442 How much do charitable 
donations impact the tax revenue of the United States? The government, by providing 
these tax incentives, forfeits about 33 to 35 cents for every one dollar donated to a tax-
exempt organization. “In total, the U.S. government’s foregone revenues from charitable 
donations are expected to reach $230 billion between 2010 and 2014.”443 Needless to say, 
the U.S. has aided the funding of art to a massive degree by relinquishing its ability to 
collect taxes from nonprofit organizations as well as allowing deductions from 
individuals and corporations for donating money to these organizations. 
 In addition to tax breaks, I think museums and other institutions could fit into the 
means category as well, though I also think the case can be made for museums and 
institutions counting as ends as they preserve and repair art. In so far as money is needed 
for the overhead costs of the museums,444 along with the acquisition and preservation of 
art, I think they should be seen more as a means to the appreciation of art. As non-profit 
organizations, museums also receive some benefit in the way of tax incentives; for 
example, the City of New York pays the property taxes for the Metropolitan Museum of 
Art to keep its ideal location. Plus, people and corporations who donate to museums 
receive tax breaks. “In 2011 the Walton Family Foundation gave $800 million to the 
Crystal Bridges Museum of Art—the largest cash donation ever made to a U.S. art 
museum.”445 In addition to art museums, corporations have helped establish and support 
other kinds of organizations for the arts. For instance, in 1967, the Ford Foundation 
                                                            
442 Ibid., 18. 
443 Ibid. 
444 In the previous chapter, I mentioned that New York State pays the utilities for the Metropolitan 
Museum of Art. 
445 Ibid., 20. 
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helped establish both the Corporation for Public Broadcasting and the American Film 
Institute. Also, “the Rockefeller Foundation supported the establishment of Lincoln 
Center (1956) and the Museum of Modern Art (1929).”446 One can clearly see that tax 
incentives, which have existed since 1917, have helped encourage the support of arts 
organizations by individuals and businesses. Museums serve an important role in 
preserving art as many works of art have already passed through the critical phase of their 
existence, where spectators and critics have declared them to be worthy of preservation. 
So, the state does not necessarily need to help fund their creation but to help fund 
(directly through grants and indirectly through tax incentives) their preservation, which is 
a means to public appreciation.  
 Second, much of what we think of as funding the arts consists of ends, such as 
directly funding public art projects and education. Though it might be somewhat risky for 
the state to fund lots of art created by new artists who have not really proven themselves 
yet, it is reasonable for the state to help preserve works of art that have achieved acclaim. 
This would help avoid Carroll’s worry that the state would have too much power in 
deciding what art gets produced; the state would only step in after the fact and help 
preserve the greatest works. This might sound similar to Dworkin’s view of the state 
indirectly funding the arts to preserve the cultural language. However, it is not quite the 
same. For one thing, I think (with many others) that Dworkin creates an odd chain of 
reasoning in hopes of avoiding an appeal to value, which would go against his anti-
perfectionist stance. I, on the other hand, embrace the view that works of art that have 
‘stood the test of time’ have value other than monetary—since they have the capacity for 
aesthetic experience, a basic good—and this is why the state ought to preserve them for 
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current and future generations. Admittedly, I believe that works of art can have value as 
historical and cultural artifacts, and this can also be a reason for preserving them. For 
example, a painting of George Washington should be preserved because of the historical 
fact that he was the first president of the United States, but it need not be the only (or 
main reason) reason.  
 Unlike Carroll, I do not think the state should avoid funding all new works of art 
and such funding need not control the future of artistic production in the way Carroll 
imagines. Consider, as an example, how the NEA actually operates for the funding of 
new art447 by looking at how it funds literature, and it provides an example of how the 
state can try to avoid funding bad art. The NEA offers grants for writers because writing 
takes time that many talented people do not have; they have to work to survive, which 
takes time away from their writing. However, in order to be eligible for a literature 
fellowship in the prose category, one must already have published recently either five 
different short stories, a novel (or novella), a volume of short fiction, or a volume of 
creative nonfiction.448 In this case, the state will not fund anyone that has not already 
gone through a peer review process of publishing some original work. Beyond the 
eligibility requirements, a committee of experts449 is put in place to select out of the many 
applications which people will receive the award for that year. These writers might not 
always produce works of literature that revolutionize the world, but the grant has enabled 
                                                            
447 It is difficult to know for sure how much money is spent in the U.S. to fund new works of art because 
there is not just one centralized organization, such as a Ministry of Culture. The NEA happens to be the 
largest organization, so I can give figures for them for 2012. From their $146 million appropriations, the 
NEA used about $11 million for the creation of art. See http://arts.gov/sites/default/files/2012-NEA-
Annual-Report.pdf (Sept. 23, 2013). 
448 http://www.nea.gov/grants/apply/Lit/eligibility.html 
449 The NEA has committees that screen the applications for the grants in the various fields of art, and then 
they also have the National Council on the Arts to recommend organizations for other kinds of grants, 
like ones for museums. 
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some of them to produce highly acclaimed works, like Jeffrey Eugenides’s Middlesex and 
William Kennedy’s Ironweed. This illustrates how the state could fund new art with less 
risk that the artists (in this case writers) are not going to produce something good. And 
the NEA has this review process for each grant that they award for the creation of new 
art. So, it avoids giving money to people who might have a good idea but have not yet 
produced anything of merit. 
 In addition to funding artists, education also plays a key role in people’s 
appreciation of and development in the arts. It frequently happens that, under budgetary 
constraints, art departments in public schools are the first things that receive cuts. It may 
sometimes be necessary to cut some funding for art programs, but I think it should be 
done more reflectively, considering the value that the arts have for our lives. In other 
words, it should not be the default to cut the art programs. Aside from the belief that art is 
valuable for its own sake, immediately cutting art sends a message that the arts are 
always something added onto our lives, something extra. However, I have argued that art, 
as an instrument of aesthetic experience, is valuable for our lives. And education plays a 
huge role in making people aware of the diversity of the arts that exist and by helping 
people explore the possibilities that art has to offer. Along with its aesthetic value, art 
helps to make us aware of problems in the world and sometimes offers solutions to these 
problems. For instance, many people have become aware of ‘the disappeared’ through the 
works of Doris Salcedo, a sculptor. She collects artifacts from those who have 
disappeared from her country of Colombia because of their resistance to the government. 
She uses these artifacts to make sculptures as reminders of these missing people.  
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 Art education can obviously occur in schools as kids learn literature, music, art 
(like drawing and painting), and art history. But the state could also help subsidize and 
organize programs in the community for children and adults, especially for those who are 
least well off.450 When people try to paint, for instance, they arrive at a higher 
appreciation of those who paint well. The goal here is not to turn everyone into artists; it 
is more to help them gain an appreciation of art by doing it. They learn what the process 
of making art is like, which helps them to see better when looking at other people’s 
paintings. Additionally, people will learn the importance of things like composition—
how all the sections of the painting fit together. This is important because it can be 
applied to many aspects of our lives. Our environment affects us, both positively and 
negatively and to varying degrees. Learning about composition can help us in how we 
arrange things in our daily lives, such as rooms in our homes.  
 
Why should the state Fund Art? 
Someone might agree that the state could encourage the appreciation and production of 
the arts, but that the state should not actually devote monetary resources to the arts. I have 
argued that the state should protect and promote works of art because they have the 
capacity to provide aesthetic experiences, which is a basic human good. So, at the very 
least, the state should encourage the production and appreciation of art. But I think there 
are at least two main reasons why the state should specifically fund the arts (to some 
degree) as well: its resources and its influence. First, the state has greater resources than 
most individuals. As mentioned previously, most people could not individually fund an 
                                                            
450 The NEA used about $5 million of its $146 million in 2012 for education, which does not include 
education that occurs in schools. See http://arts.gov/sites/default/files/2012-NEA-Annual-Report.pdf 
(Sept. 23, 2013). 
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art museum. But everyone pays taxes, and the state uses this pooled money to fund things 
for the people, like art museums. The National Gallery of Art actually appeals to 
legislation that claims that the United States will pay for the upkeep and operational costs 
for a national gallery, but not all museums have something this official to which they can 
appeal for money.451 Recall the money from the state that goes toward the Metropolitan 
Museum without which they would likely not survive, including utilities and property tax 
breaks. Additionally, state subsidies help keep costs of museum admission lower (and 
sometimes free), which enables the least advantaged to experience the works of art. Most 
museums would suffer financially without the tax breaks that come from their being 
nonprofit organizations. It should be noted that, generally speaking, art museums do not 
receive most of their money from the government, but the money they receive is often 
necessary to help offset operational costs and to save a little time and energy that would 
have been devoted to fundraising. For example, according to the 2009 tax statement for 
the Museum of Modern Art (MoMA), government contribution was about $48,000 
compared to the other $69 million of other contributions.452 Though art museums rely on 
some essential money from government sources, it should not be overstated because 
much of their financial support does not come from the government. 
 People are inclined to be skeptical when someone (or group) says that a given 
activity is important when that person (or group) is never willing to invest time, energy, 
and money into its development. So, the second reason is that the state is very influential. 
For example, by making policies against littering, the state helped to stigmatize littering, 
so that it is not nearly as big of an issue as it once was; and the state rarely seems to have 
                                                            
451 Section 4(a) of the Joint Resolution of Congress, March 24, 1937, (20 U.S.C. 71-75). 
452 http://www.guidestar.org/FinDocuments//2010/131/624/2010-131624100-07377449-9.pdf (Sept., 24, 
2013). 
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to enforce this policy. So, if policies and actions of the state can influence the opinions of 
the citizenry in a negative sense, then it seems reasonable to suppose that the actions of 
the state can influence the citizenry in a positive sense without involving coercion. The 
littering example involved coercion in that some people probably had to pay a fine at 
some point, which is where this example is not similar to what I mean here. My point is 
that the actions of the state influence people, and it seems possible that people (though 
not everyone) will value the arts more if the state demonstrates that it values the arts. 
Also, many people distrust a lot of political activity, so it seems important for the state to 
not only ‘verbally’ endorse the arts but put at least some money toward them, which 
would show people that they seriously support the arts. For these two main reasons, the 
state should not only promote the arts, but also fund them to some degree.  
 
State Funding and Censorship 
The state (as well as most individuals) wants to donate money only if they have a certain 
amount of control over the outcome. For example, the federal government in the United 
States might be willing to give individual states money for education, but the federal 
government wants some control over how that money is used and the outcomes that are 
anticipated from its use. Some people (like Carroll) worry that if the state funds the arts, 
it will necessarily lead to the state overstepping its bounds by controlling and censoring 
the arts. Though this is a possibility that most want to avoid, I do not believe that it is a 
necessary consequence of state funding. However, though the state does not need to 
censor, it must be selective about what art it funds. The state has responsibility to the 
taxpayers.  
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 Deciding not to fund some particular art that would likely offend (or be 
displeasing) to a large audience is not the same thing as trying to prevent those artists 
from doing their work. In 1990, the so called NEA 4—Karen Finley, Tim Miller, John 
Fleck, and Holly Hughes—had gone through the peer review process to receive grants as 
performance artists, but their grants were ultimately vetoed by the chairman of the NEA, 
John Frohnmayer. The veto came with the debacle of 1989 fresh in their minds, where 
people protested vehemently against the NEA funding Robert Mapplethorpe’s 
homoerotic art and Andre Serrano’s Piss Christ. So, the NEA 4 were individually denied 
on grounds of overstepping the standards of public morality. These four, in 1993, sued 
the NEA for violating their freedom of speech. Recall that Raz made a distinction 
between hindering and not helping; in other words, not funding is not the same thing as 
censoring. But the NEA 4 won their lawsuit, which resulted in the NEA ceasing to fund 
any individual artists, except writers.  
 Some people have wanted to end all government subsidies for the arts solely on 
the basis of things that have been funded, such as Andre Serrano’s Piss Christ. So, in 
order to aid the success of these programs to continue to help the arts, the state has a 
responsibility not to fund art that many of their citizens view as offensive. This is not a 
matter of censorship; it is a matter of making wise decisions for the common good. There 
is no exact way to determine how many offended people is too many, since most works 
of art will at least be disapproved (though not necessarily offended) by a few people. But 
the state has a responsibility to avoid funding art that is seen as blatantly offensive. For 
example, there is a difference (though not always perfectly clear) between works of art 
that are deliberately offensive and those that are questioning certain actions of a given 
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religious organization. As far as funding religious art, it might be better for the state to 
either not fund it or to fund it equally, such as art shows that incorporate a variety of 
religions. So, it might be better for the state to try to fund art that is less contentious. 
Again, this does not infringe on anyone’s freedom of speech because they can still make 
their art, but the state does not have to fund it. And they might even be able to receive 
funds in other ways that are not sponsored by the state. And thanks to the Internet this has 
gotten easier for current artists with crowd-funding websites, like ArtistShare, 
Kickstarter, and Power2Give.org.453  
 Obviously, the state, since run by people, will make mistakes, but it is important 
for them to be accountable for what they fund. But, to emphasize, just because the state 
should probably not fund art that is highly controversial does not mean that those works 
of art ought to be censored. That is a whole other issue. Advocating accountability for the 
NEA, V. A. Howard claims that it is wise for the NEA to exercise accountability for their 
future survival. He writes, “Note in this connection [between subsidy and accountability] 
that no one but extremists is calling for government censorship, rather that the NEA 
police itself with an eye to the tolerances of public morality.”454 For instance, video game 
companies voluntarily rate the content of their games through the Entertainment Software 
Rating Board (ESRB). So, it is not unreasonable that the NEA could exercise judgment of 
a similar kind—whether or not through an outside agency—about what art to fund. Ideas 
about public morality are obviously difficult to negotiate in a society with a wide range of 
diversity. Some things are probably widely accepted; art showing the abuse of children in 
                                                            
453 How the United States Funds the Arts, 20. ArtistShare is a fan-funded, internet-based record label, 
which began in 2000. Kickstarter bagen in 2009 and has already raised $283 million for about 29,000 
creative projects in all genres of art. Power2Give.org began in 2011 and had fully funded 37 projects by 
October of that year. 
454 V. A. Howard, “Funding the Arts: an Investment in Global Citizenship?” Journal of Aesthetic 
Education 35, No. 4 (Winter, 2001): 93. 
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a positive light presumably would go against the tolerances of public morality and should 
not be funded.  
 What about art that takes a stance on polarizing issues, like abortion? Like 
religious art, it might be better for the state to not fund this kind of art or fund (to an 
equal degree) art representing the different positions. And deciding what to fund should 
be carefully considered in the committees that already meet in most countries, including 
the NEA in the U.S. They need to decide not only on the basis of artistic merit (or 
aesthetic value) but also how the art might impact the society. Rather than seeing this as a 
way to restrict art, I think it should be seen as a way for the state to fund art that will open 
up discussions. It is difficult to imagine that highly offensive art—art that deliberately 
attacks an opposing position—could inspire meaningful conversations (as opposed to 
harsh and defensive reactions) among citizens. Art often provides a better medium for 
opening up dialogue than other things like formal debates. As Anthony Cooper has 
written, “This brings to mind a reason I have often sought for: why we moderns, who 
abound so much in treatises and essays, are so sparing in the way of dialogue [and other 
art forms], which heretofore was found the politest and best way of managing even the 
graver subjects.”455 Debates and direct attacks on positions often just make people 
defensive and less likely to listen. However, art can often help people to see the other side 
of an issue better than a direct discussion. So, the state should fund art that provides the 
capacity for aesthetic experience, while encouraging civic engagement. 
 
 
                                                            
455 Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury, “The Moralists, A Philosophical Rhapsody,” in 
Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 
233. 
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Conclusion 
The state already does many things to support the arts, but, in the previous chapters, I 
have provided theoretical justification for why the state is justified in supporting the arts. 
State support for the arts and aesthetic experience encompasses a number of topics: arts 
education, arts funding, preservation of nature, city planning, and other things. In this 
chapter, I have shown how the theory of the previous chapters would apply to the state’s 
funding of the arts; I have also added other reasons why the state might be interested in 
funding the arts, such as creating dialogue about sensitive issues. Dworkin attempts to 
reconcile arts funding with his anti-perfectionist stance. He tries to avoid saying that the 
state funds art because it is intrinsically valuable, which would be contrary to his anti-
perfectionism. Rather, he tries to claim that art is part of the cultural structure. But he 
fails to show why this is valuable to warrant state support. Carroll thinks that prospective 
arts funding is bad because it fails to fulfill any needs of the citizens. And he worries that 
funding the arts would give the state too much control over the arts. However, I have 
claimed that the state ought to fund art because of its resources and influence. But the 
state needs to exercise some discretion when funding prospective art because it has 
responsibility to its citizens. So, the state would be wise to fund art that has wider appeal 
and, if possible, has already been declared great by the art world and the community at 
large.
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CONCLUSION 
In If This is a Man, Primo Levi tells a story about his time as a prisoner at Auschwitz. He 
and one of his fellow prisoners were working and he was trying to recite a piece from 
Dante, but he could not remember a connecting line that would unite the two parts he 
could remember. Levi writes that he would have given up his day’s food ration in order 
to remember that line. The beauty of the poem helped Levi to transcend temporarily his 
harrowing surroundings; as he describes, “For a moment I forget who I am and where I 
am.”456 The experience of beauty is important in people’s lives, even in situations where 
some might think that beauty and art are mere luxuries. Aesthetic experience leads to 
people’s well-being or flourishing. To be clear, Levi was not flourishing in Auschwitz 
because he recited some poems, but I think it did help his well-being for a short while 
(enough to help him continue on). Combining political philosophy and aesthetics (which 
is not usually done, especially in analytic philosophy), I have addressed the question 
concerning what relation (if any) can or should the state have with the aesthetic 
experience of art and nature. 
 In this dissertation, I have made four claims. First, I have argued that the state 
cannot really be neutral. It will always support something that it deems valuable for its 
citizens, e.g. liberty. So, we should try to discover which things are worthy of state 
support and allow the state to support those things. In this pursuit, I am aligned with the 
natural law tradition, a political perfectionist position. This view begins with the first 
                                                            
456 Primo Levi, If This is a Man and The Truce, trans. Stuart Woolf (London: Abacus, 2009), 119. 
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principles of practical reason or the basic goods, which are the things worthy of state 
support. 
 Second, due to recent abandonment of the concept of aesthetic experience (in 
favor of interpretation), it was necessary to present the main constituents for a theory of 
aesthetic experience. I support a view known as aesthetic functionalism, which basically 
claims that all art provides the capacity for an aesthetic experience. I claimed, with 
Beardsley, that a necessary condition is the presence of an aesthetic object. This object 
must have the requisite aesthetic properties, of which I maintain that beauty and the 
sublime are the two most important. And I emphasized the role of the beholder, which is 
usually neglected, in the process of attaining an aesthetic experience. 
 Third, in addition to aesthetic experience being the primary function of art, I also 
provided reasons for thinking that aesthetic experience is a basic reason why people act, a 
basic good. I argued that it is a distinct good, since some have tried to place it under the 
heading of knowledge. I presented examples of how people act as reminders that people 
who act for aesthetic experience are better off, all things considered, than those who do 
not. Obviously, some people choose to pursue other goods more than aesthetic 
experience, so there are other factors to consider. 
 Fourth, I have claimed that the justification for the state to support the arts rests in 
the political common good. Appealing to the common good allows the state to support 
those things that lead to human well-being, of which aesthetic experience is one. The 
state exists to create the conditions (particularly justice and peace) that make it possible 
for citizens to pursue those things that lead to their own well-being, i.e. the basic goods. 
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And I have shown how this applies in the practical question about the state funding of the 
arts.
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